Robin N. Gregory

White Plains, New York, partners Michael Grady and Siobhainin Funchion obtained a defense verdict following a four-week jury trial in the New York Supreme Court, Westchester County, on behalf of their obstetrician client. The plaintiff alleged that the client improperly managed her pregnancy by failing to timely deliver an infant with intrauterine growth restriction (IUGR). In her malpractice claim, the plaintiff maintained that the delay in delivery resulted in placental insufficiency and fetal hypoxia, causing hypotonia, failure to thrive, and permanent physical, cognitive, and developmental impairments. Mike and Siobhan successfully argued that the obstetrician's management of the pregnancy complied with the applicable standard of care. Relying on the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) guidelines, they demonstrated that, in cases of isolated IUGR with normal fetal testing, delivery between 38 and 39 weeks is appropriate. The evidence established that the infant was delivered within that recommended timeframe.   Working alongside counsel for the co-defendant maternal-fetal medicine physician, Mike and Siobhan further argued that the infant’s condition was attributable to a rare genetic microdeletion that was diagnosed the year following delivery, rather than any alleged delay in delivery. The trial featured testimony from 14 witnesses, including 10 expert witnesses in the fields of obstetrics, maternal-fetal medicine, neonatology, pediatric neurology, genetics, physical medicine/rehabilitation, and economics. During closing arguments, plaintiff’s counsel sought damages ranging from $26 million to $36 million. The jury returned a defense verdict in just 23 minutes.

Kimberly Blair (Partner-Chicago, IL), Peter Catalanotti (Partner-San Francisco), Joseph Francoeur (Partner-New York, NY), and Alexandra Skarka (Associate-Philadelphia, PA) will present the Wilson Elser Forum webinar “Scope of Services: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives for Claims Professionals” on June 8, 2026. The session provides a cross-disciplinary overview of how scope of services issues arise across design and construction, legal, brokerage, and real estate professions. Presenters will address how engagement agreements define and limit the scope of professional services, the risks of scope creep and undocumented service expansion, defenses available based on scope limitations, and evidentiary sources and trial strategies for scope disputes. Also covered are deposition tactics specific to scope of services claims, underwriting red flags and claims investigation best practices, third-party liability exposure when non-clients rely on an insured’s work product, and potential subrogation opportunities.

A prior analysis examined the Virginia legislature’s rejection of a sweeping proposal to overhaul the state’s medical malpractice damages cap. That proposal would have doubled the cap from $3 million to $6 million, allowed prejudgment interest, expanded the statute of limitations, and imposed new insurance requirements on nursing homes. Instead, the legislature passed a narrower, reconciled version of Senate Bill 536 that left the existing damages cap schedule under Virginia Code § 8.01-581.15 untouched but created a new reporting framework requiring commercial insurers and self-insured hospitals to disclose detailed malpractice claims data to legislative leaders. At the time of publication, the reconciled bill had been sent to Governor Spanberger, who had until April 13 to sign, veto, or propose amendments.  Rather than sign or veto the reconciled bill, Governor Spanberger returned it to the legislature on April 12, 2026, with a set of proposed amendments that reshaped several key aspects of the reporting framework. On April 22, the amended reconciled bill was enacted, with an effective date of July 1, 2026. Bottom Line for Virginia Healthcare Entities The medical malpractice damages cap remains unchanged, but a new reporting law takes effect on July 1, 2026, with an initial disclosure deadline of October 1, 2026. The governor’s amendments broadened who must report, redirected all disclosures through the Bureau of Insurance (the “Bureau”), strengthened confidentiality protections, and eliminated the most sensitive reporting metric. However, it also expanded the scope of the law beyond hospitals to reach a wider range of healthcare entities.  Key Changes Under the Enacted Law Expanded Scope of Reporting Entities Unlike the original bill that applied to only hospitals or health systems licensed under Virginia Code § 32.1-123 that self insure or maintain retained-risk arrangements, the enacted law applies to every “medical care facility, as defined in § 32.1-3, or other health care provider” that maintains self insurance, captive insurance, risk retention arrangements, or other retained financial risk. As a result, Virginia healthcare entities that did not consider themselves subject to the original bill should assess whether they now fall within the enacted law’s broader reach. Elimination of the Revenue-Percentage Metric The original bill required self-insured hospitals to disclose total malpractice liability expenditures expressed as a percentage of the hospital’s total patient service revenue. The enacted law eliminates this requirement, leaving three categories of disclosure: (1) the number of covered physicians and providers, (2) claims activity, and (3) malpractice expenditures. This is a meaningful change. The revenue-percentage metric would have provided a uniquely revealing window into each hospital’s financial exposure relative to its operations. Anti-Duplication Provision The enacted law adds a practical provision to prevent duplicative reporting: a healthcare provider is not required to report information that has already been included in a report submitted by the entity providing its self insurance, captive insurance, or risk retention coverage. In other words, if a hospital system’s captive insurer files the required disclosures, individual hospitals covered by that program need not file separate, duplicative reports. Hospitals should confirm with their insurers or risk retention groups whether coverage-level reporting will satisfy their individual obligations. New Insurer Disclosure Requirement For commercial insurers, the enacted law adds a requirement not found in the original bill: insurers must now disclose the identity of the named insureds under their medical malpractice policies. Hospitals insured by commercial carriers should be aware that their identity as a named insured will be part of the insurer’s disclosure to the Bureau. Centralization Through the Bureau of Insurance Perhaps the most structurally significant change involves where disclosures are submitted and how they are processed. The original bill directed all reporting to the chairs and ranking minority members of the House and Senate Committees for Courts of Justice, with the Clerks of each chamber making the information publicly available on the General Assembly’s website. The enacted law redirects this entire process through the State Corporation Commission’s Bureau. Disclosures must now be submitted to the Bureau in a uniform format that it prescribes that is consistent with the format of claim-reporting requirements already established under Virginia Code § 38.2-2228.2. The Bureau is responsible for compiling and analyzing the data, preparing an aggregate summary report, and submitting that report to the legislative committee leaders. Importantly, the Bureau’s aggregate report (not the raw disclosures) is what will be made publicly available on the General Assembly’s website. This is a significant structural improvement and reduces the risk of raw data being taken out of context or used selectively in public debate. Comparison by Size, Region, and Facility Type The enacted law directs the Bureau to present data, to the extent practicable, “in a manner that allows comparison among healthcare providers by size, region, or type of facility,” using anonymized or de-identified formats. While the law prohibits identifying any individual provider, hospitals should be aware that comparisons by size, region, or facility type could narrow the field enough to make identification possible as a practical matter. This provision warrants careful attention when preparing disclosures. Strengthened Confidentiality Protections The original bill stated broadly that disclosures would be confidential and exempt from the Virginia Freedom of Information Act except in aggregate form. The enacted law replaces this with a more detailed and protective mechanism. Reporting entities may designate specific data as confidential proprietary information upon submission, provided they: (i) invoke the exclusion in writing, (ii) identify the protected material, and (iii) state the reason protection is necessary. Information properly designated as confidential will be protected from subpoena responses and public inspection. Officer Certification Requirement Disclosures must be “certified as accurate and complete by an officer of the reporting entity.” This places personal responsibility on a hospital officer for the accuracy of the filing.  Extended Initial Deadline The original bill set the first disclosure deadline as September 1, 2026. The enacted law extends this to October 1, 2026. Subsequent annual disclosures remain due on or before March 31 of each year for the preceding calendar year. Verdicts Exceeding the Cap Both the original and enacted versions require all reporting entities to submit a list of verdicts exceeding the statutory cap. Each entry must include the verdict amount, the amount recoverable after application of the cap, and the year the cause of action accrued. No personally-identifiable information may be disclosed. This provision is clearly designed to build a public record demonstrating the gap between what juries award and what plaintiffs can recover. Automatic Sunset Both versions contain the same expiration mechanism: the reporting requirements expire upon the effective date of any future legislation establishing a new limitation on recovery for medical malpractice actions. This confirms the legislative intent that the reporting framework is a temporary, data-gathering tool designed to inform future changes to the cap. Strategic Implications Virginia’s medical malpractice damages cap is intact but is under active review, and the data collected under this new law will fuel the next round of legislative efforts to increase it. With the October 1, 2026 initial deadline approaching, Virginia hospitals and healthcare entities should consider taking the following steps: 1) determine whether an institution falls within the enacted law’s expanded definition of “medical care facility” or “other healthcare provider;” 2) coordinate the production of the required materials with insurers or risk retention groups; 3) compile the necessary information for disclosure; 4) identify and designate confidential proprietary information; 5) designate a certifying officer; 6) monitor the Bureau’s prescribed format; and 7) prepare for future debates on raising the medical malpractice damages cap.

Chris Richardson (Partner-Las Vegas, NV) secured summary judgment in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Las Vegas, on behalf of Wilson Elser’s insurance broker client. The plaintiff, a security guard firm with armed and unarmed personnel, hired our client and its agent in August 2021 to obtain general liability and premises liability insurance in connection with the plaintiff's licensure with the State of Nevada Private Investigators Licensing Board. Prior to obtaining the policy, our client sent the plaintiff an email notifying him of the receipt of a proposal for General Liability coverage from an insurance carrier and providing information regarding the premium amount and coverage limits. The policy was bound and then renewed for the following year. Each policy contained an Assault and Battery Exclusion under endorsement which provided: "This insurance does not apply to any claim or 'suit' for 'bodily injury,' 'property damage' or 'personal and advertising injury' arising out of, related to, or, in any way involving any actual or alleged assault, battery, harmful or offensive contact, or threat, whether provoked or unprovoked." This exclusion was expressly listed in the quote documents and the issued policy’s schedule of forms, ensuring the insured had notice of the exclusion. The assault and battery exclusion was also discussed during the policy placement process, during the 2022 renewal, and in email communications. Following the second renewal, the plaintiff’s security guard shot a third party. The victim sued the plaintiff, but the plaintiff’s insurer disclaimed coverage for the lawsuit based on the policy’s assault and battery exclusion. The plaintiff ultimately entered a stipulated judgment with the victim in the amount of $500,000.   The plaintiff subsequently filed suit against our client, asserting: (1) breach of contract; (2) deceptive trade practices under NRS 598.0923; (3) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (4) fraudulent misrepresentation; and (5) negligence. All claims were premised on the allegation that our client failed to disclose the policy’s assault and battery exclusion before binding coverage. Chris moved for summary judgment, arguing that the undisputed documentary evidence established plaintiff’s actual or constructive notice of the exclusion as a matter of law. Specifically, the evidence showed that the plaintiff received the policy containing the clearly stated exclusion; the exclusion was expressly identified in the quote documents and policy schedule of forms; Nevada law imposes a duty on insureds to understand their policy terms; and the plaintiff acknowledged and accepted those terms, including during the 2022 renewal process when the exclusion was again prominently disclosed. Based on these undisputed facts, the court granted summary judgment in our client's favor on all claims.

J. Peter Greco (Partner-Orlando, FL) has been appointed by the president-elect of the Florida Bar to serve on the Aviation Law Committee, with his term commencing July 1, 2026. The Aviation Law Committee monitors and analyzes recent developments in aviation law, including legislative and regulatory matters, and keeps bar members informed of significant developments in the field. The committee also maintains liaisons with agencies and various local, state, and federal government authorities involved in aerospace matters, and reviews legislation, regulations, and related policy issues. A significant portion of Pete’s practice focuses on complex aviation litigation. Prior to his legal career, he worked in airfield operations at several commercial service airports, including Orlando (MCO), where he was responsible for safety, security, and regulatory compliance of one of the nation’s busiest airports. Pete is an instrument-rated private pilot and a graduate of Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University; his practical aviation background and industry experience make him a valuable addition to the Aviation Law Committee.

Nevada’s Supreme Court decided in Powers v. Dist. Ct. that NRS 629.620 violated Nevada’s separation of powers and is unconstitutional. This has immediate implications for clients defending traumatic brain injury cases in Nevada. The Decision The statute was sponsored by the local plaintiffs' bar and purported to regulate physical and mental examinations, replacing Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 35(NRCP). This was a second attempt, as the Supreme Court also deemed an earlier statute, NRS 52.380, unconstitutional for the same reasons. Both statutes upset the balance in tort litigation, violated separation of powers, and negatively affected defendants' ability to defend themselves. Powers also addressed recurring questions concerning neuropsychological examinations. These examinations generate raw data. In practice, courts had ruled this raw data could be exchanged only between the parties’ neuropsychologists. Here, the plaintiff wanted his counsel to have access to the raw data generated from the examination but without the expense of hiring his own neuropsychologist. The Supreme Court concluded “the district court did not abuse its discretion by permitting disclosure of the raw data to Bueno’s counsel, subject to a protective order.” The Court concluded “the generalized fears of some neuropsychologists that nonpsychologists, if they are provided raw data, will violate protective orders, misuse the tests and irreparably compromise the validity of future testing, is not sufficient” to support further, narrower restrictions. Finally, Powers addressed the plaintiff’s request to audio record the examination. Applying NRCP 35, “generally, recording is only proper when the court finds special circumstances amounting to good cause for the requests.” These special circumstances “are rare and typically include extreme situations….” The plaintiff’s “generalized fear that the neuropsychologist might distort the test results in front of the jury” was not sufficient. Michael Lowry (Partner-Las Vegas) submitted an amicus brief for Las Vegas Defense Lawyers asserting that NRS 629.620 was unconstitutional. The brief also addressed problems with the district court’s order implementing neuropsychological testing requirements. Implications for Pending Cases First, NRS 629.620 is inapplicable to litigated cases. This restores balance and discretion to the district courts. Removing NRS 629.620 also helps defendants in brain injury cases because the statute made it nearly impossible to obtain a neuropsychological examination. These requests are instead governed by NRCP 35. The Court, however, ruled narrowly and did not address whether NRS 629.620 may be applicable in other scenarios, such as pre-litigation examinations, UM/UIM claims, worker’s compensation claims, and other settings. This may not be the end of this years-long dispute, though. Like after the Supreme Court’s Lyft v. Dist. Ct. decision, NRS 629.620’s supporters might return to the legislature in the coming session and attempt to modify the statute in some way to achieve their goals but not violate separation of powers. Secondarily, though, defendants may still have a difficult time finding neuropsychologists willing to perform examinations. As a result of years of research, the neuropsychological community restricts the raw data generated from testing. It can be provided only to other neuropsychologists for their review. Powers, however, ruled that a party cannot be forced to hire an expert, and the district court adequately addressed the community’s confidentiality concerns by entering a protective order. Powers did not discuss NAC 641.234(3) and (4), which have the effect of expressly prohibiting such disclosure. The result is conflict between the neuropsychologist’s regulatory obligations and the terms of a court’s order. It seems likely this conflict will generate more motion work and writ petitions in future cases.

Denise Motta (Of Counsel-Louisville) will be a panelist at the 2026 AAA-ICDR Construction Conference in Marina Del Rey on June 4, 2026. She will join an expert panel of arbitrators/mediators and in-house counsel to discuss the implications of labor and supply chain issues increasingly impacting the construction industry. Denise and her fellow panelists will offer insights into navigating these claims and examine how early mediation, arbitration, and dispute review boards may help parties reach resolutions before disputes escalate.

The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) withdrew its 2013 and 2020 guidance on assistance animals in fair housing on September 17, 2025, sowing confusion among housing providers over the provisions of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) concerning reasonable accommodations in its absence. The wait for new direction under HUD on this pressing issue is over, as HUD issued its new enforcement guidance on assessing the use of animals as reasonable accommodations on May 22, 2026. The new guidance is that disability-related assistance animals exempt from housing providers’ pet policies, including pet fees, are now confined to trained service animals. The guidance also removes the presumption that untrained Emotional Support Animals (ESAs) must be accommodated by housing providers. Administratively, it puts all open HUD cases concerning ESAs on hold for individual review under the new standard by the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Enforcement. As such, HUD has taken another significant step in its view of the FHA. While the new guidance resolves certain threshold questions—most notably by confining disability-related animal accommodations to trained service animals and eliminating the longstanding presumption in favor of untrained ESAs—it leaves several critical issues open for housing providers, including the interplay with existing state and local ESA protections, the continued viability of breed and weight restriction challenges, and the status of pending and future private court actions involving ESAs. Understanding these open questions is essential for housing providers navigating this significant policy shift. HUD’s New Guidance on Assistance Animals Under the FHA HUD’s May 22, 2026 guidance begins by explaining why the 2020 guidance was rescinded, stating that it failed to provide housing providers with greater clarity on the distinction between pets and Emotional Support Animals and, instead, led to the emergence of an entire industry to convert pets into ESAs.1 The May 22, 2026 guidance provides that, effective immediately, HUD will only find “reasonable cause” and recommended charges with respect to complaints on animal-related reasonable accommodations in cases involving animals trained to provide disability-related assistance (i.e., service animals as opposed to ESAs). The new guidance further states that HUD will only find violations of the FHA for failure to provide a reasonable accommodation involving the waiver of a pet policy when the animal has been individually trained to perform work or tasks directly related to the individual’s disability. It further states that requests to waive pet policies for untrained ESAs are no longer presumptively reasonable, as opposed to requests to waive such policies for animals trained to perform specific disability-related services.  Open Issues for Housing Providers 1. Breed and Weight Restrictions The new HUD guidance raises the question of potential challenges to breed and weight restrictions for ESAs. Although it does not directly address these ancillary issues, the rescinded HUD guidance made it clear that landlords could not apply breed and weight restrictions to disability-related assistance animals, including ESAs. Whether the new guidance effectively permits the reimposition of such restrictions on ESAs remains an open question that housing providers will need to monitor closely. 2. Private Rights of Action It is important to note that, as explicitly stated in the new HUD guidance, individuals still have the right to seek redress for perceived violations of the FHA involving ESAs through private actions in court. Individuals may file complaints directly in court—bypassing HUD—within two years after the occurrence or termination of the alleged discriminatory housing practice. This means that even though HUD itself will no longer pursue ESA-related complaints, housing providers may still face litigation from individuals asserting ESA-based accommodation claims in federal and state courts. A. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act Housing providers should also note that HUD’s new guidance is not applicable to cases falling under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Section 504), which applies to properties participating in programs or activities receiving federal funding. Providers of federally-funded housing, therefore, remain subject to the prior, broader accommodation framework with respect to ESAs. B. State and Local Law Conflicts The new HUD guidance does not alter local and state laws and regulations where, in many jurisdictions, failing to waive a pet fee for an ESA could be considered a failure to accommodate. Given that many charges of discrimination are jointly filed with HUD and a local agency, the new HUD guidance can create a duality with respect to the treatment of ESAs. Housing providers operating in jurisdictions with independent ESA protections must continue to comply with those requirements regardless of HUD’s new position. Practical Implications The practical implications for housing providers of this reversal of decades of HUD policy concerning assistance animals as reasonable accommodations for individuals with disabilities cannot be overstated. Prior to the rescinding of the 2020 guidance, housing providers were generally understood to be required to allow ESAs without any pet fees or other penalties. This is no longer the case.  The new HUD guidance builds on the momentum in the direction away from the ESA-friendly interpretation of the prior HUD guidance reflected in a 2025 case from the Eastern District of Louisiana, Henderson v. Five Properties, LLC.2 In fact, HUD attached the Henderson decision to the memo issuing new guidance. In Henderson, the judge rejected the proposition that HUD guidance always required housing providers to waive pet fees for people with ESAs. Instead, the court in Henderson held that a tenant with an ESA seeking waiver of generally applicable animal fees was required to prove that waiver of the fee was both necessary for her to use and enjoy her home reasonably, and that whether such an accommodation is required is a fact-specific determination to be made on a case-by-case basis.  It is worth noting that this new HUD guidance was created in the wake of the Loper Bright decision from the U.S. Supreme Court in 2024, which noted the Court’s power to reject interpretations of statutes adopted by federal administrative agencies.3 In recent cases, such as Watts v. Joggers Run Prop. Owners Ass’n, courts are still deferring to HUD’s interpretation and regulations related to the FHA.4 The changes unfolding as a result of this new guidance will have far-reaching implications for housing providers’ operations. However, it does not change the current case law interpreting the FHA with respect to housing providers’ accommodations for ESAs. We will continue to watch closely as these issues inevitably unfold. ________________________________________________________________________________________ 1 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2026, May 22, Assessing Requests for the Use of Animal as a Reasonable Accommodation Under the Fair Housing Act [press release]. 2 Henderson v. Five Properties, LLC, 2025 WL 1951763 (E.D. LA July 16, 2025). 3 Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (U.S. June 28, 2024). 4 Watts v. Joggers Run Prop. Owners Ass'n, 133 F.4th 1032, 1042 (11th Cir. April 7, 2025).

Richard W. Boone Jr. (Partner-New York, NY) will offer a practical roadmap for drafting coverage letters that clearly articulate the insurer's position, comply with regulatory requirements, preserve defenses, and withstand judicial scrutiny. Designed for both insurance professionals and coverage attorneys, Richard’s presentation will draw on real-world claims-handling experience and case law from multiple jurisdictions to address common pitfalls that lead to waiver, estoppel, and bad-faith exposure. Attendees will learn how to conduct a thorough coverage analysis, from insuring agreements through exclusions, conditions, and endorsements, and how to produce clear, persuasive, and defensible coverage correspondence that serves both the insurer's interests and the insured's right to a good-faith coverage determination.

On May 29, 2026, Maria Papasakelariou (Of Counsel-Miami, FL) was sworn in as President of the Young Lawyer Section (YLS) of the Miami-Dade Bar at the Association’s 110th Annual Installation Gala, held at the Biltmore Hotel in Coral Gables, Florida. The YLS comprises more than 1300 members, including all regular, associate, and government service members of the Miami-Dade Bar who are age 36 and under. It’s focus is on professional development, networking, community service, and philanthropy through a variety of targeted programs, events, and legal advocacy. Governed by its own Executive Board and budget, the YLS hosts signature initiatives such as its annual “40 under 40” awards, which recognizes emerging legal talent across South Florida. Maria was honored as a YLS “40 Under 40” recipient in 2024 and also received the Miami-Dade Bar Circle of Excellence Award that same year. Most recently, she was selected as a recipient of the 2026 Florida Bar Young Lawyers Division’s 36 Under Thirty-Six Professionalism Award, recognizing young attorneys who exemplify the highest standards of professionalism in the practice of law.

A prior analysis examined the Virginia legislature’s rejection of a sweeping proposal to overhaul the state’s medical malpractice damages cap. That proposal would have doubled the cap from $3 million to $6 million, allowed prejudgment interest, expanded the statute of limitations, and imposed new insurance requirements on nursing homes. Instead, the legislature passed a narrower, reconciled version of Senate Bill 536 that left the existing damages cap schedule under Virginia Code § 8.01-581.15 untouched but created a new reporting framework requiring commercial insurers and self-insured hospitals to disclose detailed malpractice claims data to legislative leaders. At the time of publication, the reconciled bill had been sent to Governor Spanberger, who had until April 13 to sign, veto, or propose amendments.  Rather than sign or veto the reconciled bill, Governor Spanberger returned it to the legislature on April 12, 2026, with a set of proposed amendments that reshaped several key aspects of the reporting framework. On April 22, the amended reconciled bill was enacted, with an effective date of July 1, 2026. Bottom Line for Virginia Healthcare Entities The medical malpractice damages cap remains unchanged, but a new reporting law takes effect on July 1, 2026, with an initial disclosure deadline of October 1, 2026. The governor’s amendments broadened who must report, redirected all disclosures through the Bureau of Insurance (the “Bureau”), strengthened confidentiality protections, and eliminated the most sensitive reporting metric. However, it also expanded the scope of the law beyond hospitals to reach a wider range of healthcare entities.  Key Changes Under the Enacted Law Expanded Scope of Reporting Entities Unlike the original bill that applied to only hospitals or health systems licensed under Virginia Code § 32.1-123 that self insure or maintain retained-risk arrangements, the enacted law applies to every “medical care facility, as defined in § 32.1-3, or other health care provider” that maintains self insurance, captive insurance, risk retention arrangements, or other retained financial risk. As a result, Virginia healthcare entities that did not consider themselves subject to the original bill should assess whether they now fall within the enacted law’s broader reach. Elimination of the Revenue-Percentage Metric The original bill required self-insured hospitals to disclose total malpractice liability expenditures expressed as a percentage of the hospital’s total patient service revenue. The enacted law eliminates this requirement, leaving three categories of disclosure: (1) the number of covered physicians and providers, (2) claims activity, and (3) malpractice expenditures. This is a meaningful change. The revenue-percentage metric would have provided a uniquely revealing window into each hospital’s financial exposure relative to its operations. Anti-Duplication Provision The enacted law adds a practical provision to prevent duplicative reporting: a healthcare provider is not required to report information that has already been included in a report submitted by the entity providing its self insurance, captive insurance, or risk retention coverage. In other words, if a hospital system’s captive insurer files the required disclosures, individual hospitals covered by that program need not file separate, duplicative reports. Hospitals should confirm with their insurers or risk retention groups whether coverage-level reporting will satisfy their individual obligations. New Insurer Disclosure Requirement For commercial insurers, the enacted law adds a requirement not found in the original bill: insurers must now disclose the identity of the named insureds under their medical malpractice policies. Hospitals insured by commercial carriers should be aware that their identity as a named insured will be part of the insurer’s disclosure to the Bureau. Centralization Through the Bureau of Insurance Perhaps the most structurally significant change involves where disclosures are submitted and how they are processed. The original bill directed all reporting to the chairs and ranking minority members of the House and Senate Committees for Courts of Justice, with the Clerks of each chamber making the information publicly available on the General Assembly’s website. The enacted law redirects this entire process through the State Corporation Commission’s Bureau. Disclosures must now be submitted to the Bureau in a uniform format that it prescribes that is consistent with the format of claim-reporting requirements already established under Virginia Code § 38.2-2228.2. The Bureau is responsible for compiling and analyzing the data, preparing an aggregate summary report, and submitting that report to the legislative committee leaders. Importantly, the Bureau’s aggregate report (not the raw disclosures) is what will be made publicly available on the General Assembly’s website. This is a significant structural improvement and reduces the risk of raw data being taken out of context or used selectively in public debate. Comparison by Size, Region, and Facility Type The enacted law directs the Bureau to present data, to the extent practicable, “in a manner that allows comparison among healthcare providers by size, region, or type of facility,” using anonymized or de-identified formats. While the law prohibits identifying any individual provider, hospitals should be aware that comparisons by size, region, or facility type could narrow the field enough to make identification possible as a practical matter. This provision warrants careful attention when preparing disclosures. Strengthened Confidentiality Protections The original bill stated broadly that disclosures would be confidential and exempt from the Virginia Freedom of Information Act except in aggregate form. The enacted law replaces this with a more detailed and protective mechanism. Reporting entities may designate specific data as confidential proprietary information upon submission, provided they: (i) invoke the exclusion in writing, (ii) identify the protected material, and (iii) state the reason protection is necessary. Information properly designated as confidential will be protected from subpoena responses and public inspection. Officer Certification Requirement Disclosures must be “certified as accurate and complete by an officer of the reporting entity.” This places personal responsibility on a hospital officer for the accuracy of the filing.  Extended Initial Deadline The original bill set the first disclosure deadline as September 1, 2026. The enacted law extends this to October 1, 2026. Subsequent annual disclosures remain due on or before March 31 of each year for the preceding calendar year. Verdicts Exceeding the Cap Both the original and enacted versions require all reporting entities to submit a list of verdicts exceeding the statutory cap. Each entry must include the verdict amount, the amount recoverable after application of the cap, and the year the cause of action accrued. No personally-identifiable information may be disclosed. This provision is clearly designed to build a public record demonstrating the gap between what juries award and what plaintiffs can recover. Automatic Sunset Both versions contain the same expiration mechanism: the reporting requirements expire upon the effective date of any future legislation establishing a new limitation on recovery for medical malpractice actions. This confirms the legislative intent that the reporting framework is a temporary, data-gathering tool designed to inform future changes to the cap. Strategic Implications Virginia’s medical malpractice damages cap is intact but is under active review, and the data collected under this new law will fuel the next round of legislative efforts to increase it. With the October 1, 2026 initial deadline approaching, Virginia hospitals and healthcare entities should consider taking the following steps: 1) determine whether an institution falls within the enacted law’s expanded definition of “medical care facility” or “other healthcare provider;” 2) coordinate the production of the required materials with insurers or risk retention groups; 3) compile the necessary information for disclosure; 4) identify and designate confidential proprietary information; 5) designate a certifying officer; 6) monitor the Bureau’s prescribed format; and 7) prepare for future debates on raising the medical malpractice damages cap.

Kimberly Blair (Partner-Chicago, IL), Peter Catalanotti (Partner-San Francisco), Joseph Francoeur (Partner-New York, NY), and Alexandra Skarka (Associate-Philadelphia, PA) will present the Wilson Elser Forum webinar “Scope of Services: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives for Claims Professionals” on June 8, 2026. The session provides a cross-disciplinary overview of how scope of services issues arise across design and construction, legal, brokerage, and real estate professions. Presenters will address how engagement agreements define and limit the scope of professional services, the risks of scope creep and undocumented service expansion, defenses available based on scope limitations, and evidentiary sources and trial strategies for scope disputes. Also covered are deposition tactics specific to scope of services claims, underwriting red flags and claims investigation best practices, third-party liability exposure when non-clients rely on an insured’s work product, and potential subrogation opportunities.

White Plains, New York, partners Michael Grady and Siobhainin Funchion obtained a defense verdict following a four-week jury trial in the New York Supreme Court, Westchester County, on behalf of their obstetrician client. The plaintiff alleged that the client improperly managed her pregnancy by failing to timely deliver an infant with intrauterine growth restriction (IUGR). In her malpractice claim, the plaintiff maintained that the delay in delivery resulted in placental insufficiency and fetal hypoxia, causing hypotonia, failure to thrive, and permanent physical, cognitive, and developmental impairments. Mike and Siobhan successfully argued that the obstetrician's management of the pregnancy complied with the applicable standard of care. Relying on the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) guidelines, they demonstrated that, in cases of isolated IUGR with normal fetal testing, delivery between 38 and 39 weeks is appropriate. The evidence established that the infant was delivered within that recommended timeframe.   Working alongside counsel for the co-defendant maternal-fetal medicine physician, Mike and Siobhan further argued that the infant’s condition was attributable to a rare genetic microdeletion that was diagnosed the year following delivery, rather than any alleged delay in delivery. The trial featured testimony from 14 witnesses, including 10 expert witnesses in the fields of obstetrics, maternal-fetal medicine, neonatology, pediatric neurology, genetics, physical medicine/rehabilitation, and economics. During closing arguments, plaintiff’s counsel sought damages ranging from $26 million to $36 million. The jury returned a defense verdict in just 23 minutes.

Chris Richardson (Partner-Las Vegas, NV) secured summary judgment in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Las Vegas, on behalf of Wilson Elser’s insurance broker client. The plaintiff, a security guard firm with armed and unarmed personnel, hired our client and its agent in August 2021 to obtain general liability and premises liability insurance in connection with the plaintiff's licensure with the State of Nevada Private Investigators Licensing Board. Prior to obtaining the policy, our client sent the plaintiff an email notifying him of the receipt of a proposal for General Liability coverage from an insurance carrier and providing information regarding the premium amount and coverage limits. The policy was bound and then renewed for the following year. Each policy contained an Assault and Battery Exclusion under endorsement which provided: "This insurance does not apply to any claim or 'suit' for 'bodily injury,' 'property damage' or 'personal and advertising injury' arising out of, related to, or, in any way involving any actual or alleged assault, battery, harmful or offensive contact, or threat, whether provoked or unprovoked." This exclusion was expressly listed in the quote documents and the issued policy’s schedule of forms, ensuring the insured had notice of the exclusion. The assault and battery exclusion was also discussed during the policy placement process, during the 2022 renewal, and in email communications. Following the second renewal, the plaintiff’s security guard shot a third party. The victim sued the plaintiff, but the plaintiff’s insurer disclaimed coverage for the lawsuit based on the policy’s assault and battery exclusion. The plaintiff ultimately entered a stipulated judgment with the victim in the amount of $500,000.   The plaintiff subsequently filed suit against our client, asserting: (1) breach of contract; (2) deceptive trade practices under NRS 598.0923; (3) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (4) fraudulent misrepresentation; and (5) negligence. All claims were premised on the allegation that our client failed to disclose the policy’s assault and battery exclusion before binding coverage. Chris moved for summary judgment, arguing that the undisputed documentary evidence established plaintiff’s actual or constructive notice of the exclusion as a matter of law. Specifically, the evidence showed that the plaintiff received the policy containing the clearly stated exclusion; the exclusion was expressly identified in the quote documents and policy schedule of forms; Nevada law imposes a duty on insureds to understand their policy terms; and the plaintiff acknowledged and accepted those terms, including during the 2022 renewal process when the exclusion was again prominently disclosed. Based on these undisputed facts, the court granted summary judgment in our client's favor on all claims.

J. Peter Greco (Partner-Orlando, FL) has been appointed by the president-elect of the Florida Bar to serve on the Aviation Law Committee, with his term commencing July 1, 2026. The Aviation Law Committee monitors and analyzes recent developments in aviation law, including legislative and regulatory matters, and keeps bar members informed of significant developments in the field. The committee also maintains liaisons with agencies and various local, state, and federal government authorities involved in aerospace matters, and reviews legislation, regulations, and related policy issues. A significant portion of Pete’s practice focuses on complex aviation litigation. Prior to his legal career, he worked in airfield operations at several commercial service airports, including Orlando (MCO), where he was responsible for safety, security, and regulatory compliance of one of the nation’s busiest airports. Pete is an instrument-rated private pilot and a graduate of Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University; his practical aviation background and industry experience make him a valuable addition to the Aviation Law Committee.

Nevada’s Supreme Court decided in Powers v. Dist. Ct. that NRS 629.620 violated Nevada’s separation of powers and is unconstitutional. This has immediate implications for clients defending traumatic brain injury cases in Nevada. The Decision The statute was sponsored by the local plaintiffs' bar and purported to regulate physical and mental examinations, replacing Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 35(NRCP). This was a second attempt, as the Supreme Court also deemed an earlier statute, NRS 52.380, unconstitutional for the same reasons. Both statutes upset the balance in tort litigation, violated separation of powers, and negatively affected defendants' ability to defend themselves. Powers also addressed recurring questions concerning neuropsychological examinations. These examinations generate raw data. In practice, courts had ruled this raw data could be exchanged only between the parties’ neuropsychologists. Here, the plaintiff wanted his counsel to have access to the raw data generated from the examination but without the expense of hiring his own neuropsychologist. The Supreme Court concluded “the district court did not abuse its discretion by permitting disclosure of the raw data to Bueno’s counsel, subject to a protective order.” The Court concluded “the generalized fears of some neuropsychologists that nonpsychologists, if they are provided raw data, will violate protective orders, misuse the tests and irreparably compromise the validity of future testing, is not sufficient” to support further, narrower restrictions. Finally, Powers addressed the plaintiff’s request to audio record the examination. Applying NRCP 35, “generally, recording is only proper when the court finds special circumstances amounting to good cause for the requests.” These special circumstances “are rare and typically include extreme situations….” The plaintiff’s “generalized fear that the neuropsychologist might distort the test results in front of the jury” was not sufficient. Michael Lowry (Partner-Las Vegas) submitted an amicus brief for Las Vegas Defense Lawyers asserting that NRS 629.620 was unconstitutional. The brief also addressed problems with the district court’s order implementing neuropsychological testing requirements. Implications for Pending Cases First, NRS 629.620 is inapplicable to litigated cases. This restores balance and discretion to the district courts. Removing NRS 629.620 also helps defendants in brain injury cases because the statute made it nearly impossible to obtain a neuropsychological examination. These requests are instead governed by NRCP 35. The Court, however, ruled narrowly and did not address whether NRS 629.620 may be applicable in other scenarios, such as pre-litigation examinations, UM/UIM claims, worker’s compensation claims, and other settings. This may not be the end of this years-long dispute, though. Like after the Supreme Court’s Lyft v. Dist. Ct. decision, NRS 629.620’s supporters might return to the legislature in the coming session and attempt to modify the statute in some way to achieve their goals but not violate separation of powers. Secondarily, though, defendants may still have a difficult time finding neuropsychologists willing to perform examinations. As a result of years of research, the neuropsychological community restricts the raw data generated from testing. It can be provided only to other neuropsychologists for their review. Powers, however, ruled that a party cannot be forced to hire an expert, and the district court adequately addressed the community’s confidentiality concerns by entering a protective order. Powers did not discuss NAC 641.234(3) and (4), which have the effect of expressly prohibiting such disclosure. The result is conflict between the neuropsychologist’s regulatory obligations and the terms of a court’s order. It seems likely this conflict will generate more motion work and writ petitions in future cases.

Denise Motta (Of Counsel-Louisville) will be a panelist at the 2026 AAA-ICDR Construction Conference in Marina Del Rey on June 4, 2026. She will join an expert panel of arbitrators/mediators and in-house counsel to discuss the implications of labor and supply chain issues increasingly impacting the construction industry. Denise and her fellow panelists will offer insights into navigating these claims and examine how early mediation, arbitration, and dispute review boards may help parties reach resolutions before disputes escalate.

The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) withdrew its 2013 and 2020 guidance on assistance animals in fair housing on September 17, 2025, sowing confusion among housing providers over the provisions of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) concerning reasonable accommodations in its absence. The wait for new direction under HUD on this pressing issue is over, as HUD issued its new enforcement guidance on assessing the use of animals as reasonable accommodations on May 22, 2026. The new guidance is that disability-related assistance animals exempt from housing providers’ pet policies, including pet fees, are now confined to trained service animals. The guidance also removes the presumption that untrained Emotional Support Animals (ESAs) must be accommodated by housing providers. Administratively, it puts all open HUD cases concerning ESAs on hold for individual review under the new standard by the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Enforcement. As such, HUD has taken another significant step in its view of the FHA. While the new guidance resolves certain threshold questions—most notably by confining disability-related animal accommodations to trained service animals and eliminating the longstanding presumption in favor of untrained ESAs—it leaves several critical issues open for housing providers, including the interplay with existing state and local ESA protections, the continued viability of breed and weight restriction challenges, and the status of pending and future private court actions involving ESAs. Understanding these open questions is essential for housing providers navigating this significant policy shift. HUD’s New Guidance on Assistance Animals Under the FHA HUD’s May 22, 2026 guidance begins by explaining why the 2020 guidance was rescinded, stating that it failed to provide housing providers with greater clarity on the distinction between pets and Emotional Support Animals and, instead, led to the emergence of an entire industry to convert pets into ESAs.1 The May 22, 2026 guidance provides that, effective immediately, HUD will only find “reasonable cause” and recommended charges with respect to complaints on animal-related reasonable accommodations in cases involving animals trained to provide disability-related assistance (i.e., service animals as opposed to ESAs). The new guidance further states that HUD will only find violations of the FHA for failure to provide a reasonable accommodation involving the waiver of a pet policy when the animal has been individually trained to perform work or tasks directly related to the individual’s disability. It further states that requests to waive pet policies for untrained ESAs are no longer presumptively reasonable, as opposed to requests to waive such policies for animals trained to perform specific disability-related services.  Open Issues for Housing Providers 1. Breed and Weight Restrictions The new HUD guidance raises the question of potential challenges to breed and weight restrictions for ESAs. Although it does not directly address these ancillary issues, the rescinded HUD guidance made it clear that landlords could not apply breed and weight restrictions to disability-related assistance animals, including ESAs. Whether the new guidance effectively permits the reimposition of such restrictions on ESAs remains an open question that housing providers will need to monitor closely. 2. Private Rights of Action It is important to note that, as explicitly stated in the new HUD guidance, individuals still have the right to seek redress for perceived violations of the FHA involving ESAs through private actions in court. Individuals may file complaints directly in court—bypassing HUD—within two years after the occurrence or termination of the alleged discriminatory housing practice. This means that even though HUD itself will no longer pursue ESA-related complaints, housing providers may still face litigation from individuals asserting ESA-based accommodation claims in federal and state courts. A. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act Housing providers should also note that HUD’s new guidance is not applicable to cases falling under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Section 504), which applies to properties participating in programs or activities receiving federal funding. Providers of federally-funded housing, therefore, remain subject to the prior, broader accommodation framework with respect to ESAs. B. State and Local Law Conflicts The new HUD guidance does not alter local and state laws and regulations where, in many jurisdictions, failing to waive a pet fee for an ESA could be considered a failure to accommodate. Given that many charges of discrimination are jointly filed with HUD and a local agency, the new HUD guidance can create a duality with respect to the treatment of ESAs. Housing providers operating in jurisdictions with independent ESA protections must continue to comply with those requirements regardless of HUD’s new position. Practical Implications The practical implications for housing providers of this reversal of decades of HUD policy concerning assistance animals as reasonable accommodations for individuals with disabilities cannot be overstated. Prior to the rescinding of the 2020 guidance, housing providers were generally understood to be required to allow ESAs without any pet fees or other penalties. This is no longer the case.  The new HUD guidance builds on the momentum in the direction away from the ESA-friendly interpretation of the prior HUD guidance reflected in a 2025 case from the Eastern District of Louisiana, Henderson v. Five Properties, LLC.2 In fact, HUD attached the Henderson decision to the memo issuing new guidance. In Henderson, the judge rejected the proposition that HUD guidance always required housing providers to waive pet fees for people with ESAs. Instead, the court in Henderson held that a tenant with an ESA seeking waiver of generally applicable animal fees was required to prove that waiver of the fee was both necessary for her to use and enjoy her home reasonably, and that whether such an accommodation is required is a fact-specific determination to be made on a case-by-case basis.  It is worth noting that this new HUD guidance was created in the wake of the Loper Bright decision from the U.S. Supreme Court in 2024, which noted the Court’s power to reject interpretations of statutes adopted by federal administrative agencies.3 In recent cases, such as Watts v. Joggers Run Prop. Owners Ass’n, courts are still deferring to HUD’s interpretation and regulations related to the FHA.4 The changes unfolding as a result of this new guidance will have far-reaching implications for housing providers’ operations. However, it does not change the current case law interpreting the FHA with respect to housing providers’ accommodations for ESAs. We will continue to watch closely as these issues inevitably unfold. ________________________________________________________________________________________ 1 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2026, May 22, Assessing Requests for the Use of Animal as a Reasonable Accommodation Under the Fair Housing Act [press release]. 2 Henderson v. Five Properties, LLC, 2025 WL 1951763 (E.D. LA July 16, 2025). 3 Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (U.S. June 28, 2024). 4 Watts v. Joggers Run Prop. Owners Ass'n, 133 F.4th 1032, 1042 (11th Cir. April 7, 2025).

Richard W. Boone Jr. (Partner-New York, NY) will offer a practical roadmap for drafting coverage letters that clearly articulate the insurer's position, comply with regulatory requirements, preserve defenses, and withstand judicial scrutiny. Designed for both insurance professionals and coverage attorneys, Richard’s presentation will draw on real-world claims-handling experience and case law from multiple jurisdictions to address common pitfalls that lead to waiver, estoppel, and bad-faith exposure. Attendees will learn how to conduct a thorough coverage analysis, from insuring agreements through exclusions, conditions, and endorsements, and how to produce clear, persuasive, and defensible coverage correspondence that serves both the insurer's interests and the insured's right to a good-faith coverage determination.

On May 29, 2026, Maria Papasakelariou (Of Counsel-Miami, FL) was sworn in as President of the Young Lawyer Section (YLS) of the Miami-Dade Bar at the Association’s 110th Annual Installation Gala, held at the Biltmore Hotel in Coral Gables, Florida. The YLS comprises more than 1300 members, including all regular, associate, and government service members of the Miami-Dade Bar who are age 36 and under. It’s focus is on professional development, networking, community service, and philanthropy through a variety of targeted programs, events, and legal advocacy. Governed by its own Executive Board and budget, the YLS hosts signature initiatives such as its annual “40 under 40” awards, which recognizes emerging legal talent across South Florida. Maria was honored as a YLS “40 Under 40” recipient in 2024 and also received the Miami-Dade Bar Circle of Excellence Award that same year. Most recently, she was selected as a recipient of the 2026 Florida Bar Young Lawyers Division’s 36 Under Thirty-Six Professionalism Award, recognizing young attorneys who exemplify the highest standards of professionalism in the practice of law.

A prior analysis examined the Virginia legislature’s rejection of a sweeping proposal to overhaul the state’s medical malpractice damages cap. That proposal would have doubled the cap from $3 million to $6 million, allowed prejudgment interest, expanded the statute of limitations, and imposed new insurance requirements on nursing homes. Instead, the legislature passed a narrower, reconciled version of Senate Bill 536 that left the existing damages cap schedule under Virginia Code § 8.01-581.15 untouched but created a new reporting framework requiring commercial insurers and self-insured hospitals to disclose detailed malpractice claims data to legislative leaders. At the time of publication, the reconciled bill had been sent to Governor Spanberger, who had until April 13 to sign, veto, or propose amendments.  Rather than sign or veto the reconciled bill, Governor Spanberger returned it to the legislature on April 12, 2026, with a set of proposed amendments that reshaped several key aspects of the reporting framework. On April 22, the amended reconciled bill was enacted, with an effective date of July 1, 2026. Bottom Line for Virginia Healthcare Entities The medical malpractice damages cap remains unchanged, but a new reporting law takes effect on July 1, 2026, with an initial disclosure deadline of October 1, 2026. The governor’s amendments broadened who must report, redirected all disclosures through the Bureau of Insurance (the “Bureau”), strengthened confidentiality protections, and eliminated the most sensitive reporting metric. However, it also expanded the scope of the law beyond hospitals to reach a wider range of healthcare entities.  Key Changes Under the Enacted Law Expanded Scope of Reporting Entities Unlike the original bill that applied to only hospitals or health systems licensed under Virginia Code § 32.1-123 that self insure or maintain retained-risk arrangements, the enacted law applies to every “medical care facility, as defined in § 32.1-3, or other health care provider” that maintains self insurance, captive insurance, risk retention arrangements, or other retained financial risk. As a result, Virginia healthcare entities that did not consider themselves subject to the original bill should assess whether they now fall within the enacted law’s broader reach. Elimination of the Revenue-Percentage Metric The original bill required self-insured hospitals to disclose total malpractice liability expenditures expressed as a percentage of the hospital’s total patient service revenue. The enacted law eliminates this requirement, leaving three categories of disclosure: (1) the number of covered physicians and providers, (2) claims activity, and (3) malpractice expenditures. This is a meaningful change. The revenue-percentage metric would have provided a uniquely revealing window into each hospital’s financial exposure relative to its operations. Anti-Duplication Provision The enacted law adds a practical provision to prevent duplicative reporting: a healthcare provider is not required to report information that has already been included in a report submitted by the entity providing its self insurance, captive insurance, or risk retention coverage. In other words, if a hospital system’s captive insurer files the required disclosures, individual hospitals covered by that program need not file separate, duplicative reports. Hospitals should confirm with their insurers or risk retention groups whether coverage-level reporting will satisfy their individual obligations. New Insurer Disclosure Requirement For commercial insurers, the enacted law adds a requirement not found in the original bill: insurers must now disclose the identity of the named insureds under their medical malpractice policies. Hospitals insured by commercial carriers should be aware that their identity as a named insured will be part of the insurer’s disclosure to the Bureau. Centralization Through the Bureau of Insurance Perhaps the most structurally significant change involves where disclosures are submitted and how they are processed. The original bill directed all reporting to the chairs and ranking minority members of the House and Senate Committees for Courts of Justice, with the Clerks of each chamber making the information publicly available on the General Assembly’s website. The enacted law redirects this entire process through the State Corporation Commission’s Bureau. Disclosures must now be submitted to the Bureau in a uniform format that it prescribes that is consistent with the format of claim-reporting requirements already established under Virginia Code § 38.2-2228.2. The Bureau is responsible for compiling and analyzing the data, preparing an aggregate summary report, and submitting that report to the legislative committee leaders. Importantly, the Bureau’s aggregate report (not the raw disclosures) is what will be made publicly available on the General Assembly’s website. This is a significant structural improvement and reduces the risk of raw data being taken out of context or used selectively in public debate. Comparison by Size, Region, and Facility Type The enacted law directs the Bureau to present data, to the extent practicable, “in a manner that allows comparison among healthcare providers by size, region, or type of facility,” using anonymized or de-identified formats. While the law prohibits identifying any individual provider, hospitals should be aware that comparisons by size, region, or facility type could narrow the field enough to make identification possible as a practical matter. This provision warrants careful attention when preparing disclosures. Strengthened Confidentiality Protections The original bill stated broadly that disclosures would be confidential and exempt from the Virginia Freedom of Information Act except in aggregate form. The enacted law replaces this with a more detailed and protective mechanism. Reporting entities may designate specific data as confidential proprietary information upon submission, provided they: (i) invoke the exclusion in writing, (ii) identify the protected material, and (iii) state the reason protection is necessary. Information properly designated as confidential will be protected from subpoena responses and public inspection. Officer Certification Requirement Disclosures must be “certified as accurate and complete by an officer of the reporting entity.” This places personal responsibility on a hospital officer for the accuracy of the filing.  Extended Initial Deadline The original bill set the first disclosure deadline as September 1, 2026. The enacted law extends this to October 1, 2026. Subsequent annual disclosures remain due on or before March 31 of each year for the preceding calendar year. Verdicts Exceeding the Cap Both the original and enacted versions require all reporting entities to submit a list of verdicts exceeding the statutory cap. Each entry must include the verdict amount, the amount recoverable after application of the cap, and the year the cause of action accrued. No personally-identifiable information may be disclosed. This provision is clearly designed to build a public record demonstrating the gap between what juries award and what plaintiffs can recover. Automatic Sunset Both versions contain the same expiration mechanism: the reporting requirements expire upon the effective date of any future legislation establishing a new limitation on recovery for medical malpractice actions. This confirms the legislative intent that the reporting framework is a temporary, data-gathering tool designed to inform future changes to the cap. Strategic Implications Virginia’s medical malpractice damages cap is intact but is under active review, and the data collected under this new law will fuel the next round of legislative efforts to increase it. With the October 1, 2026 initial deadline approaching, Virginia hospitals and healthcare entities should consider taking the following steps: 1) determine whether an institution falls within the enacted law’s expanded definition of “medical care facility” or “other healthcare provider;” 2) coordinate the production of the required materials with insurers or risk retention groups; 3) compile the necessary information for disclosure; 4) identify and designate confidential proprietary information; 5) designate a certifying officer; 6) monitor the Bureau’s prescribed format; and 7) prepare for future debates on raising the medical malpractice damages cap.

Kimberly Blair (Partner-Chicago, IL), Peter Catalanotti (Partner-San Francisco), Joseph Francoeur (Partner-New York, NY), and Alexandra Skarka (Associate-Philadelphia, PA) will present the Wilson Elser Forum webinar “Scope of Services: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives for Claims Professionals” on June 8, 2026. The session provides a cross-disciplinary overview of how scope of services issues arise across design and construction, legal, brokerage, and real estate professions. Presenters will address how engagement agreements define and limit the scope of professional services, the risks of scope creep and undocumented service expansion, defenses available based on scope limitations, and evidentiary sources and trial strategies for scope disputes. Also covered are deposition tactics specific to scope of services claims, underwriting red flags and claims investigation best practices, third-party liability exposure when non-clients rely on an insured’s work product, and potential subrogation opportunities.

White Plains, New York, partners Michael Grady and Siobhainin Funchion obtained a defense verdict following a four-week jury trial in the New York Supreme Court, Westchester County, on behalf of their obstetrician client. The plaintiff alleged that the client improperly managed her pregnancy by failing to timely deliver an infant with intrauterine growth restriction (IUGR). In her malpractice claim, the plaintiff maintained that the delay in delivery resulted in placental insufficiency and fetal hypoxia, causing hypotonia, failure to thrive, and permanent physical, cognitive, and developmental impairments. Mike and Siobhan successfully argued that the obstetrician's management of the pregnancy complied with the applicable standard of care. Relying on the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) guidelines, they demonstrated that, in cases of isolated IUGR with normal fetal testing, delivery between 38 and 39 weeks is appropriate. The evidence established that the infant was delivered within that recommended timeframe.   Working alongside counsel for the co-defendant maternal-fetal medicine physician, Mike and Siobhan further argued that the infant’s condition was attributable to a rare genetic microdeletion that was diagnosed the year following delivery, rather than any alleged delay in delivery. The trial featured testimony from 14 witnesses, including 10 expert witnesses in the fields of obstetrics, maternal-fetal medicine, neonatology, pediatric neurology, genetics, physical medicine/rehabilitation, and economics. During closing arguments, plaintiff’s counsel sought damages ranging from $26 million to $36 million. The jury returned a defense verdict in just 23 minutes.

Chris Richardson (Partner-Las Vegas, NV) secured summary judgment in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Las Vegas, on behalf of Wilson Elser’s insurance broker client. The plaintiff, a security guard firm with armed and unarmed personnel, hired our client and its agent in August 2021 to obtain general liability and premises liability insurance in connection with the plaintiff's licensure with the State of Nevada Private Investigators Licensing Board. Prior to obtaining the policy, our client sent the plaintiff an email notifying him of the receipt of a proposal for General Liability coverage from an insurance carrier and providing information regarding the premium amount and coverage limits. The policy was bound and then renewed for the following year. Each policy contained an Assault and Battery Exclusion under endorsement which provided: "This insurance does not apply to any claim or 'suit' for 'bodily injury,' 'property damage' or 'personal and advertising injury' arising out of, related to, or, in any way involving any actual or alleged assault, battery, harmful or offensive contact, or threat, whether provoked or unprovoked." This exclusion was expressly listed in the quote documents and the issued policy’s schedule of forms, ensuring the insured had notice of the exclusion. The assault and battery exclusion was also discussed during the policy placement process, during the 2022 renewal, and in email communications. Following the second renewal, the plaintiff’s security guard shot a third party. The victim sued the plaintiff, but the plaintiff’s insurer disclaimed coverage for the lawsuit based on the policy’s assault and battery exclusion. The plaintiff ultimately entered a stipulated judgment with the victim in the amount of $500,000.   The plaintiff subsequently filed suit against our client, asserting: (1) breach of contract; (2) deceptive trade practices under NRS 598.0923; (3) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (4) fraudulent misrepresentation; and (5) negligence. All claims were premised on the allegation that our client failed to disclose the policy’s assault and battery exclusion before binding coverage. Chris moved for summary judgment, arguing that the undisputed documentary evidence established plaintiff’s actual or constructive notice of the exclusion as a matter of law. Specifically, the evidence showed that the plaintiff received the policy containing the clearly stated exclusion; the exclusion was expressly identified in the quote documents and policy schedule of forms; Nevada law imposes a duty on insureds to understand their policy terms; and the plaintiff acknowledged and accepted those terms, including during the 2022 renewal process when the exclusion was again prominently disclosed. Based on these undisputed facts, the court granted summary judgment in our client's favor on all claims.

J. Peter Greco (Partner-Orlando, FL) has been appointed by the president-elect of the Florida Bar to serve on the Aviation Law Committee, with his term commencing July 1, 2026. The Aviation Law Committee monitors and analyzes recent developments in aviation law, including legislative and regulatory matters, and keeps bar members informed of significant developments in the field. The committee also maintains liaisons with agencies and various local, state, and federal government authorities involved in aerospace matters, and reviews legislation, regulations, and related policy issues. A significant portion of Pete’s practice focuses on complex aviation litigation. Prior to his legal career, he worked in airfield operations at several commercial service airports, including Orlando (MCO), where he was responsible for safety, security, and regulatory compliance of one of the nation’s busiest airports. Pete is an instrument-rated private pilot and a graduate of Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University; his practical aviation background and industry experience make him a valuable addition to the Aviation Law Committee.

Nevada’s Supreme Court decided in Powers v. Dist. Ct. that NRS 629.620 violated Nevada’s separation of powers and is unconstitutional. This has immediate implications for clients defending traumatic brain injury cases in Nevada. The Decision The statute was sponsored by the local plaintiffs' bar and purported to regulate physical and mental examinations, replacing Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 35(NRCP). This was a second attempt, as the Supreme Court also deemed an earlier statute, NRS 52.380, unconstitutional for the same reasons. Both statutes upset the balance in tort litigation, violated separation of powers, and negatively affected defendants' ability to defend themselves. Powers also addressed recurring questions concerning neuropsychological examinations. These examinations generate raw data. In practice, courts had ruled this raw data could be exchanged only between the parties’ neuropsychologists. Here, the plaintiff wanted his counsel to have access to the raw data generated from the examination but without the expense of hiring his own neuropsychologist. The Supreme Court concluded “the district court did not abuse its discretion by permitting disclosure of the raw data to Bueno’s counsel, subject to a protective order.” The Court concluded “the generalized fears of some neuropsychologists that nonpsychologists, if they are provided raw data, will violate protective orders, misuse the tests and irreparably compromise the validity of future testing, is not sufficient” to support further, narrower restrictions. Finally, Powers addressed the plaintiff’s request to audio record the examination. Applying NRCP 35, “generally, recording is only proper when the court finds special circumstances amounting to good cause for the requests.” These special circumstances “are rare and typically include extreme situations….” The plaintiff’s “generalized fear that the neuropsychologist might distort the test results in front of the jury” was not sufficient. Michael Lowry (Partner-Las Vegas) submitted an amicus brief for Las Vegas Defense Lawyers asserting that NRS 629.620 was unconstitutional. The brief also addressed problems with the district court’s order implementing neuropsychological testing requirements. Implications for Pending Cases First, NRS 629.620 is inapplicable to litigated cases. This restores balance and discretion to the district courts. Removing NRS 629.620 also helps defendants in brain injury cases because the statute made it nearly impossible to obtain a neuropsychological examination. These requests are instead governed by NRCP 35. The Court, however, ruled narrowly and did not address whether NRS 629.620 may be applicable in other scenarios, such as pre-litigation examinations, UM/UIM claims, worker’s compensation claims, and other settings. This may not be the end of this years-long dispute, though. Like after the Supreme Court’s Lyft v. Dist. Ct. decision, NRS 629.620’s supporters might return to the legislature in the coming session and attempt to modify the statute in some way to achieve their goals but not violate separation of powers. Secondarily, though, defendants may still have a difficult time finding neuropsychologists willing to perform examinations. As a result of years of research, the neuropsychological community restricts the raw data generated from testing. It can be provided only to other neuropsychologists for their review. Powers, however, ruled that a party cannot be forced to hire an expert, and the district court adequately addressed the community’s confidentiality concerns by entering a protective order. Powers did not discuss NAC 641.234(3) and (4), which have the effect of expressly prohibiting such disclosure. The result is conflict between the neuropsychologist’s regulatory obligations and the terms of a court’s order. It seems likely this conflict will generate more motion work and writ petitions in future cases.