Michael Colgan

Super Lawyers® has named six Wilson Elser attorneys to the 2026 Oregon Super Lawyers and Rising Stars™ lists: Super Lawyers Lloyd Bernstein (Partner) – Insurance Coverage Rising Stars Vanessa Aaron (Partner) – PI General: Plaintiff Elizabeth Elkington (Of Counsel) – Transportation/Maritime Dmitry Golosinskiy (Partner) – PI Products: Defense Sean McKean (Associate) – Insurance Coverage Ross Van Ness (Partner) – Business Litigation Super Lawyers, a Thomson Reuters business, is a rating service of outstanding lawyers from more than 70 practice areas who have attained a high degree of peer recognition and professional achievement. The Rising Stars lists, comprising the best attorneys who are 40 and younger or who have practiced law for 10 years or less, are published in Super Lawyers magazines and leading city and regional magazines nationwide. No more than 2.5 percent of the lawyers in the state are named to these lists.

Isaac Netzer (Associate-New York, NY) will again serve as a faculty member for the National Business Institute (NBI) in conjunction with two rebroadcasts of the CLE webinar “Pleadings, Motions, and Briefs: AI Edition,” to be held on August 20, 2026, and October 27, 2026. Back by popular demand, Isaac’s program focuses on the practical use of artificial intelligence in litigation, including AI’s capabilities and limitations, ethical and confidentiality considerations, and real-world applications in drafting pleadings, motions, briefs, and conducting document review. The rebroadcasts of Isaac’s November 2025 NBI presentation will cover topics such as strategic prompt design, identifying AI blind spots, authority validation, and using AI to assess both one’s own filings and opposing counsel’s submissions, with Isaac hosting live Q&A sessions following the rebroadcasts. 

Paul Karp (Partner-New York, NY) and Andrew J. Piñon (Associate- New York, NY) secured the striking of the plaintiff's complaint and a complete dismissal of a catastrophic birth injury case pending in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Kings County. On July 16, 2026, the court adhered to its dismissal on plaintiff's motion to reargue, bringing a decisive end to this long-running matter and terminating the action against every named defendant, including the delivering OB/GYN and the hospital. In this high-stakes case, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants negligently managed her labor and delivery, resulting in her infant daughter sustaining an acute ischemic cerebral injury. The defense team assessed potential exposure in the mid- to high-seven-figure range. This dismissal was years in the making. After the plaintiff repeatedly ignored court-ordered discovery, the defense secured a 2025 preclusion order barring her from offering any evidence, testifying at trial, or submitting an affidavit on the issue of liability, pursuant to CPLR § 3126(2). When the plaintiff's defaults continued, the team pressed forward. In March 2026, the court issued an interim order setting forth, in explicit detail, the outstanding discovery the plaintiff was required to produce by a specified date and directing the parties to submit correspondence to the court thereafter indicating whether that discovery was provided. Critically, the court expressly found that the plaintiff's “willful and contumacious non-compliance is inferred by plaintiff's repeated failure to comply with discovery and motion orders,” cataloging violations of six different discovery orders. Paul and Andrew then made that record decisive by timely submitting a detailed letter documenting that the plaintiff had either failed to provide the court-ordered discovery or, where production was made, that it remained materially deficient. In contrast, the plaintiff failed to submit any documentation demonstrating compliance or responding to Wilson Elser’s submission. The court found that the plaintiff's sustained pattern of noncompliance, together with the meticulously documented discovery deficiencies identified by Paul and Andrew, warranted dismissal. It therefore granted Wilson Elser’s cross-motion, struck the complaint, and dismissed the action in April 2026, with judgment entered thereafter. The plaintiff moved to reargue under CPLR § 2221(d) (the tenth motion filed in this case), contending that the court had overlooked her purported compliance. Paul and Andrew opposed, demonstrating that the dismissal rested on multiple independent grounds: the plaintiff’s repeated failure to comply with court orders; reliance on Wilson Elser’s April 2026 letter documenting the deficient production; and the interim court order express finding of willful and contumacious non-compliance. In July 2026, the court denied reargument and adhered to its dismissal, confirming that a thoroughly documented CPLR § 3126 record can withstand even a determined challenge. This outcome is a testament to the thoroughness and persistence of the Wilson Elser defense team and underscores the importance of methodically documenting discovery deficiencies and creating a robust record in motion papers, which can secure dismissal even in a plaintiff-friendly venue.

Kimberly R. Silas (Of Counsel-New Orleans, LA) will present “Navigating Law School” for the Henry P. Julien, II Law Scholars Program, to be held July 27 ‒ 31, 2026, in New Orleans. Kimberly will return as a speaker for the fifth consecutive year, participating in the week-long program designed to help incoming law students from underrepresented backgrounds build the skills and confidence needed to succeed in law school. Sponsored by The Kullman Firm, Loyola University New Orleans College of Law, Tulane University College of Law, and Dillard University, the program honors Henry P. Julien, II, a civil rights and social justice advocate and the first African American shareholder with The Kullman Firm.

Peter Espey (Of Counsel-Madison, NJ) was quoted extensively in the article “Are Confidentiality Requests on the Rise in NJ? Attorneys Debate What’s at Stake,” appearing in the July 14, 2026, edition of Law.com’s New Jersey Law Journal. The article examines whether confidentiality provisions in settlement agreements are becoming more common in medical malpractice and other civil litigation. It features perspectives from both plaintiff and defense attorneys on the role of confidential settlements, their impact on transparency, and the factors that influence whether parties seek to keep settlement terms private. Peter notes that, in his experience, confidentiality provisions have long been a common part of settlements and that he has not observed a meaningful increase in their use. He also emphasizes that confidential settlements do not undermine public protection because malpractice settlements are reported to the National Practitioner Data Bank and may also be reviewed by state medical boards. "There are lots of defensible cases that can get settled for lots of different reasons," Peter said. "Just because a case settles, most of the agreements say there's no admission of liability ‒ and there's truth to that."

On May 6, 2026, the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously held in Murray v. Punina, 264 N.J. 1, 5 (2026) that future medical expense benefits that do not exceed a claimant's Personal Injury Protection (PIP) coverage limits are "collectible" for purposes of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 and, therefore, inadmissible in a plaintiff's personal injury trial against a tortfeasor. The rule applies equally to PIP benefits obtained through standard auto policies and through the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund (UCJF). Justice Fasciale wrote for the Court, affirming the Appellate Division. The facts of the Murray case are brief. Plaintiff Murray, injured as a passenger in a 2016 collision with an uninsured driver, received PIP benefits through NJPLIGA/UCJF entitling her to US$250,000 in PIP benefits. Her pre-trial medical expenses did not exhaust those limits. Over defendant Marrone's objection, the trial court admitted expert testimony projecting $42,000–$160,000 in future surgical expenses, and the jury awarded $100,000 in future medical damages. The Appellate Division reversed, holding the evidence inadmissible, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court's decision rested on five interlocking lines of reasoning. First, it observed that New Jersey's No-Fault Act was built on a deliberate trade-off: accident victims receive prompt, guaranteed medical expense compensation regardless of fault, in exchange for limits on their right to sue. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 exists specifically to enforce the other side of that bargain—by barring admission of evidence of losses "collectible" under PIP, it prevents plaintiffs from recovering the same medical costs twice (once from guaranteed PIP benefits and again from a tort verdict against the tortfeasor). The Court reasoned that permitting double recovery would undermine the entire cost-control logic of the no-fault system—if plaintiffs can collect the same expenses from both sources, the guaranteed-benefit-in-exchange-for-limited-tort-recovery bargain becomes one-sided. Second, the Court held that N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 applies to UCJF claimants because the UCJF was created to place victims of uninsured drivers in the same position as standard-policy claimants—"equivalent to" and no better than a liability policy. The UCJF statute, N.J.S.A. 39:6-86.1, uses "personal injury protection" as a general term, and every No-Fault Act PIP amendment has been conformingly applied to UCJF benefits—confirming legislative intent that the two schemes operate identically. Reading N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 to not apply to UCJF claimants would hand them a windfall double recovery unavailable to standard-policy holders, contradicting the fund's remedial purpose. Third, the Court carefully parsed the statutory terms. Under longstanding New Jersey case law, “collectible” means an amount a person has a present legal entitlement to receive—regardless of whether payment has been requested or delivered. Because PIP coverage creates an automatic legal right to payment for covered medical expenses up to the policy limit the moment those expenses are incurred, any future expense falling within remaining PIP capacity is already "collectible" as a matter of law. It is "unpaid" only in the sense that the treatment hasn't happened yet, but it is not "uncovered" or beyond the reach of PIP. The Court thus rejected Murray's conflation of "unpaid" with "not collectible," explaining that the two concepts are legally distinct. Fourth, the Court found that the legislative history confirmed the narrow scope of the 2019 amendment. In Haines v. Taft, 237 N.J. 271 (2019), the Court had barred evidence of medical expenses exceeding a plaintiff's lower PIP limits (e.g., $15,000)—leaving those plaintiffs with no source of recovery for excess costs. The legislature's fix, the 2019 amendment, was narrowly targeted: it permits recovery only of expenses that "exceed or are unpaid or uncovered by" PIP limits. The Court reflected that Governor Murphy's signing statement confirmed the amendment's purpose was to help "low-income drivers . . . [with] lesser PIP coverage options" recover costs that exceed their PIP ceilings—not to allow any plaintiff to recover costs the PIP system will eventually cover. The Court reasoned that if the legislature had intended to open the door to within-limits recovery, it would have said so explicitly—instead, the amendment's entire thrust reinforces the "collectible" reading. Finally, the Court identified a concrete policy danger if "unpaid" future expenses within PIP limits could be presented to a jury: plaintiffs would have a financial incentive to defer recommended medical treatment until after trial specifically to inflate their tort verdict—shifting costs the PIP carrier/fund was designed and funded to absorb onto individual defendants. The Court explicitly found this would constitute the precise "double-dipping" and cost-shifting the No-Fault Act was built to eliminate, rewarding gamesmanship over genuine need. This consequentialist reasoning served as an independent justification for the holding. Defense attorneys should, therefore, do three things in the wake of the Murray decision: (1) identify PIP coverage early; (2) serve targeted PIP exhaustion discovery; and (3) move in limine to exclude future medical expense evidence. To identify PIP coverage, counsel should determine plaintiff's PIP source, maximum limit, amounts paid, and remaining balance, as every dollar of remaining capacity is considered inadmissible damages. Serving targeted PIP exhaustion discovery is a must, counsel must demand the PIP declarations/UCJF coverage letter, payment ledger, and confirmation of remaining benefits. Finally, counsel should move in limine to exclude future medical expense evidence and cite Murray and N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 with supporting coverage documentation to preserve the record for appeal. Murray v. Punina provides a bright-line rule grounded in five independent but reinforcing rationales. Defense counsel should incorporate it immediately into standard motion practice in every New Jersey auto personal injury case where PIP benefits remain available.

Denise Motta (Of Counsel-Louisville, KY) and Estee Rose (Associate-Louisville, KY) secured a dismissal with prejudice in a premises liability action brought against a casino by an intoxicated plaintiff who alleged that he was exposed to harsh weather after being removed from the premises and arrested. The plaintiff had previously sued the property owner, but in May 2026 the court granted Denise and Estee's motion to dismiss that claim while permitting the plaintiff to amend the complaint to name the company operating the casino. The court ultimately dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice because the plaintiff had been found guilty of a criminal case and had not alleged intentional misconduct by the casino owner.

Jonathan Meer (Partner-New York, NY) and Angela Sekerka (Of Counsel-Chicago | New York, NY) coauthored “HUD Issues New Guidance on Emotional Support Animals Under the Fair Housing Act,” posted on the July 16, 2026, PLUS Blog. The article discusses the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s new enforcement guidance on assistance animals under the Fair Housing Act, which marks a significant shift by limiting disability-related housing accommodations to trained service animals and eliminating the longstanding presumption that emotional support animals (ESAs) must be accommodated.  Jon and Angela explain that while the guidance "resolves certain threshold questions," it also "leaves several critical issues open for housing providers," including how the new policy interacts with state and local ESA protections laws, whether breed and weight restrictions may once again apply to ESAs, the continued viability of private lawsuits, and the differing standards that remain under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The authors also examine the legal ramifications of the policy change, noting that "the practical implications for housing providers... cannot be overstated," making it essential for housing providers to understand what has changed ‒ and what hasn't.

Sarah Fink (Of Counsel-Long Island, NY) authored “Supreme Court Merges Two Types of Contributory IP Infringement into One,” appearing in the July 16, 2026, posting of Westlaw Today. The article examines two recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions ‒ Cox Communications v. Sony Music Entertainment and Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma ‒ that significantly impact the landscape of secondary copyright and patent infringement. In analyzing the decisions, Sarah explains how the court narrowed the scope of contributory liability by emphasizing that secondary infringement requires specific intent to encourage infringement. She notes, "The Cox holding is that contributory infringement cannot rest merely on providing a product capable of infringement; rather, liability depends on affirmative encouragement of infringing uses." She concludes that these decisions are likely to limit secondary IP liability in many contexts by reinforcing that intent ‒ not mere capability ‒is the touchstone of contributory infringement.

Maryan Alexander (Partner-Baltimore, MD) will present the webinar “Litigation Management 101” as part of CLM’s 2026 Insurance 101 Webinar Series, Building a Strong Foundation in Insurance Fundamentals, to be held on July 29, 2026. Maryan’s session provides a high-level overview of the litigation process and the claims professional’s role in managing outside counsel, budgets, and case strategy. Participants will gain insight into key litigation milestones, reporting expectations, and effective collaboration with defense counsel. Ideal for those newer to litigation oversight, this session emphasizes proactive management practices that support strong outcomes and cost control.

Paul Karp (Partner-New York, NY) and Andrew J. Piñon (Associate- New York, NY) secured the striking of the plaintiff's complaint and a complete dismissal of a catastrophic birth injury case pending in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Kings County. On July 16, 2026, the court adhered to its dismissal on plaintiff's motion to reargue, bringing a decisive end to this long-running matter and terminating the action against every named defendant, including the delivering OB/GYN and the hospital. In this high-stakes case, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants negligently managed her labor and delivery, resulting in her infant daughter sustaining an acute ischemic cerebral injury. The defense team assessed potential exposure in the mid- to high-seven-figure range. This dismissal was years in the making. After the plaintiff repeatedly ignored court-ordered discovery, the defense secured a 2025 preclusion order barring her from offering any evidence, testifying at trial, or submitting an affidavit on the issue of liability, pursuant to CPLR § 3126(2). When the plaintiff's defaults continued, the team pressed forward. In March 2026, the court issued an interim order setting forth, in explicit detail, the outstanding discovery the plaintiff was required to produce by a specified date and directing the parties to submit correspondence to the court thereafter indicating whether that discovery was provided. Critically, the court expressly found that the plaintiff's “willful and contumacious non-compliance is inferred by plaintiff's repeated failure to comply with discovery and motion orders,” cataloging violations of six different discovery orders. Paul and Andrew then made that record decisive by timely submitting a detailed letter documenting that the plaintiff had either failed to provide the court-ordered discovery or, where production was made, that it remained materially deficient. In contrast, the plaintiff failed to submit any documentation demonstrating compliance or responding to Wilson Elser’s submission. The court found that the plaintiff's sustained pattern of noncompliance, together with the meticulously documented discovery deficiencies identified by Paul and Andrew, warranted dismissal. It therefore granted Wilson Elser’s cross-motion, struck the complaint, and dismissed the action in April 2026, with judgment entered thereafter. The plaintiff moved to reargue under CPLR § 2221(d) (the tenth motion filed in this case), contending that the court had overlooked her purported compliance. Paul and Andrew opposed, demonstrating that the dismissal rested on multiple independent grounds: the plaintiff’s repeated failure to comply with court orders; reliance on Wilson Elser’s April 2026 letter documenting the deficient production; and the interim court order express finding of willful and contumacious non-compliance. In July 2026, the court denied reargument and adhered to its dismissal, confirming that a thoroughly documented CPLR § 3126 record can withstand even a determined challenge. This outcome is a testament to the thoroughness and persistence of the Wilson Elser defense team and underscores the importance of methodically documenting discovery deficiencies and creating a robust record in motion papers, which can secure dismissal even in a plaintiff-friendly venue.

Isaac Netzer (Associate-New York, NY) will again serve as a faculty member for the National Business Institute (NBI) in conjunction with two rebroadcasts of the CLE webinar “Pleadings, Motions, and Briefs: AI Edition,” to be held on August 20, 2026, and October 27, 2026. Back by popular demand, Isaac’s program focuses on the practical use of artificial intelligence in litigation, including AI’s capabilities and limitations, ethical and confidentiality considerations, and real-world applications in drafting pleadings, motions, briefs, and conducting document review. The rebroadcasts of Isaac’s November 2025 NBI presentation will cover topics such as strategic prompt design, identifying AI blind spots, authority validation, and using AI to assess both one’s own filings and opposing counsel’s submissions, with Isaac hosting live Q&A sessions following the rebroadcasts. 

Super Lawyers® has named six Wilson Elser attorneys to the 2026 Oregon Super Lawyers and Rising Stars™ lists: Super Lawyers Lloyd Bernstein (Partner) – Insurance Coverage Rising Stars Vanessa Aaron (Partner) – PI General: Plaintiff Elizabeth Elkington (Of Counsel) – Transportation/Maritime Dmitry Golosinskiy (Partner) – PI Products: Defense Sean McKean (Associate) – Insurance Coverage Ross Van Ness (Partner) – Business Litigation Super Lawyers, a Thomson Reuters business, is a rating service of outstanding lawyers from more than 70 practice areas who have attained a high degree of peer recognition and professional achievement. The Rising Stars lists, comprising the best attorneys who are 40 and younger or who have practiced law for 10 years or less, are published in Super Lawyers magazines and leading city and regional magazines nationwide. No more than 2.5 percent of the lawyers in the state are named to these lists.

Kimberly R. Silas (Of Counsel-New Orleans, LA) will present “Navigating Law School” for the Henry P. Julien, II Law Scholars Program, to be held July 27 ‒ 31, 2026, in New Orleans. Kimberly will return as a speaker for the fifth consecutive year, participating in the week-long program designed to help incoming law students from underrepresented backgrounds build the skills and confidence needed to succeed in law school. Sponsored by The Kullman Firm, Loyola University New Orleans College of Law, Tulane University College of Law, and Dillard University, the program honors Henry P. Julien, II, a civil rights and social justice advocate and the first African American shareholder with The Kullman Firm.

Peter Espey (Of Counsel-Madison, NJ) was quoted extensively in the article “Are Confidentiality Requests on the Rise in NJ? Attorneys Debate What’s at Stake,” appearing in the July 14, 2026, edition of Law.com’s New Jersey Law Journal. The article examines whether confidentiality provisions in settlement agreements are becoming more common in medical malpractice and other civil litigation. It features perspectives from both plaintiff and defense attorneys on the role of confidential settlements, their impact on transparency, and the factors that influence whether parties seek to keep settlement terms private. Peter notes that, in his experience, confidentiality provisions have long been a common part of settlements and that he has not observed a meaningful increase in their use. He also emphasizes that confidential settlements do not undermine public protection because malpractice settlements are reported to the National Practitioner Data Bank and may also be reviewed by state medical boards. "There are lots of defensible cases that can get settled for lots of different reasons," Peter said. "Just because a case settles, most of the agreements say there's no admission of liability ‒ and there's truth to that."

On May 6, 2026, the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously held in Murray v. Punina, 264 N.J. 1, 5 (2026) that future medical expense benefits that do not exceed a claimant's Personal Injury Protection (PIP) coverage limits are "collectible" for purposes of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 and, therefore, inadmissible in a plaintiff's personal injury trial against a tortfeasor. The rule applies equally to PIP benefits obtained through standard auto policies and through the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund (UCJF). Justice Fasciale wrote for the Court, affirming the Appellate Division. The facts of the Murray case are brief. Plaintiff Murray, injured as a passenger in a 2016 collision with an uninsured driver, received PIP benefits through NJPLIGA/UCJF entitling her to US$250,000 in PIP benefits. Her pre-trial medical expenses did not exhaust those limits. Over defendant Marrone's objection, the trial court admitted expert testimony projecting $42,000–$160,000 in future surgical expenses, and the jury awarded $100,000 in future medical damages. The Appellate Division reversed, holding the evidence inadmissible, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court's decision rested on five interlocking lines of reasoning. First, it observed that New Jersey's No-Fault Act was built on a deliberate trade-off: accident victims receive prompt, guaranteed medical expense compensation regardless of fault, in exchange for limits on their right to sue. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 exists specifically to enforce the other side of that bargain—by barring admission of evidence of losses "collectible" under PIP, it prevents plaintiffs from recovering the same medical costs twice (once from guaranteed PIP benefits and again from a tort verdict against the tortfeasor). The Court reasoned that permitting double recovery would undermine the entire cost-control logic of the no-fault system—if plaintiffs can collect the same expenses from both sources, the guaranteed-benefit-in-exchange-for-limited-tort-recovery bargain becomes one-sided. Second, the Court held that N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 applies to UCJF claimants because the UCJF was created to place victims of uninsured drivers in the same position as standard-policy claimants—"equivalent to" and no better than a liability policy. The UCJF statute, N.J.S.A. 39:6-86.1, uses "personal injury protection" as a general term, and every No-Fault Act PIP amendment has been conformingly applied to UCJF benefits—confirming legislative intent that the two schemes operate identically. Reading N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 to not apply to UCJF claimants would hand them a windfall double recovery unavailable to standard-policy holders, contradicting the fund's remedial purpose. Third, the Court carefully parsed the statutory terms. Under longstanding New Jersey case law, “collectible” means an amount a person has a present legal entitlement to receive—regardless of whether payment has been requested or delivered. Because PIP coverage creates an automatic legal right to payment for covered medical expenses up to the policy limit the moment those expenses are incurred, any future expense falling within remaining PIP capacity is already "collectible" as a matter of law. It is "unpaid" only in the sense that the treatment hasn't happened yet, but it is not "uncovered" or beyond the reach of PIP. The Court thus rejected Murray's conflation of "unpaid" with "not collectible," explaining that the two concepts are legally distinct. Fourth, the Court found that the legislative history confirmed the narrow scope of the 2019 amendment. In Haines v. Taft, 237 N.J. 271 (2019), the Court had barred evidence of medical expenses exceeding a plaintiff's lower PIP limits (e.g., $15,000)—leaving those plaintiffs with no source of recovery for excess costs. The legislature's fix, the 2019 amendment, was narrowly targeted: it permits recovery only of expenses that "exceed or are unpaid or uncovered by" PIP limits. The Court reflected that Governor Murphy's signing statement confirmed the amendment's purpose was to help "low-income drivers . . . [with] lesser PIP coverage options" recover costs that exceed their PIP ceilings—not to allow any plaintiff to recover costs the PIP system will eventually cover. The Court reasoned that if the legislature had intended to open the door to within-limits recovery, it would have said so explicitly—instead, the amendment's entire thrust reinforces the "collectible" reading. Finally, the Court identified a concrete policy danger if "unpaid" future expenses within PIP limits could be presented to a jury: plaintiffs would have a financial incentive to defer recommended medical treatment until after trial specifically to inflate their tort verdict—shifting costs the PIP carrier/fund was designed and funded to absorb onto individual defendants. The Court explicitly found this would constitute the precise "double-dipping" and cost-shifting the No-Fault Act was built to eliminate, rewarding gamesmanship over genuine need. This consequentialist reasoning served as an independent justification for the holding. Defense attorneys should, therefore, do three things in the wake of the Murray decision: (1) identify PIP coverage early; (2) serve targeted PIP exhaustion discovery; and (3) move in limine to exclude future medical expense evidence. To identify PIP coverage, counsel should determine plaintiff's PIP source, maximum limit, amounts paid, and remaining balance, as every dollar of remaining capacity is considered inadmissible damages. Serving targeted PIP exhaustion discovery is a must, counsel must demand the PIP declarations/UCJF coverage letter, payment ledger, and confirmation of remaining benefits. Finally, counsel should move in limine to exclude future medical expense evidence and cite Murray and N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 with supporting coverage documentation to preserve the record for appeal. Murray v. Punina provides a bright-line rule grounded in five independent but reinforcing rationales. Defense counsel should incorporate it immediately into standard motion practice in every New Jersey auto personal injury case where PIP benefits remain available.

Denise Motta (Of Counsel-Louisville, KY) and Estee Rose (Associate-Louisville, KY) secured a dismissal with prejudice in a premises liability action brought against a casino by an intoxicated plaintiff who alleged that he was exposed to harsh weather after being removed from the premises and arrested. The plaintiff had previously sued the property owner, but in May 2026 the court granted Denise and Estee's motion to dismiss that claim while permitting the plaintiff to amend the complaint to name the company operating the casino. The court ultimately dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice because the plaintiff had been found guilty of a criminal case and had not alleged intentional misconduct by the casino owner.

Jonathan Meer (Partner-New York, NY) and Angela Sekerka (Of Counsel-Chicago | New York, NY) coauthored “HUD Issues New Guidance on Emotional Support Animals Under the Fair Housing Act,” posted on the July 16, 2026, PLUS Blog. The article discusses the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s new enforcement guidance on assistance animals under the Fair Housing Act, which marks a significant shift by limiting disability-related housing accommodations to trained service animals and eliminating the longstanding presumption that emotional support animals (ESAs) must be accommodated.  Jon and Angela explain that while the guidance "resolves certain threshold questions," it also "leaves several critical issues open for housing providers," including how the new policy interacts with state and local ESA protections laws, whether breed and weight restrictions may once again apply to ESAs, the continued viability of private lawsuits, and the differing standards that remain under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The authors also examine the legal ramifications of the policy change, noting that "the practical implications for housing providers... cannot be overstated," making it essential for housing providers to understand what has changed ‒ and what hasn't.

Sarah Fink (Of Counsel-Long Island, NY) authored “Supreme Court Merges Two Types of Contributory IP Infringement into One,” appearing in the July 16, 2026, posting of Westlaw Today. The article examines two recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions ‒ Cox Communications v. Sony Music Entertainment and Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma ‒ that significantly impact the landscape of secondary copyright and patent infringement. In analyzing the decisions, Sarah explains how the court narrowed the scope of contributory liability by emphasizing that secondary infringement requires specific intent to encourage infringement. She notes, "The Cox holding is that contributory infringement cannot rest merely on providing a product capable of infringement; rather, liability depends on affirmative encouragement of infringing uses." She concludes that these decisions are likely to limit secondary IP liability in many contexts by reinforcing that intent ‒ not mere capability ‒is the touchstone of contributory infringement.

Maryan Alexander (Partner-Baltimore, MD) will present the webinar “Litigation Management 101” as part of CLM’s 2026 Insurance 101 Webinar Series, Building a Strong Foundation in Insurance Fundamentals, to be held on July 29, 2026. Maryan’s session provides a high-level overview of the litigation process and the claims professional’s role in managing outside counsel, budgets, and case strategy. Participants will gain insight into key litigation milestones, reporting expectations, and effective collaboration with defense counsel. Ideal for those newer to litigation oversight, this session emphasizes proactive management practices that support strong outcomes and cost control.

Paul Karp (Partner-New York, NY) and Andrew J. Piñon (Associate- New York, NY) secured the striking of the plaintiff's complaint and a complete dismissal of a catastrophic birth injury case pending in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Kings County. On July 16, 2026, the court adhered to its dismissal on plaintiff's motion to reargue, bringing a decisive end to this long-running matter and terminating the action against every named defendant, including the delivering OB/GYN and the hospital. In this high-stakes case, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants negligently managed her labor and delivery, resulting in her infant daughter sustaining an acute ischemic cerebral injury. The defense team assessed potential exposure in the mid- to high-seven-figure range. This dismissal was years in the making. After the plaintiff repeatedly ignored court-ordered discovery, the defense secured a 2025 preclusion order barring her from offering any evidence, testifying at trial, or submitting an affidavit on the issue of liability, pursuant to CPLR § 3126(2). When the plaintiff's defaults continued, the team pressed forward. In March 2026, the court issued an interim order setting forth, in explicit detail, the outstanding discovery the plaintiff was required to produce by a specified date and directing the parties to submit correspondence to the court thereafter indicating whether that discovery was provided. Critically, the court expressly found that the plaintiff's “willful and contumacious non-compliance is inferred by plaintiff's repeated failure to comply with discovery and motion orders,” cataloging violations of six different discovery orders. Paul and Andrew then made that record decisive by timely submitting a detailed letter documenting that the plaintiff had either failed to provide the court-ordered discovery or, where production was made, that it remained materially deficient. In contrast, the plaintiff failed to submit any documentation demonstrating compliance or responding to Wilson Elser’s submission. The court found that the plaintiff's sustained pattern of noncompliance, together with the meticulously documented discovery deficiencies identified by Paul and Andrew, warranted dismissal. It therefore granted Wilson Elser’s cross-motion, struck the complaint, and dismissed the action in April 2026, with judgment entered thereafter. The plaintiff moved to reargue under CPLR § 2221(d) (the tenth motion filed in this case), contending that the court had overlooked her purported compliance. Paul and Andrew opposed, demonstrating that the dismissal rested on multiple independent grounds: the plaintiff’s repeated failure to comply with court orders; reliance on Wilson Elser’s April 2026 letter documenting the deficient production; and the interim court order express finding of willful and contumacious non-compliance. In July 2026, the court denied reargument and adhered to its dismissal, confirming that a thoroughly documented CPLR § 3126 record can withstand even a determined challenge. This outcome is a testament to the thoroughness and persistence of the Wilson Elser defense team and underscores the importance of methodically documenting discovery deficiencies and creating a robust record in motion papers, which can secure dismissal even in a plaintiff-friendly venue.

Isaac Netzer (Associate-New York, NY) will again serve as a faculty member for the National Business Institute (NBI) in conjunction with two rebroadcasts of the CLE webinar “Pleadings, Motions, and Briefs: AI Edition,” to be held on August 20, 2026, and October 27, 2026. Back by popular demand, Isaac’s program focuses on the practical use of artificial intelligence in litigation, including AI’s capabilities and limitations, ethical and confidentiality considerations, and real-world applications in drafting pleadings, motions, briefs, and conducting document review. The rebroadcasts of Isaac’s November 2025 NBI presentation will cover topics such as strategic prompt design, identifying AI blind spots, authority validation, and using AI to assess both one’s own filings and opposing counsel’s submissions, with Isaac hosting live Q&A sessions following the rebroadcasts. 

Super Lawyers® has named six Wilson Elser attorneys to the 2026 Oregon Super Lawyers and Rising Stars™ lists: Super Lawyers Lloyd Bernstein (Partner) – Insurance Coverage Rising Stars Vanessa Aaron (Partner) – PI General: Plaintiff Elizabeth Elkington (Of Counsel) – Transportation/Maritime Dmitry Golosinskiy (Partner) – PI Products: Defense Sean McKean (Associate) – Insurance Coverage Ross Van Ness (Partner) – Business Litigation Super Lawyers, a Thomson Reuters business, is a rating service of outstanding lawyers from more than 70 practice areas who have attained a high degree of peer recognition and professional achievement. The Rising Stars lists, comprising the best attorneys who are 40 and younger or who have practiced law for 10 years or less, are published in Super Lawyers magazines and leading city and regional magazines nationwide. No more than 2.5 percent of the lawyers in the state are named to these lists.

Kimberly R. Silas (Of Counsel-New Orleans, LA) will present “Navigating Law School” for the Henry P. Julien, II Law Scholars Program, to be held July 27 ‒ 31, 2026, in New Orleans. Kimberly will return as a speaker for the fifth consecutive year, participating in the week-long program designed to help incoming law students from underrepresented backgrounds build the skills and confidence needed to succeed in law school. Sponsored by The Kullman Firm, Loyola University New Orleans College of Law, Tulane University College of Law, and Dillard University, the program honors Henry P. Julien, II, a civil rights and social justice advocate and the first African American shareholder with The Kullman Firm.

Peter Espey (Of Counsel-Madison, NJ) was quoted extensively in the article “Are Confidentiality Requests on the Rise in NJ? Attorneys Debate What’s at Stake,” appearing in the July 14, 2026, edition of Law.com’s New Jersey Law Journal. The article examines whether confidentiality provisions in settlement agreements are becoming more common in medical malpractice and other civil litigation. It features perspectives from both plaintiff and defense attorneys on the role of confidential settlements, their impact on transparency, and the factors that influence whether parties seek to keep settlement terms private. Peter notes that, in his experience, confidentiality provisions have long been a common part of settlements and that he has not observed a meaningful increase in their use. He also emphasizes that confidential settlements do not undermine public protection because malpractice settlements are reported to the National Practitioner Data Bank and may also be reviewed by state medical boards. "There are lots of defensible cases that can get settled for lots of different reasons," Peter said. "Just because a case settles, most of the agreements say there's no admission of liability ‒ and there's truth to that."

On May 6, 2026, the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously held in Murray v. Punina, 264 N.J. 1, 5 (2026) that future medical expense benefits that do not exceed a claimant's Personal Injury Protection (PIP) coverage limits are "collectible" for purposes of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 and, therefore, inadmissible in a plaintiff's personal injury trial against a tortfeasor. The rule applies equally to PIP benefits obtained through standard auto policies and through the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund (UCJF). Justice Fasciale wrote for the Court, affirming the Appellate Division. The facts of the Murray case are brief. Plaintiff Murray, injured as a passenger in a 2016 collision with an uninsured driver, received PIP benefits through NJPLIGA/UCJF entitling her to US$250,000 in PIP benefits. Her pre-trial medical expenses did not exhaust those limits. Over defendant Marrone's objection, the trial court admitted expert testimony projecting $42,000–$160,000 in future surgical expenses, and the jury awarded $100,000 in future medical damages. The Appellate Division reversed, holding the evidence inadmissible, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court's decision rested on five interlocking lines of reasoning. First, it observed that New Jersey's No-Fault Act was built on a deliberate trade-off: accident victims receive prompt, guaranteed medical expense compensation regardless of fault, in exchange for limits on their right to sue. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 exists specifically to enforce the other side of that bargain—by barring admission of evidence of losses "collectible" under PIP, it prevents plaintiffs from recovering the same medical costs twice (once from guaranteed PIP benefits and again from a tort verdict against the tortfeasor). The Court reasoned that permitting double recovery would undermine the entire cost-control logic of the no-fault system—if plaintiffs can collect the same expenses from both sources, the guaranteed-benefit-in-exchange-for-limited-tort-recovery bargain becomes one-sided. Second, the Court held that N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 applies to UCJF claimants because the UCJF was created to place victims of uninsured drivers in the same position as standard-policy claimants—"equivalent to" and no better than a liability policy. The UCJF statute, N.J.S.A. 39:6-86.1, uses "personal injury protection" as a general term, and every No-Fault Act PIP amendment has been conformingly applied to UCJF benefits—confirming legislative intent that the two schemes operate identically. Reading N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 to not apply to UCJF claimants would hand them a windfall double recovery unavailable to standard-policy holders, contradicting the fund's remedial purpose. Third, the Court carefully parsed the statutory terms. Under longstanding New Jersey case law, “collectible” means an amount a person has a present legal entitlement to receive—regardless of whether payment has been requested or delivered. Because PIP coverage creates an automatic legal right to payment for covered medical expenses up to the policy limit the moment those expenses are incurred, any future expense falling within remaining PIP capacity is already "collectible" as a matter of law. It is "unpaid" only in the sense that the treatment hasn't happened yet, but it is not "uncovered" or beyond the reach of PIP. The Court thus rejected Murray's conflation of "unpaid" with "not collectible," explaining that the two concepts are legally distinct. Fourth, the Court found that the legislative history confirmed the narrow scope of the 2019 amendment. In Haines v. Taft, 237 N.J. 271 (2019), the Court had barred evidence of medical expenses exceeding a plaintiff's lower PIP limits (e.g., $15,000)—leaving those plaintiffs with no source of recovery for excess costs. The legislature's fix, the 2019 amendment, was narrowly targeted: it permits recovery only of expenses that "exceed or are unpaid or uncovered by" PIP limits. The Court reflected that Governor Murphy's signing statement confirmed the amendment's purpose was to help "low-income drivers . . . [with] lesser PIP coverage options" recover costs that exceed their PIP ceilings—not to allow any plaintiff to recover costs the PIP system will eventually cover. The Court reasoned that if the legislature had intended to open the door to within-limits recovery, it would have said so explicitly—instead, the amendment's entire thrust reinforces the "collectible" reading. Finally, the Court identified a concrete policy danger if "unpaid" future expenses within PIP limits could be presented to a jury: plaintiffs would have a financial incentive to defer recommended medical treatment until after trial specifically to inflate their tort verdict—shifting costs the PIP carrier/fund was designed and funded to absorb onto individual defendants. The Court explicitly found this would constitute the precise "double-dipping" and cost-shifting the No-Fault Act was built to eliminate, rewarding gamesmanship over genuine need. This consequentialist reasoning served as an independent justification for the holding. Defense attorneys should, therefore, do three things in the wake of the Murray decision: (1) identify PIP coverage early; (2) serve targeted PIP exhaustion discovery; and (3) move in limine to exclude future medical expense evidence. To identify PIP coverage, counsel should determine plaintiff's PIP source, maximum limit, amounts paid, and remaining balance, as every dollar of remaining capacity is considered inadmissible damages. Serving targeted PIP exhaustion discovery is a must, counsel must demand the PIP declarations/UCJF coverage letter, payment ledger, and confirmation of remaining benefits. Finally, counsel should move in limine to exclude future medical expense evidence and cite Murray and N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 with supporting coverage documentation to preserve the record for appeal. Murray v. Punina provides a bright-line rule grounded in five independent but reinforcing rationales. Defense counsel should incorporate it immediately into standard motion practice in every New Jersey auto personal injury case where PIP benefits remain available.