Eric W.F. Niederer

Nevada’s Supreme Court has overruled Capriati Construction Corp. v. Yahyavi, 137 Nev. 675, 498 P.3d 226 (2021) to the extent it holds that a plaintiff represented on a contingency fee may recover the entire contingency fee if an offer of judgment is beaten. In Clark v. Marin, 142 Nev. Adv. Op. 47 (July 2, 2026), Marin sued Clark for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident. Marin served Clark a $2 million offer of judgment 24 days before trial. The jury’s verdict totaled $2,045,117.55. Offers of judgment under NRCP 68 are a powerful tool, allowing a plaintiff to serve an offer of judgment and recover post-offer attorneys’ fees if the plaintiff recovers more than was offered. The verdict here, plus prejudgment interest and taxable costs, produced a judgment that exceeded $2 million, so the plaintiff moved for attorneys’ fees. In Capriati, the Supreme Court affirmed a district court’s order awarding a personal injury plaintiff’s entire contingency fee because a “contingency fee does not vest until the client prevails.” As the client does not prevail until after the offer of judgment is served, the full contingency fee could be awarded. The district court applied Capriati and awarded “attorney’s fees in the full amount of Marin’s contingency fee agreement, totaling $818,047.02.” On appeal, Clark overruled Capriati. Clark reasoned a personal injury plaintiff incurs attorneys’ fees throughout the case but has no obligation to pay them unless there is a recovery. This is consistent with the fact that clients who discharge attorneys on contingency fee agreements are still obligated to pay for the services they receive. Moving forward, “while courts can consider the contingency fee amount in awarding attorney fees under NRCP 68, the award must be proportionate to and directly reflective of the work performed from the time of the offer.” The Court did not specify a specific method for doing so, but district courts “should determine a starting amount and make adjustments to account only for the work completed post-offer.” The Clark decision is a significant ruling for defendants. Nevada courts have consistently ruled that offers of judgment are not intended to force parties unfairly to forego legitimate claims. Excessive fee awards, “like those covering the entirety of a contingency fee agreement, risk such an effect. … NRCP 68 must hold offerees responsible for the value of the work required in continuing to litigate the case instead of settling, and no more.”

Understanding key principles of policy interpretation and following sound drafting practices can help you reduce ambiguity, minimize costly disputes, and ensure coverage is applied as intended—protecting both your organization and your insureds. Wilson Elser’s Words Matter! is a one-page reference guide developed by our Insurance Coverage Practice attorneys to avoid issues with insurance policy and application language.

Jonathan Meer (Partner-New York, NY) will present the Wilson Elser Forum webinar “Legal Ethics in the World of Artificial Intelligence” on July 16, 2026. The presentation will address how attorney regulation has evolved over time and what steps are being considered for policing attorney use of AI. Jonathan will touch on some of the model rules and ethical opinions concerning technology, as well as rules being adopted by the courts regarding AI use. He’ll also highlight instances of attorneys being reprimanded for misusing AI. Using artificial intelligence as a tool is becoming more commonplace among lawyers. The AI guidelines, whether established by courts, state bar associations, law firms, individual practitioners, or otherwise, should be a growing concern that requires careful consideration by lawyers today. 

Kathleen Wilkinson was honored with the Pennsylvania Bar Association’s (PBA) 2026 Civil Litigation Professional Excellence Award, presented at the PBA Civil Litigation Section’s Annual Civil Litigation Retreat in State College, Pennsylvania, on April 25, 2026. Past Section Chair Jennifer Coatsworth and the Honorable Stephanie Domitrovich, a senior state trial judge, presented the award. At the presentation, Past Chair Coatsworth stated that as past president of the Pennsylvania Bar Association and past chair of the Civil Litigation Section, Kathleen has long been recognized for her leadership, professionalism, and commitment to the legal profession. As PBA president, she championed attorney wellness and civility, leading the PBA House of Delegates to support a wellness pledge. Kathleen’s nomination highlighted her distinguished service as the PBA's 127th President and the Philadelphia Bar Association’s 86th Chancellor ‒ the sixth woman to hold each office ‒ as well as her continued leadership through committee service, mentoring, and strategic guidance to both organizations. Throughout her career, Kathleen’s nomination also emphasized that Kathleen has advanced initiatives focused on attorney wellness, civility, diversity and inclusion, leadership development, and the advancement of women in the profession. As Philadelphia Bar Association Chancellor, she established the Chancellor Leadership Institute to help young and diverse attorneys develop leadership skills, and she has remained an active contributor to CLE programming and the PBA's Civility Committee. Kathleen’s nomination aptly recognized her as embodying the qualities the Civil Litigation Professional Excellence Award celebrates: excellence in the practice and administration of law, unwavering integrity, the highest ethical standards, and civility and fairness both inside and outside the courtroom. 

Celeena Pompeo (Partner-Orange County, CA) and Jessica Trinh (Associate-Orange County, LA) secured a voluntary dismissal in the Superior Court of California, Los Angeles County, on behalf of Wilson Elser’s festival promoter client in a wrongful death action. Recognizing the opportunity to resolve the matter at an early stage, Celeena and Jessica proactively presented the relevant facts with transparency and credibility, demonstrating that the claims against the client lacked merit. Their strategic advocacy prompted the plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss the client from the litigation before motion practice. By securing an early dismissal, Celeena and Jessica spared the client the cost and burden of prolonged litigation.

On May 6, 2026, the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously held in Murray v. Punina, 264 N.J. 1, 5 (2026) that future medical expense benefits that do not exceed a claimant's Personal Injury Protection (“PIP”) coverage limits are "collectible" for purposes of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 and, therefore, inadmissible in a plaintiff's personal injury trial against a tortfeasor. The rule applies equally to PIP benefits obtained through standard auto policies and through the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund ("UCJF"). Justice Fasciale wrote for the Court, affirming the Appellate Division. The facts of the Murray case are brief. Plaintiff Murray, injured as a passenger in a 2016 collision with an uninsured driver, received PIP benefits through NJPLIGA/UCJF entitling her to US$250,000 in PIP benefits. Her pre-trial medical expenses did not exhaust those limits. Over defendant Marrone's objection, the trial court admitted expert testimony projecting $42,000–$160,000 in future surgical expenses, and the jury awarded $100,000 in future medical damages. The Appellate Division reversed, holding the evidence inadmissible, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court's decision rested on five interlocking lines of reasoning. First, it observed that New Jersey's No-Fault Act was built on a deliberate trade-off: accident victims receive prompt, guaranteed medical expense compensation regardless of fault, in exchange for limits on their right to sue. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 exists specifically to enforce the other side of that bargain—by barring admission of evidence of losses "collectible" under PIP, it prevents plaintiffs from recovering the same medical costs twice (once from guaranteed PIP benefits and again from a tort verdict against the tortfeasor). The Court reasoned that permitting double recovery would undermine the entire cost-control logic of the no-fault system—if plaintiffs can collect the same expenses from both sources, the guaranteed-benefit-in-exchange-for-limited-tort-recovery bargain becomes one-sided. Second, the Court held that N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 applies to UCJF claimants because the UCJF was created to place victims of uninsured drivers in the same position as standard-policy claimants—"equivalent to" and no better than a liability policy. The UCJF statute, N.J.S.A. 39:6-86.1, uses "personal injury protection" as a general term, and every No-Fault Act PIP amendment has been conformingly applied to UCJF benefits—confirming legislative intent that the two schemes operate identically. Reading N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 to not apply to UCJF claimants would hand them a windfall double recovery unavailable to standard-policy holders, contradicting the fund's remedial purpose. Third, the Court carefully parsed the statutory terms. Under longstanding New Jersey case law, “collectible” means an amount a person has a present legal entitlement to receive—regardless of whether payment has been requested or delivered. Because PIP coverage creates an automatic legal right to payment for covered medical expenses up to the policy limit the moment those expenses are incurred, any future expense falling within remaining PIP capacity is already "collectible" as a matter of law. It is "unpaid" only in the sense that the treatment hasn't happened yet, but it is not "uncovered" or beyond the reach of PIP. The Court thus rejected Murray's conflation of "unpaid" with "not collectible," explaining that the two concepts are legally distinct. Fourth, the Court found that the legislative history confirmed the narrow scope of the 2019 amendment. In Haines v. Taft, 237 N.J. 271 (2019), the Court had barred evidence of medical expenses exceeding a plaintiff's lower PIP limits (e.g., $15,000)—leaving those plaintiffs with no source of recovery for excess costs. The legislature's fix, the 2019 amendment, was narrowly targeted: it permits recovery only of expenses that "exceed or are unpaid or uncovered by" PIP limits. The Court reflected that Governor Murphy's signing statement confirmed the amendment's purpose was to help "low-income drivers . . . [with] lesser PIP coverage options" recover costs that exceed their PIP ceilings—not to allow any plaintiff to recover costs the PIP system will eventually cover. The Court reasoned that if the legislature had intended to open the door to within-limits recovery, it would have said so explicitly—instead, the amendment's entire thrust reinforces the "collectible" reading. Finally, the Court identified a concrete policy danger if "unpaid" future expenses within PIP limits could be presented to a jury: plaintiffs would have a financial incentive to defer recommended medical treatment until after trial specifically to inflate their tort verdict—shifting costs the PIP carrier/fund was designed and funded to absorb onto individual defendants. The Court explicitly found this would constitute the precise "double-dipping" and cost-shifting the No-Fault Act was built to eliminate, rewarding gamesmanship over genuine need. This consequentialist reasoning served as an independent justification for the holding. Defense attorneys should, therefore, do three things in the wake of the Murray decision: (1) identify PIP coverage early; (2) serve targeted PIP exhaustion discovery; (3) move in limine to exclude future medical expense evidence. To identify PIP coverage, counsel should determine plaintiff's PIP source, maximum limit, amounts paid, and remaining balance, as every dollar of remaining capacity is considered inadmissible damages. Serving targeted PIP exhaustion discovery is a must, counsel must demand the PIP declarations/UCJF coverage letter, payment ledger, and confirmation of remaining benefits. Finally, counsel should move in limine to exclude future medical expense evidence and cite Murray and N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 with supporting coverage documentation to preserve the record for appeal. Murray v. Punina provides a bright-line rule grounded in five independent but reinforcing rationales. Defense counsel should incorporate it immediately into standard motion practice in every New Jersey auto personal injury case where PIP benefits remain available.

​Jazmin Williams (Associate-White Plains, NY) and Jay Potter (Partner-New York, NY) obtained summary judgment in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Nassau County, on behalf of Wilson Elser’s client, a sign repair company, securing dismissal of all claims and cross-claims. The team persuaded the court to reject the plaintiff’s metallurgical engineering expert’s opinions as speculative and unsupported by the evidence. The plaintiff, a convenience store patron, alleged that a portion of a store sign fell and struck her head and neck, causing a traumatic brain injury and requiring a multi-level cervical fusion. She made a $10 million pre-motion settlement demand, and the store owner sought defense and indemnification from the client as well. Our client had been retained to perform limited repairs to the sign approximately 13 months before the accident. Through a careful analysis of the governing contracts and testimony from the co-defendants, Jazmin established that the client acted solely as an independent contractor with a narrowly defined scope of work. Further evidence demonstrated that the parties specifically negotiated a one-year warranty on the repairs. This record helped establish Wilson Elser’s prima facie argument that the client owed no duty to inspect or reassess the sign after its work was completed. Jazmin meticulously prepared the client's witnesses for deposition and secured testimony confirming the owner's acceptance of the completed work. Combined with the defense expert's opinions, the court agreed that the evidence eliminated any triable issue of fact as to whether the sign was defective when the client completed its repairs more than a year before the incident. Without evidence linking the client’s repair work to the sign failure, the plaintiff’s engineering expert lacked a factual basis to support his causation opinions. The court agreed with Wilson Elser’s arguments that the plaintiff’s expert’s opinions were based on speculation and conjecture, rejected them outright, and dismissed both the plaintiff’s negligence claims against the client and the contractual indemnification and contribution claims asserted by the co-defendants.

Super Lawyers® has named six Wilson Elser attorneys to the 2026 Florida Rising Stars™ List: Miami: Danielle T. Gauer (Of Counsel) – Transportation/Maritime Maria Papasakelariou (Of Counsel) – PI General – Defense Orlando: Michelle L. Bedoya (Of Counsel) – Insurance Coverage Shaina Druker (Partner) –  Insurance Coverage Michael Nesper (Associate) – Insurance Coverage West Palm Beach: Daniel M. Schwarz (Of Counsel) – Appellate Super Lawyers, a Thomson Reuters business, is a rating service of outstanding lawyers from more than 70 practice areas who have attained a high degree of peer recognition and professional achievement. The Rising Stars lists, comprising the best attorneys who are 40 and younger or who have practiced law for 10 years or less, are published in Super Lawyers magazines and leading city and regional magazines nationwide. No more than 2.5 percent of the lawyers in the state are named to these lists.

Maryan Alexander (Partner-Baltimore, MD) will present the webinar “Litigation Management 101” as part of CLM’s 2026 Insurance 101 Webinar Series, Building a Strong Foundation in Insurance Fundamentals, to be held on July 29, 2026. Maryan’s session provides a high-level overview of the litigation process and the claims professional’s role in managing outside counsel, budgets, and case strategy. Participants will gain insight into key litigation milestones, reporting expectations, and effective collaboration with defense counsel. Ideal for those newer to litigation oversight, this session emphasizes proactive management practices that support strong outcomes and cost control.

Joe Baiocco (Partner-White Plains, NY), Lara Lickhalter (Partner-Chicago, IL), Wendy Testa (Partner-Philadelphia, NY), and Jane Young (Partner-Denver, CO) are featured professors in the Transportation and Construction Schools at the 2026 ClaimsXchange Claims Academy in Chicago, Illinois, on July 14 ‒ 15, 2026. The Academy, an intensive two-day CLE and CE-accredited program, brings together renowned experts in various claims management specialties to offer professionals a challenging curriculum and unparalleled opportunities for creative learning and problem-solving. Wendy, who will serve as both provost and an instructor for the Construction track, will present "Construction Contracts and Risk Transfer" and "Emerging Professional and Technological Exposures in Construction". Jane, also an instructor in the Construction track, will present "Analysis of Coverage and Potential Gaps Related to Design and Construction Claims." Joe and Lara will provide their expertise in the Transportation School Track. Joe’s sessions include “Creative Resolution Strategies" and "Rapid Response", and Lara will provide instruction in her session "Risk Transfer.” Programs presented by our attorneys focus on developing advanced decision-making skills through analytical and practical approaches to evaluating transportation and construction/design claims; strengthening negotiation techniques for resolving complex disputes; and enhancing participants' ability to evaluate significant construction/design claims and analyze the coverage issues they present. 

Jonathan Meer (Partner-New York, NY) will present the Wilson Elser Forum webinar “Legal Ethics in the World of Artificial Intelligence” on July 16, 2026. The presentation will address how attorney regulation has evolved over time and what steps are being considered for policing attorney use of AI. Jonathan will touch on some of the model rules and ethical opinions concerning technology, as well as rules being adopted by the courts regarding AI use. He’ll also highlight instances of attorneys being reprimanded for misusing AI. Using artificial intelligence as a tool is becoming more commonplace among lawyers. The AI guidelines, whether established by courts, state bar associations, law firms, individual practitioners, or otherwise, should be a growing concern that requires careful consideration by lawyers today. 

Understanding key principles of policy interpretation and following sound drafting practices can help you reduce ambiguity, minimize costly disputes, and ensure coverage is applied as intended—protecting both your organization and your insureds. Wilson Elser’s Words Matter! is a one-page reference guide developed by our Insurance Coverage Practice attorneys to avoid issues with insurance policy and application language.

Nevada’s Supreme Court has overruled Capriati Construction Corp. v. Yahyavi, 137 Nev. 675, 498 P.3d 226 (2021) to the extent it holds that a plaintiff represented on a contingency fee may recover the entire contingency fee if an offer of judgment is beaten. In Clark v. Marin, 142 Nev. Adv. Op. 47 (July 2, 2026), Marin sued Clark for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident. Marin served Clark a $2 million offer of judgment 24 days before trial. The jury’s verdict totaled $2,045,117.55. Offers of judgment under NRCP 68 are a powerful tool, allowing a plaintiff to serve an offer of judgment and recover post-offer attorneys’ fees if the plaintiff recovers more than was offered. The verdict here, plus prejudgment interest and taxable costs, produced a judgment that exceeded $2 million, so the plaintiff moved for attorneys’ fees. In Capriati, the Supreme Court affirmed a district court’s order awarding a personal injury plaintiff’s entire contingency fee because a “contingency fee does not vest until the client prevails.” As the client does not prevail until after the offer of judgment is served, the full contingency fee could be awarded. The district court applied Capriati and awarded “attorney’s fees in the full amount of Marin’s contingency fee agreement, totaling $818,047.02.” On appeal, Clark overruled Capriati. Clark reasoned a personal injury plaintiff incurs attorneys’ fees throughout the case but has no obligation to pay them unless there is a recovery. This is consistent with the fact that clients who discharge attorneys on contingency fee agreements are still obligated to pay for the services they receive. Moving forward, “while courts can consider the contingency fee amount in awarding attorney fees under NRCP 68, the award must be proportionate to and directly reflective of the work performed from the time of the offer.” The Court did not specify a specific method for doing so, but district courts “should determine a starting amount and make adjustments to account only for the work completed post-offer.” The Clark decision is a significant ruling for defendants. Nevada courts have consistently ruled that offers of judgment are not intended to force parties unfairly to forego legitimate claims. Excessive fee awards, “like those covering the entirety of a contingency fee agreement, risk such an effect. … NRCP 68 must hold offerees responsible for the value of the work required in continuing to litigate the case instead of settling, and no more.”

Kathleen Wilkinson was honored with the Pennsylvania Bar Association’s (PBA) 2026 Civil Litigation Professional Excellence Award, presented at the PBA Civil Litigation Section’s Annual Civil Litigation Retreat in State College, Pennsylvania, on April 25, 2026. Past Section Chair Jennifer Coatsworth and the Honorable Stephanie Domitrovich, a senior state trial judge, presented the award. At the presentation, Past Chair Coatsworth stated that as past president of the Pennsylvania Bar Association and past chair of the Civil Litigation Section, Kathleen has long been recognized for her leadership, professionalism, and commitment to the legal profession. As PBA president, she championed attorney wellness and civility, leading the PBA House of Delegates to support a wellness pledge. Kathleen’s nomination highlighted her distinguished service as the PBA's 127th President and the Philadelphia Bar Association’s 86th Chancellor ‒ the sixth woman to hold each office ‒ as well as her continued leadership through committee service, mentoring, and strategic guidance to both organizations. Throughout her career, Kathleen’s nomination also emphasized that Kathleen has advanced initiatives focused on attorney wellness, civility, diversity and inclusion, leadership development, and the advancement of women in the profession. As Philadelphia Bar Association Chancellor, she established the Chancellor Leadership Institute to help young and diverse attorneys develop leadership skills, and she has remained an active contributor to CLE programming and the PBA's Civility Committee. Kathleen’s nomination aptly recognized her as embodying the qualities the Civil Litigation Professional Excellence Award celebrates: excellence in the practice and administration of law, unwavering integrity, the highest ethical standards, and civility and fairness both inside and outside the courtroom. 

Celeena Pompeo (Partner-Orange County, CA) and Jessica Trinh (Associate-Orange County, LA) secured a voluntary dismissal in the Superior Court of California, Los Angeles County, on behalf of Wilson Elser’s festival promoter client in a wrongful death action. Recognizing the opportunity to resolve the matter at an early stage, Celeena and Jessica proactively presented the relevant facts with transparency and credibility, demonstrating that the claims against the client lacked merit. Their strategic advocacy prompted the plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss the client from the litigation before motion practice. By securing an early dismissal, Celeena and Jessica spared the client the cost and burden of prolonged litigation.

On May 6, 2026, the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously held in Murray v. Punina, 264 N.J. 1, 5 (2026) that future medical expense benefits that do not exceed a claimant's Personal Injury Protection (“PIP”) coverage limits are "collectible" for purposes of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 and, therefore, inadmissible in a plaintiff's personal injury trial against a tortfeasor. The rule applies equally to PIP benefits obtained through standard auto policies and through the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund ("UCJF"). Justice Fasciale wrote for the Court, affirming the Appellate Division. The facts of the Murray case are brief. Plaintiff Murray, injured as a passenger in a 2016 collision with an uninsured driver, received PIP benefits through NJPLIGA/UCJF entitling her to US$250,000 in PIP benefits. Her pre-trial medical expenses did not exhaust those limits. Over defendant Marrone's objection, the trial court admitted expert testimony projecting $42,000–$160,000 in future surgical expenses, and the jury awarded $100,000 in future medical damages. The Appellate Division reversed, holding the evidence inadmissible, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court's decision rested on five interlocking lines of reasoning. First, it observed that New Jersey's No-Fault Act was built on a deliberate trade-off: accident victims receive prompt, guaranteed medical expense compensation regardless of fault, in exchange for limits on their right to sue. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 exists specifically to enforce the other side of that bargain—by barring admission of evidence of losses "collectible" under PIP, it prevents plaintiffs from recovering the same medical costs twice (once from guaranteed PIP benefits and again from a tort verdict against the tortfeasor). The Court reasoned that permitting double recovery would undermine the entire cost-control logic of the no-fault system—if plaintiffs can collect the same expenses from both sources, the guaranteed-benefit-in-exchange-for-limited-tort-recovery bargain becomes one-sided. Second, the Court held that N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 applies to UCJF claimants because the UCJF was created to place victims of uninsured drivers in the same position as standard-policy claimants—"equivalent to" and no better than a liability policy. The UCJF statute, N.J.S.A. 39:6-86.1, uses "personal injury protection" as a general term, and every No-Fault Act PIP amendment has been conformingly applied to UCJF benefits—confirming legislative intent that the two schemes operate identically. Reading N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 to not apply to UCJF claimants would hand them a windfall double recovery unavailable to standard-policy holders, contradicting the fund's remedial purpose. Third, the Court carefully parsed the statutory terms. Under longstanding New Jersey case law, “collectible” means an amount a person has a present legal entitlement to receive—regardless of whether payment has been requested or delivered. Because PIP coverage creates an automatic legal right to payment for covered medical expenses up to the policy limit the moment those expenses are incurred, any future expense falling within remaining PIP capacity is already "collectible" as a matter of law. It is "unpaid" only in the sense that the treatment hasn't happened yet, but it is not "uncovered" or beyond the reach of PIP. The Court thus rejected Murray's conflation of "unpaid" with "not collectible," explaining that the two concepts are legally distinct. Fourth, the Court found that the legislative history confirmed the narrow scope of the 2019 amendment. In Haines v. Taft, 237 N.J. 271 (2019), the Court had barred evidence of medical expenses exceeding a plaintiff's lower PIP limits (e.g., $15,000)—leaving those plaintiffs with no source of recovery for excess costs. The legislature's fix, the 2019 amendment, was narrowly targeted: it permits recovery only of expenses that "exceed or are unpaid or uncovered by" PIP limits. The Court reflected that Governor Murphy's signing statement confirmed the amendment's purpose was to help "low-income drivers . . . [with] lesser PIP coverage options" recover costs that exceed their PIP ceilings—not to allow any plaintiff to recover costs the PIP system will eventually cover. The Court reasoned that if the legislature had intended to open the door to within-limits recovery, it would have said so explicitly—instead, the amendment's entire thrust reinforces the "collectible" reading. Finally, the Court identified a concrete policy danger if "unpaid" future expenses within PIP limits could be presented to a jury: plaintiffs would have a financial incentive to defer recommended medical treatment until after trial specifically to inflate their tort verdict—shifting costs the PIP carrier/fund was designed and funded to absorb onto individual defendants. The Court explicitly found this would constitute the precise "double-dipping" and cost-shifting the No-Fault Act was built to eliminate, rewarding gamesmanship over genuine need. This consequentialist reasoning served as an independent justification for the holding. Defense attorneys should, therefore, do three things in the wake of the Murray decision: (1) identify PIP coverage early; (2) serve targeted PIP exhaustion discovery; (3) move in limine to exclude future medical expense evidence. To identify PIP coverage, counsel should determine plaintiff's PIP source, maximum limit, amounts paid, and remaining balance, as every dollar of remaining capacity is considered inadmissible damages. Serving targeted PIP exhaustion discovery is a must, counsel must demand the PIP declarations/UCJF coverage letter, payment ledger, and confirmation of remaining benefits. Finally, counsel should move in limine to exclude future medical expense evidence and cite Murray and N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 with supporting coverage documentation to preserve the record for appeal. Murray v. Punina provides a bright-line rule grounded in five independent but reinforcing rationales. Defense counsel should incorporate it immediately into standard motion practice in every New Jersey auto personal injury case where PIP benefits remain available.

​Jazmin Williams (Associate-White Plains, NY) and Jay Potter (Partner-New York, NY) obtained summary judgment in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Nassau County, on behalf of Wilson Elser’s client, a sign repair company, securing dismissal of all claims and cross-claims. The team persuaded the court to reject the plaintiff’s metallurgical engineering expert’s opinions as speculative and unsupported by the evidence. The plaintiff, a convenience store patron, alleged that a portion of a store sign fell and struck her head and neck, causing a traumatic brain injury and requiring a multi-level cervical fusion. She made a $10 million pre-motion settlement demand, and the store owner sought defense and indemnification from the client as well. Our client had been retained to perform limited repairs to the sign approximately 13 months before the accident. Through a careful analysis of the governing contracts and testimony from the co-defendants, Jazmin established that the client acted solely as an independent contractor with a narrowly defined scope of work. Further evidence demonstrated that the parties specifically negotiated a one-year warranty on the repairs. This record helped establish Wilson Elser’s prima facie argument that the client owed no duty to inspect or reassess the sign after its work was completed. Jazmin meticulously prepared the client's witnesses for deposition and secured testimony confirming the owner's acceptance of the completed work. Combined with the defense expert's opinions, the court agreed that the evidence eliminated any triable issue of fact as to whether the sign was defective when the client completed its repairs more than a year before the incident. Without evidence linking the client’s repair work to the sign failure, the plaintiff’s engineering expert lacked a factual basis to support his causation opinions. The court agreed with Wilson Elser’s arguments that the plaintiff’s expert’s opinions were based on speculation and conjecture, rejected them outright, and dismissed both the plaintiff’s negligence claims against the client and the contractual indemnification and contribution claims asserted by the co-defendants.

Super Lawyers® has named six Wilson Elser attorneys to the 2026 Florida Rising Stars™ List: Miami: Danielle T. Gauer (Of Counsel) – Transportation/Maritime Maria Papasakelariou (Of Counsel) – PI General – Defense Orlando: Michelle L. Bedoya (Of Counsel) – Insurance Coverage Shaina Druker (Partner) –  Insurance Coverage Michael Nesper (Associate) – Insurance Coverage West Palm Beach: Daniel M. Schwarz (Of Counsel) – Appellate Super Lawyers, a Thomson Reuters business, is a rating service of outstanding lawyers from more than 70 practice areas who have attained a high degree of peer recognition and professional achievement. The Rising Stars lists, comprising the best attorneys who are 40 and younger or who have practiced law for 10 years or less, are published in Super Lawyers magazines and leading city and regional magazines nationwide. No more than 2.5 percent of the lawyers in the state are named to these lists.

Maryan Alexander (Partner-Baltimore, MD) will present the webinar “Litigation Management 101” as part of CLM’s 2026 Insurance 101 Webinar Series, Building a Strong Foundation in Insurance Fundamentals, to be held on July 29, 2026. Maryan’s session provides a high-level overview of the litigation process and the claims professional’s role in managing outside counsel, budgets, and case strategy. Participants will gain insight into key litigation milestones, reporting expectations, and effective collaboration with defense counsel. Ideal for those newer to litigation oversight, this session emphasizes proactive management practices that support strong outcomes and cost control.

Joe Baiocco (Partner-White Plains, NY), Lara Lickhalter (Partner-Chicago, IL), Wendy Testa (Partner-Philadelphia, NY), and Jane Young (Partner-Denver, CO) are featured professors in the Transportation and Construction Schools at the 2026 ClaimsXchange Claims Academy in Chicago, Illinois, on July 14 ‒ 15, 2026. The Academy, an intensive two-day CLE and CE-accredited program, brings together renowned experts in various claims management specialties to offer professionals a challenging curriculum and unparalleled opportunities for creative learning and problem-solving. Wendy, who will serve as both provost and an instructor for the Construction track, will present "Construction Contracts and Risk Transfer" and "Emerging Professional and Technological Exposures in Construction". Jane, also an instructor in the Construction track, will present "Analysis of Coverage and Potential Gaps Related to Design and Construction Claims." Joe and Lara will provide their expertise in the Transportation School Track. Joe’s sessions include “Creative Resolution Strategies" and "Rapid Response", and Lara will provide instruction in her session "Risk Transfer.” Programs presented by our attorneys focus on developing advanced decision-making skills through analytical and practical approaches to evaluating transportation and construction/design claims; strengthening negotiation techniques for resolving complex disputes; and enhancing participants' ability to evaluate significant construction/design claims and analyze the coverage issues they present. 

Jonathan Meer (Partner-New York, NY) will present the Wilson Elser Forum webinar “Legal Ethics in the World of Artificial Intelligence” on July 16, 2026. The presentation will address how attorney regulation has evolved over time and what steps are being considered for policing attorney use of AI. Jonathan will touch on some of the model rules and ethical opinions concerning technology, as well as rules being adopted by the courts regarding AI use. He’ll also highlight instances of attorneys being reprimanded for misusing AI. Using artificial intelligence as a tool is becoming more commonplace among lawyers. The AI guidelines, whether established by courts, state bar associations, law firms, individual practitioners, or otherwise, should be a growing concern that requires careful consideration by lawyers today. 

Understanding key principles of policy interpretation and following sound drafting practices can help you reduce ambiguity, minimize costly disputes, and ensure coverage is applied as intended—protecting both your organization and your insureds. Wilson Elser’s Words Matter! is a one-page reference guide developed by our Insurance Coverage Practice attorneys to avoid issues with insurance policy and application language.

Nevada’s Supreme Court has overruled Capriati Construction Corp. v. Yahyavi, 137 Nev. 675, 498 P.3d 226 (2021) to the extent it holds that a plaintiff represented on a contingency fee may recover the entire contingency fee if an offer of judgment is beaten. In Clark v. Marin, 142 Nev. Adv. Op. 47 (July 2, 2026), Marin sued Clark for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident. Marin served Clark a $2 million offer of judgment 24 days before trial. The jury’s verdict totaled $2,045,117.55. Offers of judgment under NRCP 68 are a powerful tool, allowing a plaintiff to serve an offer of judgment and recover post-offer attorneys’ fees if the plaintiff recovers more than was offered. The verdict here, plus prejudgment interest and taxable costs, produced a judgment that exceeded $2 million, so the plaintiff moved for attorneys’ fees. In Capriati, the Supreme Court affirmed a district court’s order awarding a personal injury plaintiff’s entire contingency fee because a “contingency fee does not vest until the client prevails.” As the client does not prevail until after the offer of judgment is served, the full contingency fee could be awarded. The district court applied Capriati and awarded “attorney’s fees in the full amount of Marin’s contingency fee agreement, totaling $818,047.02.” On appeal, Clark overruled Capriati. Clark reasoned a personal injury plaintiff incurs attorneys’ fees throughout the case but has no obligation to pay them unless there is a recovery. This is consistent with the fact that clients who discharge attorneys on contingency fee agreements are still obligated to pay for the services they receive. Moving forward, “while courts can consider the contingency fee amount in awarding attorney fees under NRCP 68, the award must be proportionate to and directly reflective of the work performed from the time of the offer.” The Court did not specify a specific method for doing so, but district courts “should determine a starting amount and make adjustments to account only for the work completed post-offer.” The Clark decision is a significant ruling for defendants. Nevada courts have consistently ruled that offers of judgment are not intended to force parties unfairly to forego legitimate claims. Excessive fee awards, “like those covering the entirety of a contingency fee agreement, risk such an effect. … NRCP 68 must hold offerees responsible for the value of the work required in continuing to litigate the case instead of settling, and no more.”

Kathleen Wilkinson was honored with the Pennsylvania Bar Association’s (PBA) 2026 Civil Litigation Professional Excellence Award, presented at the PBA Civil Litigation Section’s Annual Civil Litigation Retreat in State College, Pennsylvania, on April 25, 2026. Past Section Chair Jennifer Coatsworth and the Honorable Stephanie Domitrovich, a senior state trial judge, presented the award. At the presentation, Past Chair Coatsworth stated that as past president of the Pennsylvania Bar Association and past chair of the Civil Litigation Section, Kathleen has long been recognized for her leadership, professionalism, and commitment to the legal profession. As PBA president, she championed attorney wellness and civility, leading the PBA House of Delegates to support a wellness pledge. Kathleen’s nomination highlighted her distinguished service as the PBA's 127th President and the Philadelphia Bar Association’s 86th Chancellor ‒ the sixth woman to hold each office ‒ as well as her continued leadership through committee service, mentoring, and strategic guidance to both organizations. Throughout her career, Kathleen’s nomination also emphasized that Kathleen has advanced initiatives focused on attorney wellness, civility, diversity and inclusion, leadership development, and the advancement of women in the profession. As Philadelphia Bar Association Chancellor, she established the Chancellor Leadership Institute to help young and diverse attorneys develop leadership skills, and she has remained an active contributor to CLE programming and the PBA's Civility Committee. Kathleen’s nomination aptly recognized her as embodying the qualities the Civil Litigation Professional Excellence Award celebrates: excellence in the practice and administration of law, unwavering integrity, the highest ethical standards, and civility and fairness both inside and outside the courtroom. 

Celeena Pompeo (Partner-Orange County, CA) and Jessica Trinh (Associate-Orange County, LA) secured a voluntary dismissal in the Superior Court of California, Los Angeles County, on behalf of Wilson Elser’s festival promoter client in a wrongful death action. Recognizing the opportunity to resolve the matter at an early stage, Celeena and Jessica proactively presented the relevant facts with transparency and credibility, demonstrating that the claims against the client lacked merit. Their strategic advocacy prompted the plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss the client from the litigation before motion practice. By securing an early dismissal, Celeena and Jessica spared the client the cost and burden of prolonged litigation.

On May 6, 2026, the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously held in Murray v. Punina, 264 N.J. 1, 5 (2026) that future medical expense benefits that do not exceed a claimant's Personal Injury Protection (“PIP”) coverage limits are "collectible" for purposes of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 and, therefore, inadmissible in a plaintiff's personal injury trial against a tortfeasor. The rule applies equally to PIP benefits obtained through standard auto policies and through the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund ("UCJF"). Justice Fasciale wrote for the Court, affirming the Appellate Division. The facts of the Murray case are brief. Plaintiff Murray, injured as a passenger in a 2016 collision with an uninsured driver, received PIP benefits through NJPLIGA/UCJF entitling her to US$250,000 in PIP benefits. Her pre-trial medical expenses did not exhaust those limits. Over defendant Marrone's objection, the trial court admitted expert testimony projecting $42,000–$160,000 in future surgical expenses, and the jury awarded $100,000 in future medical damages. The Appellate Division reversed, holding the evidence inadmissible, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court's decision rested on five interlocking lines of reasoning. First, it observed that New Jersey's No-Fault Act was built on a deliberate trade-off: accident victims receive prompt, guaranteed medical expense compensation regardless of fault, in exchange for limits on their right to sue. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 exists specifically to enforce the other side of that bargain—by barring admission of evidence of losses "collectible" under PIP, it prevents plaintiffs from recovering the same medical costs twice (once from guaranteed PIP benefits and again from a tort verdict against the tortfeasor). The Court reasoned that permitting double recovery would undermine the entire cost-control logic of the no-fault system—if plaintiffs can collect the same expenses from both sources, the guaranteed-benefit-in-exchange-for-limited-tort-recovery bargain becomes one-sided. Second, the Court held that N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 applies to UCJF claimants because the UCJF was created to place victims of uninsured drivers in the same position as standard-policy claimants—"equivalent to" and no better than a liability policy. The UCJF statute, N.J.S.A. 39:6-86.1, uses "personal injury protection" as a general term, and every No-Fault Act PIP amendment has been conformingly applied to UCJF benefits—confirming legislative intent that the two schemes operate identically. Reading N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 to not apply to UCJF claimants would hand them a windfall double recovery unavailable to standard-policy holders, contradicting the fund's remedial purpose. Third, the Court carefully parsed the statutory terms. Under longstanding New Jersey case law, “collectible” means an amount a person has a present legal entitlement to receive—regardless of whether payment has been requested or delivered. Because PIP coverage creates an automatic legal right to payment for covered medical expenses up to the policy limit the moment those expenses are incurred, any future expense falling within remaining PIP capacity is already "collectible" as a matter of law. It is "unpaid" only in the sense that the treatment hasn't happened yet, but it is not "uncovered" or beyond the reach of PIP. The Court thus rejected Murray's conflation of "unpaid" with "not collectible," explaining that the two concepts are legally distinct. Fourth, the Court found that the legislative history confirmed the narrow scope of the 2019 amendment. In Haines v. Taft, 237 N.J. 271 (2019), the Court had barred evidence of medical expenses exceeding a plaintiff's lower PIP limits (e.g., $15,000)—leaving those plaintiffs with no source of recovery for excess costs. The legislature's fix, the 2019 amendment, was narrowly targeted: it permits recovery only of expenses that "exceed or are unpaid or uncovered by" PIP limits. The Court reflected that Governor Murphy's signing statement confirmed the amendment's purpose was to help "low-income drivers . . . [with] lesser PIP coverage options" recover costs that exceed their PIP ceilings—not to allow any plaintiff to recover costs the PIP system will eventually cover. The Court reasoned that if the legislature had intended to open the door to within-limits recovery, it would have said so explicitly—instead, the amendment's entire thrust reinforces the "collectible" reading. Finally, the Court identified a concrete policy danger if "unpaid" future expenses within PIP limits could be presented to a jury: plaintiffs would have a financial incentive to defer recommended medical treatment until after trial specifically to inflate their tort verdict—shifting costs the PIP carrier/fund was designed and funded to absorb onto individual defendants. The Court explicitly found this would constitute the precise "double-dipping" and cost-shifting the No-Fault Act was built to eliminate, rewarding gamesmanship over genuine need. This consequentialist reasoning served as an independent justification for the holding. Defense attorneys should, therefore, do three things in the wake of the Murray decision: (1) identify PIP coverage early; (2) serve targeted PIP exhaustion discovery; (3) move in limine to exclude future medical expense evidence. To identify PIP coverage, counsel should determine plaintiff's PIP source, maximum limit, amounts paid, and remaining balance, as every dollar of remaining capacity is considered inadmissible damages. Serving targeted PIP exhaustion discovery is a must, counsel must demand the PIP declarations/UCJF coverage letter, payment ledger, and confirmation of remaining benefits. Finally, counsel should move in limine to exclude future medical expense evidence and cite Murray and N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 with supporting coverage documentation to preserve the record for appeal. Murray v. Punina provides a bright-line rule grounded in five independent but reinforcing rationales. Defense counsel should incorporate it immediately into standard motion practice in every New Jersey auto personal injury case where PIP benefits remain available.