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Virginia Legislature Makes Clear Testamentary Attorneys Do Not Owe a Legal Duty to Intended Third-Party Beneficiaries, Except Under Limited Circumstances
September 2025 - Professionally Speaking
Partner
Matthew Lee (Partner-McLean, VA) and Haley Mathis (Associate-McLean, VA) represented a media client located in Washington, D.C. The client wrote articles on the alleged retaliation against two whistleblowers by the Office of Inspector General for the Social Security Administration. The plaintiff, chief counsel for the OIG, sued the firm’s client for defamation, false light, and infliction of emotional distress. The lawsuit was ultimately transferred to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia and assigned to District Judge Mehta. On behalf of the firm’s client, Haley and Matt moved to dismiss all claims under Rule 12(b)(6), specifically arguing that the plaintiff’s defamation claims were not actionable under Pennsylvania’s fair report privilege (the case was originally filed in the Middle District of Pennsylvania); and to the extent that the privilege did not apply to a specific statement, that the plaintiff had failed to plead sufficient facts to support an allegation of actual falsehood (the statements touched on matters of public concern); and, lastly, that the amended complaint failed to allege actual or NY Times malice, which is required for an action by a public official – the plaintiff was, as chief counsel for the SSA OIG, clearly such an official. Further, they argued that the plaintiff’s claims for false light and infliction of emotional distress were not actionable for the same reasons that the defamation claims were not actionable. In a March 26, 2025, Order, Judge Mehta granted our client’s motion to dismiss in all respects. The order was accompanied by a 64-page memorandum opinion setting forth in detail the Judge’s reasoning for granting our client’s and the other defendants’ motions to dismiss. The entire case was dismissed, and the defendants are waiting to see if the plaintiff will appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
Matthew W. Lee and Haley B. Mathis
Matthew Lee (Partner-McLean, VA) and Taylor Giles (Associate-McLean, VA) prevailed on a demurrer (motion to dismiss) in Arlington County General District Court in a chiropractor malpractice case. Matt and Taylor argued that prior to requesting service of process upon the defendant, the plaintiff was required to obtain expert opinions that the firm’s client breached the standard of care, and that the breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s alleged damages. The plaintiff failed to do so, and, at the start of trial, the Court granted the client’s motion to dismiss for failure to obtain the requisite expert opinions.
Matthew W. Lee and Taylor J. Giles
Matthew Lee (Partner-DC Metro) and Haley Mathis (Associate-McLean, VA) forced a plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss his defamation case against a local newspaper on the eve of trial. A local newspaper published a letter to the editor that drew the ire of a local attorney who filed suit against the firm’s clients (the newspaper, publisher and editor) and the author of the letter. Prior to trial, Matt and Haley filed a motion with the court requesting that it rule as a matter of law that the subject matter of the letter to the editor touched on matters of public concern. The trial court agreed their argument, concluding that plaintiff’s various lawsuits and allegations against county board members, as well as a financial scandal in a neighboring town, in which the plaintiff was, at the time, the assistant town attorney, were matters of public concern. Thus, plaintiff was required to prove New York Times malice by clear and convincing evidence in order to recover presumed or punitive damages; the plaintiff had already stipulated that he was not seeking compensatory damages in the case. In the face of the court’s ruling, the plaintiff chose to suffer a voluntary dismissal rather than prosecute a futile attempt to prove that the firm’s clients knew that the statements were false or acted with reckless disregard for the truth.
Matthew W. Lee and Haley B. Mathis
Curt Schlom (Partner-Chicago, IL), Matthew Lee (Partner-DC Metro) and Haley Mathis (Associate-McLean, VA) prevailed on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction on behalf of the firm’s client, a corporation having its principal place of business in the Republic of China (Taiwan). The plaintiff purchased an e-bike online and was injured while riding when the seat assembly dislodged. The plaintiff alleged that the assembly was defective in design and/or manufacture and, further, that the firm’s client designed and manufactured the product assembly. The team argued that the plaintiff could not present facts establishing that the firm’s client “purposefully availed” itself of the privilege of doing business in Virginia such that it was subject to jurisdiction in the Commonwealth. The team further argued that the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 180 L. Ed. 2d 765 (2011) made clear that simply placing a product into the “stream of commerce” was not sufficient to satisfy minimum contacts, even if a defendant could have predicted that the product would arrive in the forum jurisdiction. The trial court agreed with the team’s argument and dismissed the client from the lawsuit, which remains pending against the retailer of the e-bike in question.
Curt J. Schlom, Matthew W. Lee and Haley B. Mathis
Matthew Lee (Partner-Washington, DC) and Nicole Melvani (Of Counsel, Washington, DC) prevailed on a motion for summary judgment in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in a legal malpractice against the firm’s attorney client. Matt and Nicole argued that the plaintiff – himself a lawyer – was unable, as a matter of law, to prove the “case-within-the-case,” which requires that a legal malpractice plaintiff adduce sufficient evidence proving he would have received a more favorable result in the underlying litigation (in this case the plaintiff was denied a Chapter 7 discharge of his extensive debts due to his having fraudulently transferred his residence to his newlywed wife and himself as tenants by the entirety six months before filing for bankruptcy protection). Even though the prima facie element of causation is an issue ordinarily left for the jury to decide, in this case the Court ruled that reasonable minds could not differ – that plaintiff could not prove a better result, and thus he was unable to prove causation as a matter of law. The plaintiff did not note an appeal of the summary judgment ruling, and that order is now final.
Matthew W. Lee and Nicole T. Melvani