Kevin P. Farrell

Washington, D.C., partners Catherine Hanrahan and Kevin Farrell and associate Madeline Creps won summary judgment in favor of the District of Columbia Housing Authority (DCHA). The plaintiff community association claimed that DCHA and other entities failed to pay assessments owed pursuant to the Declaration and Bylaws that govern the development. After successfully barring the equitable claims filed against DCHA in a motion to dismiss, a motion for summary judgment was filed on the one remaining breach of contract count. DCHA argued that the claim failed as a matter of law because the Declaration unambiguously waived DCHA’s liability for assessments. In opposition, the plaintiff argued there were contradictory clauses in the Declaration that a jury must reconcile. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia determined that DCHA was entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law, finding that there was no ambiguity in the language of the Declaration and opining that while DCHA is the legal owner in fee simple of the Community and Daycare Lot at issue, the Declaration’s definition of “owner” as it is used throughout the Declaration plainly excludes DCHA. The court concluded that because the plain language of the agreement unambiguously waives DCHA’s responsibility for paying assessments, the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim fails as a matter of law, and granted our Motion for Summary Judgment. This is a significant win for DCHA because the legal issues resolved in this matter potentially impact its obligations in many other affordable housing development projects. 

Kevin Farrell (Partner-Washington, DC) and Daniel Coffman (Associate-Washington, DC) prevailed on a motion to dismiss on behalf of a United States military defense contractor after a plaintiff attempted to add the contractor to a suit regarding the loss of plaintiff’s security clearance. The motion to dismiss demonstrated that the tortious interference and other claims against Wilson Elser’s client were barred by the statute of limitations. The plaintiff argued that several exceptions applied, including that his claims were timely because the D.C. Superior Court’s COVID-19 orders tolled the statute of limitations. While noting that the relevant orders were not a model of clarity, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia agreed with Dan and Kevin’s concise analysis of the D.C. Superior Court’s COVID-19 orders, and found that the claims were time-barred. The court further determined that (1) the continuous tort doctrine does not apply to the plaintiff’s claims, (2) the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s joinder rules have no bearing on whether the plaintiff’s claims are timely, and (3) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 the plaintiff’s claims did not “relate back” to his first complaint because his failure to timely add the contractor as a defendant was not the type of mistake Rule 15 was meant to remedy. All claims against Wilson Elser’s client were dismissed with prejudice.