Christopher P. Flanagan

Convergence is a one-day, in-person conference for professionals at the intersection of privacy, cybersecurity, and AI governance. Hosted by Wilson Elser in partnership with Ankura and PrivadoAI, the event brings together general counsel, privacy leaders, cybersecurity and risk professionals, the insurance and carrier community, and outside counsel for practical discussions and industry networking. As agentic AI advances and regulatory expectations evolve, privacy, security, and governance can no longer be addressed in isolation. Convergence explores this convergence through four focused sessions, followed by a closing reception designed to continue the conversation.

Carrie Davis (Of Counsel-Atlanta, GA), Michael Manfredi (Partner-Atlanta, GA), and Chad Capers (Associate-Atlanta, GA) secured summary judgment in the State Court of Fulton County, Georgia, for Wilson Elser’s client, a real estate group primarily dealing in retail and mixed-use properties. The suit arose after an incident at a shopping center in Fulton County during which the plaintiff allegedly sustained serious injuries. The plaintiff alleged that she came to the shopping center to meet a coworker to exchange keys and then shop at a store there. While speaking with her coworker, an unknown assailant entered the plaintiff’s unlocked, running vehicle. As she attempted to stop the assailant, she was dragged through the parking lot, which was owned by a large American general merchandise retailer. Wilson Elser moved for summary judgment on the grounds that our client was neither an owner nor occupier of the premises; the plaintiff was not an invitee; the client did possess superior knowledge of criminal activity on the property; the plaintiff’s theory of proximate causation is conjectural; and the plaintiff’s own conduct was the proximate cause of her injuries ‒ due to a lack of due care and because she engaged in mutual combat. The judge granted the motion, concurring with the Atlanta team’s arguments that the plaintiff failed to prove our client had the requisite knowledge of other criminal activity on the property to make this incident foreseeable, and that the plaintiff failed to prove any additional or different security measures would have prevented it.

Super Lawyers® has named four attorneys from Wilson Elser’s Houston office to the 2026 Texas Super Lawyers® and Rising Stars™ lists: Super Lawyers Kent M. Adams (Senior Counsel) Personal Injury General: Defense Linda P. Wills (Partner) Employment & Labor Rising Stars Lina Al-Salim (Of Counsel) Personal Injury Medical Malpractice: Plaintiff Kelsi Wade Piatkowski (Partner) Personal Injury General: Defense Super Lawyers, a Thomson Reuters business, is a rating service of outstanding lawyers from more than 70 practice areas who have attained a high degree of peer recognition and professional achievement. The Rising Stars lists, comprising the best attorneys who are 40 years of age and younger or who have practiced law for 10 years or less, are published nationwide in Super Lawyers magazines and in leading city and regional magazines across the country. No more than 2.5 percent of the lawyers in the state are named to these lists.

Introduction  Nearly 100 years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927), limiting the recovery of purely economic damages in maritime tort cases. The implications of what became known as the Robins Dry Dock rule, however, are still felt to this day. Recently, in a 75-page memorandum, Judge James K. Bredar of the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland issued a decision dismissing and narrowing several claims for purely economic losses arising out of the Baltimore Bridge collapse incident. As highlighted by the court, “the time has come to face the implications of Robins and the near century of case law that has interpreted and applied it.”1The decision highlights the strength and precedential value of the Robins Dry Dock rule. Background and Procedural Posture  Following the tragic incident involving the M/V DALI and Baltimore’s Francis Scott Key Bridge on March 26, 2024, the owner and manager of the DALI (the Petitioners) filed a petition in limitation in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland invoking the Shipowners' Limitation of Liability Act and seeking to limit their liability exposure to the value of the vessel and its pending freight.2 More than 50 claims were filed, including claims from federal and state governments, local government entities, and numerous other private parties seeking to recover damages for wrongful death and personal injury, property damage and cargo losses, and economic losses. The case was originally scheduled for a bench trial on June 1, 2026. Two weeks before trial, however, Petitioners moved to stay the proceedings based on newly pending criminal charges: an 18-count indictment against one of the Petitioners and its employee for various crimes related to the allision (a maritime term for a moving vessel striking a stationary object).3 The Court denied the stay and ordered that the case “stay the course.” As the matter approached the trial date, several parties settled the vast majority of claims. But two categories of claims remained: those filed by the City and County of Baltimore (the Local Government Claimants) and those filed by Private Economic Loss (PEL) Claimants. Petitioners asserted that the Robins Dry Dock rule barred recovery as a matter of law on all remaining claims, potentially obviating the need for a trial. Specifically, Petitioners moved to dismiss all pending and remaining claims from the Local Government Claimants and Private Economic Loss Claimants, arguing that the remaining Claimants “did not have an ownership interest in the Key Bridge and have failed to allege or identify a recognizable interest in any other property which purportedly sustained physical damage as a result of the allision.”4 In response, the remaining Claimants opposed Petitioners’ motion and argued, among other things, that: (1) they do have a proprietary interest in the Key Bridge and/or other property which sustained physical damage from the allision, and (2) even if the Robins Dry Dock rule applied, “well-established exceptions” also apply and would permit their claims to survive. Thus, the Court had to decide whether the Robins Dry Dock rule would dismiss or narrow the remaining and surviving claims. What is the Robins Dry Dock Rule? The Robins Dry Dock rule takes its name from a 1927 Supreme Court decision that, as the Court noted, applied “a principle, then settled in both the United States and in England, which refused recovery for negligent interference with contractual rights.”5 The facts of that case were unremarkable: while repairing a vessel, Robins Dry Dock negligently damaged one of its propellers, rendering the vessel unusable for two weeks longer than anticipated. The ship's owners could sue for the negligent damage. The charterer, however, who suffered no injury to himself or his property, could not recover lost profits caused by the delay. In the century since, courts have relied on the Robins Dry Dock decision to deny the recovery of purely economic damages in maritime tort cases. Under the Robins Dry Dock rule, a plaintiff in a maritime tort suit may not recover “for economic loss if that loss resulted from physical damage to property in which [plaintiff] had no proprietary interest (i.e., no ownership or ownership-equivalent stake).”6 In general terms, a party may not recover economic damages in the absence of a showing that the party sustained physical injury to its property or property in which it has a proprietary interest as a result of the maritime incident. The purpose of the rule is “to serve as a pragmatic limitation on the doctrine of foreseeability, giving judges an easily administrable rule of decision and allowing parties to order their affairs in view of predictable outcomes.”7 As noted by the Court in this case, a contrary rule “would open the door to virtually limitless suits, often of a highly speculative and remote nature” and “would expose the negligent defendant to a severe penalty.”8 Thus, the rule has “the virtue of predictability” even if it sometimes “denies recovery for foreseeable injury caused by negligent acts.”9  Are There Any Exceptions? To overcome the Robins Dry Dock hurdle, parties who may have sustained economic damages from a maritime incident must show either that they also have sustained physical injury to their property or that an exception applies and allows for recovery. The Court's decision identified some exceptions that may overcome the hurdles and harsh consequences of the Robins Dry Dock rule. Also, there are more exceptions suggested by other courts throughout the U.S., although they are narrowly applied. Proprietary Interest in the Physically Injured Property is Key A party may overcome the Robins Dry Dock hurdle if it can show a proprietary interest in the physically injured property. Importantly, and as highlighted by the Fifth Circuit, ownership is not an absolute requirement in determining proprietary interest.10 A party may have sufficient “proprietary interest” to recover economic damages if the party is the actual owner of the physically damaged property or one who is tantamount to an owner. For example, a party who has: (a) actual possession or control, (b) responsibility for repairs, and (c) responsibility for maintenance for the physically injured property is one tantamount to an owner and may recover for economic losses.11 The Commercial Fisherman or Special Situation Exception The Court noted the “commercial fisherman exception,” which is dependent upon a very special and narrow situation. Specifically, the Court noted that the Fourth Circuit has permitted commercial fishermen to recover lost profits following the loss of a ship in which they had no ownership interest, due to their “special situation” of being in “a kind of joint venture” with the owner, because their losses were “as foreseeable and direct a consequence of the tortfeasor's actions as the shipowner's.”12 The Contractual Loss-Shifting Exception The Court also noted a potential exception when a contract has transferred the risk of economic loss from a property owner to a third party, which may allow the third party to recover despite the Robins Dry Dock rule.13 The Court highlighted a decision from the Fourth Circuit which permitted a time charterer to recover purely economic losses because the charter contract “transferred the risk of loss of use from the owner to the time charterer” and the time charterer had “a possessory interest in the vessel sufficient to give it standing to claim [economic] damages.”14 The Intentional Acts Exception The Court noted that the remaining Claimants attempted to advance an “intentional acts exception” because of Petitioners’ criminal misconduct. Specifically, Claimants argued that the Robins Dry Dock rule does not apply “because [their] damages were caused by Petitioners’ intentional acts.”15 As noted by the Court, this is a very narrow exception that does not cover intentional conduct generally but only situations where a wrongdoer intentionally targeted a plaintiff's economic interests, such as intentional interference with contract or intentionally caused nuisance.16 The Court rejected the intentional acts exception raised by the Claimants, finding that even if Petitioners engaged in criminal misconduct, they did not intend to cause harm to any claimant’s specific economic interests.17 The Integrated Unit Exception Although not expressly discussed by the Court, the Fifth Circuit has articulated and applied an integrated unit exception to the Robins Dry Dock rule. Under this exception, a party who is not the owner or tantamount to an owner of the physically impacted property may, nonetheless, recover economic damages if the physically affected asset is attached to the party’s asset and they both operate as an integrated unit.18  Application of the Robins Dry Dock Rule to This Case With these principles in mind, the Court turned to the remaining individual claims. The results reinforced the precedential force and implications of the Robins Dry Dock rule.  The Claims from City of Baltimore The City's claim only survived in one narrow aspect: it may continue to pursue damages associated with the harm to the 72-inch pre-cast concrete water main that runs beneath the Patapsco River at the location of the bridge. The City alleged that the combination of the DALI's evasive maneuvers and the collapse of the bridge physically damaged this City-owned infrastructure, and the Court could not conclude as a matter of law that this claim would fail. However, the remainder of the City's claimed damages, which were purely economic in nature, including lost tax revenue, increased road maintenance costs, and other downstream economic harms, were dismissed. The City's argument that it held a “proprietary interest” in the Key Bridge itself, because the bridge was a “functional component” of its municipal transportation network, was rejected by the Court. Likewise, damages to the City's streets and other bridges, caused by diverted heavy traffic, were also deemed too remote and attenuated. The Claims from Baltimore County The County's claim likewise survived only in part. It may proceed only on damages to those waterways and shorelines in which it can establish ownership. The collapse sent tons of debris into surrounding waters, and the County plausibly alleged physical damage to its shorelines, surface waters, and sediments. But the County's response costs, search-and-rescue expenses, lost tax revenue, and other economic damages were dismissed. The Claims from the Private Economic Loss Claimants The PEL Claimants, which were businesses ranging from shipping companies and longshoremen to sugar refiners and construction firms, saw their claims dismissed almost entirely as they could not show physical injury to their property. The sole exception: four “Container Claimant” parties who alleged they had cargo aboard the DALI that was physically damaged in the allision were permitted to proceed, because physical damage to one's own property is precisely the kind of injury that Robins Dry Dock rule does not bar. Key Takeaways  1. The Robins Dry Dock rule remains a big hurdle. Nearly a century after the Supreme Court issued the decision, the rule continues to operate as a near-absolute bar to recovery of economic damages for claimants who lack a proprietary interest in the damaged property. The Baltimore Bridge decision confirms and highlights that even catastrophic, highly publicized incidents with clearly devastating economic consequences do not affect the rule's application and implications. 2. The exceptions are narrowly applied. Although certain exceptions have been recognized by courts in the U.S., these exceptions are narrow and are only applied in very specific circumstances. As exemplified by the Court, none of the exceptions raised by the remaining Claimants prevented the harsh consequences of the Robins Dry Dock rule.  3. Proprietary interest in the physically injured property is key. The dividing line between claims that survived and claims that were dismissed is whether the claimant could establish a proprietary interest in property that was directly and physically damaged by the tortfeasor’s conduct. Thus, it is important to properly investigate a claim and develop the record following an incident to properly plead and show physical injury. _______________________________________________________________________________________ 1 In re Petition of Grace Ocean Private Ltd., Civ. No. 24-0941-JKB, Memorandum (D. Md. Aug. 25, 2026) (R. Doc. 906 at 4). 2 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501–30. This special maritime procedure is known as a limitation proceeding, which is a legal proceeding that consolidates all related claims into a single court. 3 On April 8, 2026, a grand jury returned an 18-count indictment charging the Owner and Captain with various crimes. See R. Doc. 906 at 5.  4 Petitioners sought to dismiss the remaining claims based on the standard of Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (motion to dismiss) or, in the alternative, to covert the motion and apply the standard of Rule 56 (summary judgment). See R. Doc. 906 at 7-8. 5 R. Doc. 906 at 11 (citing Robins Dry Dock, 275 U.S. at 307-10; State of La. ex rel. Guste v. M/V TESTBANK, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985)). 6 Robins Dry Dock, 275 U.S. at 303; TESTBANK, 752 F.2d at 1022.  7 Plains Pipeline, L.P. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 620 F. App’x 281, 286 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing TESTBANK, 752 F.2d at 1022, 1028-30)). 8 R. Doc. 906 at 12 (citing General Foods Corp. v. United States, 448 F. Supp. 111, 112-13 (D. Md. 1978)). 9 TESTBANK, 752 F.2d at 1028–29. 10 See Plains Pipeline, 620 F. App’x at 285 (citing In re Deepwater Horizon, 784 F.3d 1019, 1026 (5th Cir. 2015)). 11 See Tex. E. Transmission Corp. v. McMoran Offshore Expl. Co., 877 F.2d 1214, 1226 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Louisville & N. R. Co. v. M/V BAYOU LACOMBE, 597 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1979)); Mardi Gras World, LLC v. Marquette Transp. Co., 416 F. Supp. 3d 596, 602 (E.D. La. 2019). 12 Yarmouth Sea Prods. Ltd. v. Scully, 131 F.3d 389, 398 (4th Cir. 1997); see also Adams v. Star Enter., 51 F.3d 417, 424–25 (4th Cir. 1995). 13 Venore Transp. Co. v. M/V STRUMA, 583 F.2d 708, 711 (4th Cir. 1978); see Amoco Transp. Co. v. S/S MASON LYKES, 768 F.2d 659, 668 (5th Cir. 1985). 14 R. Doc. 906 at 13 (citing Venore, 583 F.2d at 711). 15 R. Doc. 906 at 36. 16 See, e.g., Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Marshland Dredging Co., 455 F.2d 957, 958 (5th Cir. 1972); Dick Meyers Towing Serv., Inc. v. United States, 577 F.2d 1023, 1025 (5th Cir. 1978). 17 R. Doc. 906 at 3 (citing Nautilus Marine, Inc. v. Niemela, 170 F.3d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1999)). 18 See Domar Ocean Transp., Ltd., Div. of Lee-Vac, Ltd. v. M/V ANDREW MARTIN, 754 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1985).

Sunny Rehsi (Of Counsel-Detroit, MI) coauthored “Ontario’s 15-Year Ultimate Limitation Period Bars Old Product Liability Lawsuits,” appearing in the September 2026 edition of DRI’s publication For the Defense. The article examines how Ontario’s 15-year ultimate limitation period can bar product liability claims involving older products, even where an injury occurs recently and the plaintiff sues within the ordinary two-year discoverability period. The authors explain that recent Ontario decisions, including Huether v. Sharpe and Hennebury v. Makita Canada Inc., clarify that a plaintiff cannot avoid the limitation period simply by characterizing an alleged failure to warn or other duty as “continuing”; there must be “successive or repeated actionable conduct” by the defendant. Referring to Hennebury, Sunny highlights the ruling’s significance for U.S. manufacturers, distributors, and insurers, noting that “the key limitation question is not simply when the plaintiff was injured or when the claim was discovered,” but when the underlying act or omission occurred. For product defendants, the practical lesson is to investigate the chronology of design, manufacture, distribution, warnings, recalls, and post-sale conduct at the outset of an Ontario claim and assess whether the 15-year ultimate limitation period provides a basis for an early dispositive motion.

Pernell Choren (Of Counsel-Washington, DC) and Catherine Hanrahan (Partner-Washington, DC) obtained summary judgment on behalf of a global logistics and courier company client in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, after more than two years of extensive litigation. The case arose from the alleged loss of a personal package that was shipped internationally from Iran to the District. The plaintiff claimed that the firm’s client failed to properly deliver the package and sued for negligence. After the trial was continued in February 2026, the court expressed willingness to entertain additional motion practice. Perry and Catherine filed a motion for summary judgment, supported by detailed shipping documentation demonstrating the client owed no duty of care to the plaintiff. They further established that the plaintiff failed to identify any expert witnesses or produce evidence of a standard of care the client allegedly violated, a necessary element of the negligence claim. In a thorough eight-page Order, the court agreed with the defense on all points, finding that the undisputed material facts were insufficient to demonstrate that the client owed any duty to the plaintiff and that the elements of his negligence claim could not be met. The court granted the motion, entered judgment in favor of the client, and closed the case.

Carolyn Husmann (Of Counsel-St. Louis, MO) has been appointed Vice Chair of DRI's Asbestos Litigation Committee, effective at the conclusion of DRI's Annual Meeting in October 2026. In this role, Carolyn will support the committee’s work connecting defense attorneys nationwide to address emerging issues affecting asbestos litigation. Carolyn has been an active and engaged member of DRI for many years and currently holds leadership roles within DRI’s Asbestos Litigation Committee, Women in the Law Committee, and the DRI Foundation. Her involvement with DRI spans nearly a decade and includes several leadership roles with the Women in the Law Committee since 2016. She also served as a Member at Large of the DRI Cares Committee from 2018 to 2023, has served as a Member at Large of the DRI Foundation since 2024, and currently serves as the DRI Cares Liaison for the Asbestos Litigation Committee. In addition, Carolyn contributed to the organization’s annual meeting as a member of the Annual Meeting Steering Committee in both 2021 and 2022, and served as an At-Large Member of DRI’s Nominating Committee during the 2025 Annual Meeting. Her appointment as Vice Chair of the Asbestos Litigation Committee further reflects her continued leadership, service, and commitment to DRI and its members.

John H. Podesta (Partner-San Francisco, CA) and Daron Stone (Of Counsel-New York, NY) will present the Wilson Elser Forum webinar “Your Work, Your Product, Your Problem? Understanding Business Risk Exclusions” on October 1, 2026. The Commercial General Liability (CGL) policy is not meant to cover every cost when an insured’s work, products, or operations go wrong. But what happens when a breakdown or failure requires repair or replacement and also causes damage to the host structure or shuts down the project while repairs are being made? Who pays what? The answers lie in the CGL’s so-called “business risk exclusions” ‒ Exclusions J through N. In this session, we will trace the history of these exclusions and where courts have drawn the line between covered and uncovered amounts.

Jacqueline Hattar (Partner-White Plains, NY) will co-moderate a virtual Continuing Legal Education program, “NY CPLR Update – Important New Stuff,” for the Westchester Women’s Bar Association on October 1, 2026. The program will feature the Honorable Mark C. Dillon, an Associate Justice of the New York State Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department. Justice Dillon will discuss key recent amendments to the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules and their practical implications for practitioners.

Introduction For many businesses, a mailing address is an operational detail. For small businesses that are primarily internet-based and operate remotely or without a brick-and-mortar location, a business address is often created at a co-working space or a mail drop.  In trademark filings, however, the wrong address can delay examination, trigger an Office Action, increase costs, and put registration at risk. Recent enforcement of the USPTO’s domicile address requirement has made this a front-line filing issue for brand owners and their counsel. Etsy, TikTok and other platform-based businesses without a physical facility must take notice that simple mail drops and co-working spaces are insufficient to support a trademark application.  This article explains the domicile address requirement, identifies the address types most likely to draw scrutiny, and explains ways to preserve privacy when the owner’s true domicile is a home address. The Domicile Address Requirement Since August 2019, the USPTO has required every trademark applicant and registrant, whether U.S. or foreign-domiciled, to provide and maintain a current domicile address on the application record. Over the past several months, we have seen examiners become more stringent with this requirement, and they are performing their own investigations into the address submitted.  They are also challenging trademark filers who use shared workspaces as their address. The requirement serves two purposes: (1) confirming the owner’s identity and geographic location, and (2) determining whether the applicant must be represented by an attorney licensed to practice in the United States.  The domicile address requirement can create avoidable problems when a business lists a P.O. Box, virtual office, shared workspace, registered agent address, commercial mail receiving agency, private mailbox, or similar address as its domicile. These addresses may be legitimate and useful for mail handling, privacy, state filings, insurance documents, marketing materials, or customer-facing operations. But for USPTO trademark purposes, the key question is whether the address identifies where an individual applicant actually lives, or where a company’s senior executives or officers direct and control the business.  This issue is particularly relevant for small businesses, brand managers, founders, and legal teams because many modern companies do not operate from a traditional headquarters. Remote-first businesses, online retailers, professional services firms, and home-based companies often rely on co-working spaces, virtual offices, registered agents, or mail service providers. Those arrangements may make sound business sense, but they should be reviewed before they are used in a trademark application. A filing-stage address decision can affect timing, privacy, and the risk of receiving an avoidable Office Action. Defining “Domicile” Under the Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure (TMEP): Individual applicant: The place where the person resides and intends to be the person’s principal home. Juristic entity (corporation, LLC, partnership, etc.): The principal place of business, where senior executives or officers direct, control, and coordinate the entity’s activities. Domicile is not the same as a mailing address. A mailing address is where correspondence is received or where the business presents itself publicly. The domicile is where the owner is actually based, not merely where mail is received. This distinction matters because many businesses have multiple addresses: a registered agent address, mailbox, coworking suite, home office, or leadership location. For trademark filing purposes, those addresses are not automatically interchangeable. The address that works for one business function may not satisfy the USPTO’s domicile requirement.  Address Types that Invite Scrutiny USPTO Examination Guide 3-23 (the Domicile Address Requirement for Trademark Applicants and Registrants (July 2023), instructs examining attorneys to review, and presumptively refuse, domicile addresses that do not identify an actual physical location where the applicant resides or conducts business. The following address types are particularly at risk: P.O. Boxes Virtual offices or executive-suite addresses Commercial mail receiving agencies (CMRAs) and private mailboxes (PMBs) Registered-agent or “care of” addresses Co-working or shared-workspace addresses used solely for mail These addresses may be perfectly appropriate for mail handling, state filings, or customer-facing operations. But the USPTO’s question is narrow: does the address identify where the owner actually lives (for an individual) or where senior executives direct and control the business (for an entity)? If it does not, the examining attorney will likely refuse it, even if the same address was previously accepted on another record. See In re Chestek PLLC, 92 F.4th 1105 (Fed. Cir. 2024). TMEP § 601.01(c)(i) specifically states that the USPTO does not accept virtual offices as domicile addresses. The fact that an address was previously accepted on another application is not dispositive; examining attorneys evaluate each filing independently. | Federal Circuit Authority: In re Chestek PLLC In In re Chestek PLLC, 92 F.4th 1105 (Fed. Cir. 2024), the Federal Circuit affirmed the refusal of a trademark application where the applicant provided only a P.O. Box and failed to supply an acceptable domicile address. The court’s holding underscores that the domicile requirement is substantive, not merely procedural, and that noncompliance is a valid basis for refusal. Applicants should, therefore, treat domicile as a filing requirement of equal importance to the identification of goods and services, not as a clerical detail to revisit later. Protecting Privacy When the Domicile Is a Home Address Many individual owners and small-business founders will find that their true domicile is a personal home address. Most business owners and executives do not want to publicly reveal their home addresses and take steps to protect their privacy. Given heightened awareness of personal security, the desire to keep one’s home address private is understandable. The USPTO’s electronic filing system provides a mechanism to keep that address private but only if the form is used correctly. Dedicated domicile field: The domicile address entered in the USPTO’s dedicated domicile field is generally not publicly viewable on the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system. Mailing address: The mailing address is publicly viewable. This can be a business address, P.O. Box, or even counsel’s address. Critical trap: If the same address is entered as both the mailing address and the domicile address, the address becomes publicly viewable. Similarly, if a private domicile address appears elsewhere in the filing, such as in an attachment, cover letter, or response narrative, it may become part of the public record. The practical takeaway: decide before filing which address will be public-facing and which will appear only in the dedicated domicile field. Do not duplicate the private address anywhere else in the submission. If the USPTO Questions the Address Even with careful planning, the examining attorney may issue a domicile-related Office Action. Examiners are more frequently performing their own investigations of addresses, and if they learn that the address is for a mail drop or a shared workspace, a rejection is likely to follow.  If an Office Action is issued, note: A Change of Address form alone will not resolve the issue if the address on file remains unacceptable. The response must address the domicile requirement directly, either by providing an acceptable address or by explaining, with supporting documentation, why the address already on record qualifies.  Even if a co-working space is used, one may need to provide evidence that it is actually the location where business is typically conducted and directed. An informal request for an Examiner’s Amendment will not suffice; the USPTO has stated that domicile issues require a formal response. In extraordinary circumstances, an applicant may petition the Director to waive the requirement under 37 C.F.R. § 2.146, but such a petition does not extend or replace the deadline for a timely Office Action response.  So, while one waits for the Director to respond, the trademark applicant must still address an open Office Action. Speed matters. A domicile Office Action can delay examination and if it is not addressed within the response period, it can result in abandonment. Pre-Filing Checklist The domicile address requirement is not new, but it has become more important in practice as more businesses operate remotely and rely on virtual offices, shared workspaces, registered agents, or mail service addresses. The USPTO has issued guidance explaining how examiners evaluate domicile addresses. The practical message for businesses is simple: address strategy should be part of trademark filing strategy from the beginning. Before filing or renewing a trademark application, confirm the following: 1. Identify the true domicile. For an individual, this is the principal home. For an entity, it is the principal place of business where senior executives or officers direct and control the business: not the registered-agent address, not a virtual office, not a coworking suite used only for mail. 2. Distinguish domicile from mailing address. Determine which address will serve as the public-facing mailing address and which will go only in the dedicated domicile field. 3. Do not duplicate. Enter the private domicile address only in the domicile field. Do not repeat it as the mailing address, and do not include it in attachments, or in any free-text narrative. 4. Review existing registrations. Audit the domicile address on current registrations and pending applications. A domicile address that was accepted in the past may be questioned at renewal or on a new filing. 5. Coordinate across stakeholders. Brand managers, marketing teams, in-house counsel, and outside trademark counsel should agree on the address strategy before filing, especially when an entity operates remotely or uses non-traditional addresses. 6. Document the domicile basis. Maintain records (e.g., lease, utility bills, workspace usage calendars and meetings, officer attestation, corporate resolution) that can support the domicile address if challenged. 7. Consult counsel early. If there is any doubt about whether an address qualifies, resolve it before filing, not after an Office Action issues. Conclusion The domicile address requirement is not new, but its enforcement has sharpened as more businesses operate remotely and rely on virtual offices, shared workspaces, and mail-forwarding services. The rule is manageable when addressed proactively: identify the true domicile, separate it from the mailing address, protect privacy by using the correct fields, and prepare supporting documentation in advance. A few filing-stage decisions can prevent delays, protect sensitive personal information, and keep trademark applications on track. This issue concerns individuals who care about the intersection of trademark prosecution and personal privacy and physical protection. Wilson Elser has robust trademark and privacy prosecution practices.  For questions about domicile address compliance, filing strategy, privacy-protective submissions, or responding to domicile-related Office Actions, please contact the authors or your Wilson Elser relationship attorney.

Super Lawyers® has named four attorneys from Wilson Elser’s Houston office to the 2026 Texas Super Lawyers® and Rising Stars™ lists: Super Lawyers Kent M. Adams (Senior Counsel) Personal Injury General: Defense Linda P. Wills (Partner) Employment & Labor Rising Stars Lina Al-Salim (Of Counsel) Personal Injury Medical Malpractice: Plaintiff Kelsi Wade Piatkowski (Partner) Personal Injury General: Defense Super Lawyers, a Thomson Reuters business, is a rating service of outstanding lawyers from more than 70 practice areas who have attained a high degree of peer recognition and professional achievement. The Rising Stars lists, comprising the best attorneys who are 40 years of age and younger or who have practiced law for 10 years or less, are published nationwide in Super Lawyers magazines and in leading city and regional magazines across the country. No more than 2.5 percent of the lawyers in the state are named to these lists.

Carrie Davis (Of Counsel-Atlanta, GA), Michael Manfredi (Partner-Atlanta, GA), and Chad Capers (Associate-Atlanta, GA) secured summary judgment in the State Court of Fulton County, Georgia, for Wilson Elser’s client, a real estate group primarily dealing in retail and mixed-use properties. The suit arose after an incident at a shopping center in Fulton County during which the plaintiff allegedly sustained serious injuries. The plaintiff alleged that she came to the shopping center to meet a coworker to exchange keys and then shop at a store there. While speaking with her coworker, an unknown assailant entered the plaintiff’s unlocked, running vehicle. As she attempted to stop the assailant, she was dragged through the parking lot, which was owned by a large American general merchandise retailer. Wilson Elser moved for summary judgment on the grounds that our client was neither an owner nor occupier of the premises; the plaintiff was not an invitee; the client did possess superior knowledge of criminal activity on the property; the plaintiff’s theory of proximate causation is conjectural; and the plaintiff’s own conduct was the proximate cause of her injuries ‒ due to a lack of due care and because she engaged in mutual combat. The judge granted the motion, concurring with the Atlanta team’s arguments that the plaintiff failed to prove our client had the requisite knowledge of other criminal activity on the property to make this incident foreseeable, and that the plaintiff failed to prove any additional or different security measures would have prevented it.

Convergence is a one-day, in-person conference for professionals at the intersection of privacy, cybersecurity, and AI governance. Hosted by Wilson Elser in partnership with Ankura and PrivadoAI, the event brings together general counsel, privacy leaders, cybersecurity and risk professionals, the insurance and carrier community, and outside counsel for practical discussions and industry networking. As agentic AI advances and regulatory expectations evolve, privacy, security, and governance can no longer be addressed in isolation. Convergence explores this convergence through four focused sessions, followed by a closing reception designed to continue the conversation.

Introduction  Nearly 100 years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927), limiting the recovery of purely economic damages in maritime tort cases. The implications of what became known as the Robins Dry Dock rule, however, are still felt to this day. Recently, in a 75-page memorandum, Judge James K. Bredar of the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland issued a decision dismissing and narrowing several claims for purely economic losses arising out of the Baltimore Bridge collapse incident. As highlighted by the court, “the time has come to face the implications of Robins and the near century of case law that has interpreted and applied it.”1The decision highlights the strength and precedential value of the Robins Dry Dock rule. Background and Procedural Posture  Following the tragic incident involving the M/V DALI and Baltimore’s Francis Scott Key Bridge on March 26, 2024, the owner and manager of the DALI (the Petitioners) filed a petition in limitation in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland invoking the Shipowners' Limitation of Liability Act and seeking to limit their liability exposure to the value of the vessel and its pending freight.2 More than 50 claims were filed, including claims from federal and state governments, local government entities, and numerous other private parties seeking to recover damages for wrongful death and personal injury, property damage and cargo losses, and economic losses. The case was originally scheduled for a bench trial on June 1, 2026. Two weeks before trial, however, Petitioners moved to stay the proceedings based on newly pending criminal charges: an 18-count indictment against one of the Petitioners and its employee for various crimes related to the allision (a maritime term for a moving vessel striking a stationary object).3 The Court denied the stay and ordered that the case “stay the course.” As the matter approached the trial date, several parties settled the vast majority of claims. But two categories of claims remained: those filed by the City and County of Baltimore (the Local Government Claimants) and those filed by Private Economic Loss (PEL) Claimants. Petitioners asserted that the Robins Dry Dock rule barred recovery as a matter of law on all remaining claims, potentially obviating the need for a trial. Specifically, Petitioners moved to dismiss all pending and remaining claims from the Local Government Claimants and Private Economic Loss Claimants, arguing that the remaining Claimants “did not have an ownership interest in the Key Bridge and have failed to allege or identify a recognizable interest in any other property which purportedly sustained physical damage as a result of the allision.”4 In response, the remaining Claimants opposed Petitioners’ motion and argued, among other things, that: (1) they do have a proprietary interest in the Key Bridge and/or other property which sustained physical damage from the allision, and (2) even if the Robins Dry Dock rule applied, “well-established exceptions” also apply and would permit their claims to survive. Thus, the Court had to decide whether the Robins Dry Dock rule would dismiss or narrow the remaining and surviving claims. What is the Robins Dry Dock Rule? The Robins Dry Dock rule takes its name from a 1927 Supreme Court decision that, as the Court noted, applied “a principle, then settled in both the United States and in England, which refused recovery for negligent interference with contractual rights.”5 The facts of that case were unremarkable: while repairing a vessel, Robins Dry Dock negligently damaged one of its propellers, rendering the vessel unusable for two weeks longer than anticipated. The ship's owners could sue for the negligent damage. The charterer, however, who suffered no injury to himself or his property, could not recover lost profits caused by the delay. In the century since, courts have relied on the Robins Dry Dock decision to deny the recovery of purely economic damages in maritime tort cases. Under the Robins Dry Dock rule, a plaintiff in a maritime tort suit may not recover “for economic loss if that loss resulted from physical damage to property in which [plaintiff] had no proprietary interest (i.e., no ownership or ownership-equivalent stake).”6 In general terms, a party may not recover economic damages in the absence of a showing that the party sustained physical injury to its property or property in which it has a proprietary interest as a result of the maritime incident. The purpose of the rule is “to serve as a pragmatic limitation on the doctrine of foreseeability, giving judges an easily administrable rule of decision and allowing parties to order their affairs in view of predictable outcomes.”7 As noted by the Court in this case, a contrary rule “would open the door to virtually limitless suits, often of a highly speculative and remote nature” and “would expose the negligent defendant to a severe penalty.”8 Thus, the rule has “the virtue of predictability” even if it sometimes “denies recovery for foreseeable injury caused by negligent acts.”9  Are There Any Exceptions? To overcome the Robins Dry Dock hurdle, parties who may have sustained economic damages from a maritime incident must show either that they also have sustained physical injury to their property or that an exception applies and allows for recovery. The Court's decision identified some exceptions that may overcome the hurdles and harsh consequences of the Robins Dry Dock rule. Also, there are more exceptions suggested by other courts throughout the U.S., although they are narrowly applied. Proprietary Interest in the Physically Injured Property is Key A party may overcome the Robins Dry Dock hurdle if it can show a proprietary interest in the physically injured property. Importantly, and as highlighted by the Fifth Circuit, ownership is not an absolute requirement in determining proprietary interest.10 A party may have sufficient “proprietary interest” to recover economic damages if the party is the actual owner of the physically damaged property or one who is tantamount to an owner. For example, a party who has: (a) actual possession or control, (b) responsibility for repairs, and (c) responsibility for maintenance for the physically injured property is one tantamount to an owner and may recover for economic losses.11 The Commercial Fisherman or Special Situation Exception The Court noted the “commercial fisherman exception,” which is dependent upon a very special and narrow situation. Specifically, the Court noted that the Fourth Circuit has permitted commercial fishermen to recover lost profits following the loss of a ship in which they had no ownership interest, due to their “special situation” of being in “a kind of joint venture” with the owner, because their losses were “as foreseeable and direct a consequence of the tortfeasor's actions as the shipowner's.”12 The Contractual Loss-Shifting Exception The Court also noted a potential exception when a contract has transferred the risk of economic loss from a property owner to a third party, which may allow the third party to recover despite the Robins Dry Dock rule.13 The Court highlighted a decision from the Fourth Circuit which permitted a time charterer to recover purely economic losses because the charter contract “transferred the risk of loss of use from the owner to the time charterer” and the time charterer had “a possessory interest in the vessel sufficient to give it standing to claim [economic] damages.”14 The Intentional Acts Exception The Court noted that the remaining Claimants attempted to advance an “intentional acts exception” because of Petitioners’ criminal misconduct. Specifically, Claimants argued that the Robins Dry Dock rule does not apply “because [their] damages were caused by Petitioners’ intentional acts.”15 As noted by the Court, this is a very narrow exception that does not cover intentional conduct generally but only situations where a wrongdoer intentionally targeted a plaintiff's economic interests, such as intentional interference with contract or intentionally caused nuisance.16 The Court rejected the intentional acts exception raised by the Claimants, finding that even if Petitioners engaged in criminal misconduct, they did not intend to cause harm to any claimant’s specific economic interests.17 The Integrated Unit Exception Although not expressly discussed by the Court, the Fifth Circuit has articulated and applied an integrated unit exception to the Robins Dry Dock rule. Under this exception, a party who is not the owner or tantamount to an owner of the physically impacted property may, nonetheless, recover economic damages if the physically affected asset is attached to the party’s asset and they both operate as an integrated unit.18  Application of the Robins Dry Dock Rule to This Case With these principles in mind, the Court turned to the remaining individual claims. The results reinforced the precedential force and implications of the Robins Dry Dock rule.  The Claims from City of Baltimore The City's claim only survived in one narrow aspect: it may continue to pursue damages associated with the harm to the 72-inch pre-cast concrete water main that runs beneath the Patapsco River at the location of the bridge. The City alleged that the combination of the DALI's evasive maneuvers and the collapse of the bridge physically damaged this City-owned infrastructure, and the Court could not conclude as a matter of law that this claim would fail. However, the remainder of the City's claimed damages, which were purely economic in nature, including lost tax revenue, increased road maintenance costs, and other downstream economic harms, were dismissed. The City's argument that it held a “proprietary interest” in the Key Bridge itself, because the bridge was a “functional component” of its municipal transportation network, was rejected by the Court. Likewise, damages to the City's streets and other bridges, caused by diverted heavy traffic, were also deemed too remote and attenuated. The Claims from Baltimore County The County's claim likewise survived only in part. It may proceed only on damages to those waterways and shorelines in which it can establish ownership. The collapse sent tons of debris into surrounding waters, and the County plausibly alleged physical damage to its shorelines, surface waters, and sediments. But the County's response costs, search-and-rescue expenses, lost tax revenue, and other economic damages were dismissed. The Claims from the Private Economic Loss Claimants The PEL Claimants, which were businesses ranging from shipping companies and longshoremen to sugar refiners and construction firms, saw their claims dismissed almost entirely as they could not show physical injury to their property. The sole exception: four “Container Claimant” parties who alleged they had cargo aboard the DALI that was physically damaged in the allision were permitted to proceed, because physical damage to one's own property is precisely the kind of injury that Robins Dry Dock rule does not bar. Key Takeaways  1. The Robins Dry Dock rule remains a big hurdle. Nearly a century after the Supreme Court issued the decision, the rule continues to operate as a near-absolute bar to recovery of economic damages for claimants who lack a proprietary interest in the damaged property. The Baltimore Bridge decision confirms and highlights that even catastrophic, highly publicized incidents with clearly devastating economic consequences do not affect the rule's application and implications. 2. The exceptions are narrowly applied. Although certain exceptions have been recognized by courts in the U.S., these exceptions are narrow and are only applied in very specific circumstances. As exemplified by the Court, none of the exceptions raised by the remaining Claimants prevented the harsh consequences of the Robins Dry Dock rule.  3. Proprietary interest in the physically injured property is key. The dividing line between claims that survived and claims that were dismissed is whether the claimant could establish a proprietary interest in property that was directly and physically damaged by the tortfeasor’s conduct. Thus, it is important to properly investigate a claim and develop the record following an incident to properly plead and show physical injury. _______________________________________________________________________________________ 1 In re Petition of Grace Ocean Private Ltd., Civ. No. 24-0941-JKB, Memorandum (D. Md. Aug. 25, 2026) (R. Doc. 906 at 4). 2 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501–30. This special maritime procedure is known as a limitation proceeding, which is a legal proceeding that consolidates all related claims into a single court. 3 On April 8, 2026, a grand jury returned an 18-count indictment charging the Owner and Captain with various crimes. See R. Doc. 906 at 5.  4 Petitioners sought to dismiss the remaining claims based on the standard of Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (motion to dismiss) or, in the alternative, to covert the motion and apply the standard of Rule 56 (summary judgment). See R. Doc. 906 at 7-8. 5 R. Doc. 906 at 11 (citing Robins Dry Dock, 275 U.S. at 307-10; State of La. ex rel. Guste v. M/V TESTBANK, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985)). 6 Robins Dry Dock, 275 U.S. at 303; TESTBANK, 752 F.2d at 1022.  7 Plains Pipeline, L.P. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 620 F. App’x 281, 286 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing TESTBANK, 752 F.2d at 1022, 1028-30)). 8 R. Doc. 906 at 12 (citing General Foods Corp. v. United States, 448 F. Supp. 111, 112-13 (D. Md. 1978)). 9 TESTBANK, 752 F.2d at 1028–29. 10 See Plains Pipeline, 620 F. App’x at 285 (citing In re Deepwater Horizon, 784 F.3d 1019, 1026 (5th Cir. 2015)). 11 See Tex. E. Transmission Corp. v. McMoran Offshore Expl. Co., 877 F.2d 1214, 1226 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Louisville & N. R. Co. v. M/V BAYOU LACOMBE, 597 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1979)); Mardi Gras World, LLC v. Marquette Transp. Co., 416 F. Supp. 3d 596, 602 (E.D. La. 2019). 12 Yarmouth Sea Prods. Ltd. v. Scully, 131 F.3d 389, 398 (4th Cir. 1997); see also Adams v. Star Enter., 51 F.3d 417, 424–25 (4th Cir. 1995). 13 Venore Transp. Co. v. M/V STRUMA, 583 F.2d 708, 711 (4th Cir. 1978); see Amoco Transp. Co. v. S/S MASON LYKES, 768 F.2d 659, 668 (5th Cir. 1985). 14 R. Doc. 906 at 13 (citing Venore, 583 F.2d at 711). 15 R. Doc. 906 at 36. 16 See, e.g., Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Marshland Dredging Co., 455 F.2d 957, 958 (5th Cir. 1972); Dick Meyers Towing Serv., Inc. v. United States, 577 F.2d 1023, 1025 (5th Cir. 1978). 17 R. Doc. 906 at 3 (citing Nautilus Marine, Inc. v. Niemela, 170 F.3d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1999)). 18 See Domar Ocean Transp., Ltd., Div. of Lee-Vac, Ltd. v. M/V ANDREW MARTIN, 754 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1985).

Sunny Rehsi (Of Counsel-Detroit, MI) coauthored “Ontario’s 15-Year Ultimate Limitation Period Bars Old Product Liability Lawsuits,” appearing in the September 2026 edition of DRI’s publication For the Defense. The article examines how Ontario’s 15-year ultimate limitation period can bar product liability claims involving older products, even where an injury occurs recently and the plaintiff sues within the ordinary two-year discoverability period. The authors explain that recent Ontario decisions, including Huether v. Sharpe and Hennebury v. Makita Canada Inc., clarify that a plaintiff cannot avoid the limitation period simply by characterizing an alleged failure to warn or other duty as “continuing”; there must be “successive or repeated actionable conduct” by the defendant. Referring to Hennebury, Sunny highlights the ruling’s significance for U.S. manufacturers, distributors, and insurers, noting that “the key limitation question is not simply when the plaintiff was injured or when the claim was discovered,” but when the underlying act or omission occurred. For product defendants, the practical lesson is to investigate the chronology of design, manufacture, distribution, warnings, recalls, and post-sale conduct at the outset of an Ontario claim and assess whether the 15-year ultimate limitation period provides a basis for an early dispositive motion.

Pernell Choren (Of Counsel-Washington, DC) and Catherine Hanrahan (Partner-Washington, DC) obtained summary judgment on behalf of a global logistics and courier company client in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, after more than two years of extensive litigation. The case arose from the alleged loss of a personal package that was shipped internationally from Iran to the District. The plaintiff claimed that the firm’s client failed to properly deliver the package and sued for negligence. After the trial was continued in February 2026, the court expressed willingness to entertain additional motion practice. Perry and Catherine filed a motion for summary judgment, supported by detailed shipping documentation demonstrating the client owed no duty of care to the plaintiff. They further established that the plaintiff failed to identify any expert witnesses or produce evidence of a standard of care the client allegedly violated, a necessary element of the negligence claim. In a thorough eight-page Order, the court agreed with the defense on all points, finding that the undisputed material facts were insufficient to demonstrate that the client owed any duty to the plaintiff and that the elements of his negligence claim could not be met. The court granted the motion, entered judgment in favor of the client, and closed the case.

Carolyn Husmann (Of Counsel-St. Louis, MO) has been appointed Vice Chair of DRI's Asbestos Litigation Committee, effective at the conclusion of DRI's Annual Meeting in October 2026. In this role, Carolyn will support the committee’s work connecting defense attorneys nationwide to address emerging issues affecting asbestos litigation. Carolyn has been an active and engaged member of DRI for many years and currently holds leadership roles within DRI’s Asbestos Litigation Committee, Women in the Law Committee, and the DRI Foundation. Her involvement with DRI spans nearly a decade and includes several leadership roles with the Women in the Law Committee since 2016. She also served as a Member at Large of the DRI Cares Committee from 2018 to 2023, has served as a Member at Large of the DRI Foundation since 2024, and currently serves as the DRI Cares Liaison for the Asbestos Litigation Committee. In addition, Carolyn contributed to the organization’s annual meeting as a member of the Annual Meeting Steering Committee in both 2021 and 2022, and served as an At-Large Member of DRI’s Nominating Committee during the 2025 Annual Meeting. Her appointment as Vice Chair of the Asbestos Litigation Committee further reflects her continued leadership, service, and commitment to DRI and its members.

John H. Podesta (Partner-San Francisco, CA) and Daron Stone (Of Counsel-New York, NY) will present the Wilson Elser Forum webinar “Your Work, Your Product, Your Problem? Understanding Business Risk Exclusions” on October 1, 2026. The Commercial General Liability (CGL) policy is not meant to cover every cost when an insured’s work, products, or operations go wrong. But what happens when a breakdown or failure requires repair or replacement and also causes damage to the host structure or shuts down the project while repairs are being made? Who pays what? The answers lie in the CGL’s so-called “business risk exclusions” ‒ Exclusions J through N. In this session, we will trace the history of these exclusions and where courts have drawn the line between covered and uncovered amounts.

Jacqueline Hattar (Partner-White Plains, NY) will co-moderate a virtual Continuing Legal Education program, “NY CPLR Update – Important New Stuff,” for the Westchester Women’s Bar Association on October 1, 2026. The program will feature the Honorable Mark C. Dillon, an Associate Justice of the New York State Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department. Justice Dillon will discuss key recent amendments to the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules and their practical implications for practitioners.

Introduction For many businesses, a mailing address is an operational detail. For small businesses that are primarily internet-based and operate remotely or without a brick-and-mortar location, a business address is often created at a co-working space or a mail drop.  In trademark filings, however, the wrong address can delay examination, trigger an Office Action, increase costs, and put registration at risk. Recent enforcement of the USPTO’s domicile address requirement has made this a front-line filing issue for brand owners and their counsel. Etsy, TikTok and other platform-based businesses without a physical facility must take notice that simple mail drops and co-working spaces are insufficient to support a trademark application.  This article explains the domicile address requirement, identifies the address types most likely to draw scrutiny, and explains ways to preserve privacy when the owner’s true domicile is a home address. The Domicile Address Requirement Since August 2019, the USPTO has required every trademark applicant and registrant, whether U.S. or foreign-domiciled, to provide and maintain a current domicile address on the application record. Over the past several months, we have seen examiners become more stringent with this requirement, and they are performing their own investigations into the address submitted.  They are also challenging trademark filers who use shared workspaces as their address. The requirement serves two purposes: (1) confirming the owner’s identity and geographic location, and (2) determining whether the applicant must be represented by an attorney licensed to practice in the United States.  The domicile address requirement can create avoidable problems when a business lists a P.O. Box, virtual office, shared workspace, registered agent address, commercial mail receiving agency, private mailbox, or similar address as its domicile. These addresses may be legitimate and useful for mail handling, privacy, state filings, insurance documents, marketing materials, or customer-facing operations. But for USPTO trademark purposes, the key question is whether the address identifies where an individual applicant actually lives, or where a company’s senior executives or officers direct and control the business.  This issue is particularly relevant for small businesses, brand managers, founders, and legal teams because many modern companies do not operate from a traditional headquarters. Remote-first businesses, online retailers, professional services firms, and home-based companies often rely on co-working spaces, virtual offices, registered agents, or mail service providers. Those arrangements may make sound business sense, but they should be reviewed before they are used in a trademark application. A filing-stage address decision can affect timing, privacy, and the risk of receiving an avoidable Office Action. Defining “Domicile” Under the Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure (TMEP): Individual applicant: The place where the person resides and intends to be the person’s principal home. Juristic entity (corporation, LLC, partnership, etc.): The principal place of business, where senior executives or officers direct, control, and coordinate the entity’s activities. Domicile is not the same as a mailing address. A mailing address is where correspondence is received or where the business presents itself publicly. The domicile is where the owner is actually based, not merely where mail is received. This distinction matters because many businesses have multiple addresses: a registered agent address, mailbox, coworking suite, home office, or leadership location. For trademark filing purposes, those addresses are not automatically interchangeable. The address that works for one business function may not satisfy the USPTO’s domicile requirement.  Address Types that Invite Scrutiny USPTO Examination Guide 3-23 (the Domicile Address Requirement for Trademark Applicants and Registrants (July 2023), instructs examining attorneys to review, and presumptively refuse, domicile addresses that do not identify an actual physical location where the applicant resides or conducts business. The following address types are particularly at risk: P.O. Boxes Virtual offices or executive-suite addresses Commercial mail receiving agencies (CMRAs) and private mailboxes (PMBs) Registered-agent or “care of” addresses Co-working or shared-workspace addresses used solely for mail These addresses may be perfectly appropriate for mail handling, state filings, or customer-facing operations. But the USPTO’s question is narrow: does the address identify where the owner actually lives (for an individual) or where senior executives direct and control the business (for an entity)? If it does not, the examining attorney will likely refuse it, even if the same address was previously accepted on another record. See In re Chestek PLLC, 92 F.4th 1105 (Fed. Cir. 2024). TMEP § 601.01(c)(i) specifically states that the USPTO does not accept virtual offices as domicile addresses. The fact that an address was previously accepted on another application is not dispositive; examining attorneys evaluate each filing independently. | Federal Circuit Authority: In re Chestek PLLC In In re Chestek PLLC, 92 F.4th 1105 (Fed. Cir. 2024), the Federal Circuit affirmed the refusal of a trademark application where the applicant provided only a P.O. Box and failed to supply an acceptable domicile address. The court’s holding underscores that the domicile requirement is substantive, not merely procedural, and that noncompliance is a valid basis for refusal. Applicants should, therefore, treat domicile as a filing requirement of equal importance to the identification of goods and services, not as a clerical detail to revisit later. Protecting Privacy When the Domicile Is a Home Address Many individual owners and small-business founders will find that their true domicile is a personal home address. Most business owners and executives do not want to publicly reveal their home addresses and take steps to protect their privacy. Given heightened awareness of personal security, the desire to keep one’s home address private is understandable. The USPTO’s electronic filing system provides a mechanism to keep that address private but only if the form is used correctly. Dedicated domicile field: The domicile address entered in the USPTO’s dedicated domicile field is generally not publicly viewable on the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system. Mailing address: The mailing address is publicly viewable. This can be a business address, P.O. Box, or even counsel’s address. Critical trap: If the same address is entered as both the mailing address and the domicile address, the address becomes publicly viewable. Similarly, if a private domicile address appears elsewhere in the filing, such as in an attachment, cover letter, or response narrative, it may become part of the public record. The practical takeaway: decide before filing which address will be public-facing and which will appear only in the dedicated domicile field. Do not duplicate the private address anywhere else in the submission. If the USPTO Questions the Address Even with careful planning, the examining attorney may issue a domicile-related Office Action. Examiners are more frequently performing their own investigations of addresses, and if they learn that the address is for a mail drop or a shared workspace, a rejection is likely to follow.  If an Office Action is issued, note: A Change of Address form alone will not resolve the issue if the address on file remains unacceptable. The response must address the domicile requirement directly, either by providing an acceptable address or by explaining, with supporting documentation, why the address already on record qualifies.  Even if a co-working space is used, one may need to provide evidence that it is actually the location where business is typically conducted and directed. An informal request for an Examiner’s Amendment will not suffice; the USPTO has stated that domicile issues require a formal response. In extraordinary circumstances, an applicant may petition the Director to waive the requirement under 37 C.F.R. § 2.146, but such a petition does not extend or replace the deadline for a timely Office Action response.  So, while one waits for the Director to respond, the trademark applicant must still address an open Office Action. Speed matters. A domicile Office Action can delay examination and if it is not addressed within the response period, it can result in abandonment. Pre-Filing Checklist The domicile address requirement is not new, but it has become more important in practice as more businesses operate remotely and rely on virtual offices, shared workspaces, registered agents, or mail service addresses. The USPTO has issued guidance explaining how examiners evaluate domicile addresses. The practical message for businesses is simple: address strategy should be part of trademark filing strategy from the beginning. Before filing or renewing a trademark application, confirm the following: 1. Identify the true domicile. For an individual, this is the principal home. For an entity, it is the principal place of business where senior executives or officers direct and control the business: not the registered-agent address, not a virtual office, not a coworking suite used only for mail. 2. Distinguish domicile from mailing address. Determine which address will serve as the public-facing mailing address and which will go only in the dedicated domicile field. 3. Do not duplicate. Enter the private domicile address only in the domicile field. Do not repeat it as the mailing address, and do not include it in attachments, or in any free-text narrative. 4. Review existing registrations. Audit the domicile address on current registrations and pending applications. A domicile address that was accepted in the past may be questioned at renewal or on a new filing. 5. Coordinate across stakeholders. Brand managers, marketing teams, in-house counsel, and outside trademark counsel should agree on the address strategy before filing, especially when an entity operates remotely or uses non-traditional addresses. 6. Document the domicile basis. Maintain records (e.g., lease, utility bills, workspace usage calendars and meetings, officer attestation, corporate resolution) that can support the domicile address if challenged. 7. Consult counsel early. If there is any doubt about whether an address qualifies, resolve it before filing, not after an Office Action issues. Conclusion The domicile address requirement is not new, but its enforcement has sharpened as more businesses operate remotely and rely on virtual offices, shared workspaces, and mail-forwarding services. The rule is manageable when addressed proactively: identify the true domicile, separate it from the mailing address, protect privacy by using the correct fields, and prepare supporting documentation in advance. A few filing-stage decisions can prevent delays, protect sensitive personal information, and keep trademark applications on track. This issue concerns individuals who care about the intersection of trademark prosecution and personal privacy and physical protection. Wilson Elser has robust trademark and privacy prosecution practices.  For questions about domicile address compliance, filing strategy, privacy-protective submissions, or responding to domicile-related Office Actions, please contact the authors or your Wilson Elser relationship attorney.

Super Lawyers® has named four attorneys from Wilson Elser’s Houston office to the 2026 Texas Super Lawyers® and Rising Stars™ lists: Super Lawyers Kent M. Adams (Senior Counsel) Personal Injury General: Defense Linda P. Wills (Partner) Employment & Labor Rising Stars Lina Al-Salim (Of Counsel) Personal Injury Medical Malpractice: Plaintiff Kelsi Wade Piatkowski (Partner) Personal Injury General: Defense Super Lawyers, a Thomson Reuters business, is a rating service of outstanding lawyers from more than 70 practice areas who have attained a high degree of peer recognition and professional achievement. The Rising Stars lists, comprising the best attorneys who are 40 years of age and younger or who have practiced law for 10 years or less, are published nationwide in Super Lawyers magazines and in leading city and regional magazines across the country. No more than 2.5 percent of the lawyers in the state are named to these lists.

Carrie Davis (Of Counsel-Atlanta, GA), Michael Manfredi (Partner-Atlanta, GA), and Chad Capers (Associate-Atlanta, GA) secured summary judgment in the State Court of Fulton County, Georgia, for Wilson Elser’s client, a real estate group primarily dealing in retail and mixed-use properties. The suit arose after an incident at a shopping center in Fulton County during which the plaintiff allegedly sustained serious injuries. The plaintiff alleged that she came to the shopping center to meet a coworker to exchange keys and then shop at a store there. While speaking with her coworker, an unknown assailant entered the plaintiff’s unlocked, running vehicle. As she attempted to stop the assailant, she was dragged through the parking lot, which was owned by a large American general merchandise retailer. Wilson Elser moved for summary judgment on the grounds that our client was neither an owner nor occupier of the premises; the plaintiff was not an invitee; the client did possess superior knowledge of criminal activity on the property; the plaintiff’s theory of proximate causation is conjectural; and the plaintiff’s own conduct was the proximate cause of her injuries ‒ due to a lack of due care and because she engaged in mutual combat. The judge granted the motion, concurring with the Atlanta team’s arguments that the plaintiff failed to prove our client had the requisite knowledge of other criminal activity on the property to make this incident foreseeable, and that the plaintiff failed to prove any additional or different security measures would have prevented it.

Convergence is a one-day, in-person conference for professionals at the intersection of privacy, cybersecurity, and AI governance. Hosted by Wilson Elser in partnership with Ankura and PrivadoAI, the event brings together general counsel, privacy leaders, cybersecurity and risk professionals, the insurance and carrier community, and outside counsel for practical discussions and industry networking. As agentic AI advances and regulatory expectations evolve, privacy, security, and governance can no longer be addressed in isolation. Convergence explores this convergence through four focused sessions, followed by a closing reception designed to continue the conversation.

Introduction  Nearly 100 years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927), limiting the recovery of purely economic damages in maritime tort cases. The implications of what became known as the Robins Dry Dock rule, however, are still felt to this day. Recently, in a 75-page memorandum, Judge James K. Bredar of the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland issued a decision dismissing and narrowing several claims for purely economic losses arising out of the Baltimore Bridge collapse incident. As highlighted by the court, “the time has come to face the implications of Robins and the near century of case law that has interpreted and applied it.”1The decision highlights the strength and precedential value of the Robins Dry Dock rule. Background and Procedural Posture  Following the tragic incident involving the M/V DALI and Baltimore’s Francis Scott Key Bridge on March 26, 2024, the owner and manager of the DALI (the Petitioners) filed a petition in limitation in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland invoking the Shipowners' Limitation of Liability Act and seeking to limit their liability exposure to the value of the vessel and its pending freight.2 More than 50 claims were filed, including claims from federal and state governments, local government entities, and numerous other private parties seeking to recover damages for wrongful death and personal injury, property damage and cargo losses, and economic losses. The case was originally scheduled for a bench trial on June 1, 2026. Two weeks before trial, however, Petitioners moved to stay the proceedings based on newly pending criminal charges: an 18-count indictment against one of the Petitioners and its employee for various crimes related to the allision (a maritime term for a moving vessel striking a stationary object).3 The Court denied the stay and ordered that the case “stay the course.” As the matter approached the trial date, several parties settled the vast majority of claims. But two categories of claims remained: those filed by the City and County of Baltimore (the Local Government Claimants) and those filed by Private Economic Loss (PEL) Claimants. Petitioners asserted that the Robins Dry Dock rule barred recovery as a matter of law on all remaining claims, potentially obviating the need for a trial. Specifically, Petitioners moved to dismiss all pending and remaining claims from the Local Government Claimants and Private Economic Loss Claimants, arguing that the remaining Claimants “did not have an ownership interest in the Key Bridge and have failed to allege or identify a recognizable interest in any other property which purportedly sustained physical damage as a result of the allision.”4 In response, the remaining Claimants opposed Petitioners’ motion and argued, among other things, that: (1) they do have a proprietary interest in the Key Bridge and/or other property which sustained physical damage from the allision, and (2) even if the Robins Dry Dock rule applied, “well-established exceptions” also apply and would permit their claims to survive. Thus, the Court had to decide whether the Robins Dry Dock rule would dismiss or narrow the remaining and surviving claims. What is the Robins Dry Dock Rule? The Robins Dry Dock rule takes its name from a 1927 Supreme Court decision that, as the Court noted, applied “a principle, then settled in both the United States and in England, which refused recovery for negligent interference with contractual rights.”5 The facts of that case were unremarkable: while repairing a vessel, Robins Dry Dock negligently damaged one of its propellers, rendering the vessel unusable for two weeks longer than anticipated. The ship's owners could sue for the negligent damage. The charterer, however, who suffered no injury to himself or his property, could not recover lost profits caused by the delay. In the century since, courts have relied on the Robins Dry Dock decision to deny the recovery of purely economic damages in maritime tort cases. Under the Robins Dry Dock rule, a plaintiff in a maritime tort suit may not recover “for economic loss if that loss resulted from physical damage to property in which [plaintiff] had no proprietary interest (i.e., no ownership or ownership-equivalent stake).”6 In general terms, a party may not recover economic damages in the absence of a showing that the party sustained physical injury to its property or property in which it has a proprietary interest as a result of the maritime incident. The purpose of the rule is “to serve as a pragmatic limitation on the doctrine of foreseeability, giving judges an easily administrable rule of decision and allowing parties to order their affairs in view of predictable outcomes.”7 As noted by the Court in this case, a contrary rule “would open the door to virtually limitless suits, often of a highly speculative and remote nature” and “would expose the negligent defendant to a severe penalty.”8 Thus, the rule has “the virtue of predictability” even if it sometimes “denies recovery for foreseeable injury caused by negligent acts.”9  Are There Any Exceptions? To overcome the Robins Dry Dock hurdle, parties who may have sustained economic damages from a maritime incident must show either that they also have sustained physical injury to their property or that an exception applies and allows for recovery. The Court's decision identified some exceptions that may overcome the hurdles and harsh consequences of the Robins Dry Dock rule. Also, there are more exceptions suggested by other courts throughout the U.S., although they are narrowly applied. Proprietary Interest in the Physically Injured Property is Key A party may overcome the Robins Dry Dock hurdle if it can show a proprietary interest in the physically injured property. Importantly, and as highlighted by the Fifth Circuit, ownership is not an absolute requirement in determining proprietary interest.10 A party may have sufficient “proprietary interest” to recover economic damages if the party is the actual owner of the physically damaged property or one who is tantamount to an owner. For example, a party who has: (a) actual possession or control, (b) responsibility for repairs, and (c) responsibility for maintenance for the physically injured property is one tantamount to an owner and may recover for economic losses.11 The Commercial Fisherman or Special Situation Exception The Court noted the “commercial fisherman exception,” which is dependent upon a very special and narrow situation. Specifically, the Court noted that the Fourth Circuit has permitted commercial fishermen to recover lost profits following the loss of a ship in which they had no ownership interest, due to their “special situation” of being in “a kind of joint venture” with the owner, because their losses were “as foreseeable and direct a consequence of the tortfeasor's actions as the shipowner's.”12 The Contractual Loss-Shifting Exception The Court also noted a potential exception when a contract has transferred the risk of economic loss from a property owner to a third party, which may allow the third party to recover despite the Robins Dry Dock rule.13 The Court highlighted a decision from the Fourth Circuit which permitted a time charterer to recover purely economic losses because the charter contract “transferred the risk of loss of use from the owner to the time charterer” and the time charterer had “a possessory interest in the vessel sufficient to give it standing to claim [economic] damages.”14 The Intentional Acts Exception The Court noted that the remaining Claimants attempted to advance an “intentional acts exception” because of Petitioners’ criminal misconduct. Specifically, Claimants argued that the Robins Dry Dock rule does not apply “because [their] damages were caused by Petitioners’ intentional acts.”15 As noted by the Court, this is a very narrow exception that does not cover intentional conduct generally but only situations where a wrongdoer intentionally targeted a plaintiff's economic interests, such as intentional interference with contract or intentionally caused nuisance.16 The Court rejected the intentional acts exception raised by the Claimants, finding that even if Petitioners engaged in criminal misconduct, they did not intend to cause harm to any claimant’s specific economic interests.17 The Integrated Unit Exception Although not expressly discussed by the Court, the Fifth Circuit has articulated and applied an integrated unit exception to the Robins Dry Dock rule. Under this exception, a party who is not the owner or tantamount to an owner of the physically impacted property may, nonetheless, recover economic damages if the physically affected asset is attached to the party’s asset and they both operate as an integrated unit.18  Application of the Robins Dry Dock Rule to This Case With these principles in mind, the Court turned to the remaining individual claims. The results reinforced the precedential force and implications of the Robins Dry Dock rule.  The Claims from City of Baltimore The City's claim only survived in one narrow aspect: it may continue to pursue damages associated with the harm to the 72-inch pre-cast concrete water main that runs beneath the Patapsco River at the location of the bridge. The City alleged that the combination of the DALI's evasive maneuvers and the collapse of the bridge physically damaged this City-owned infrastructure, and the Court could not conclude as a matter of law that this claim would fail. However, the remainder of the City's claimed damages, which were purely economic in nature, including lost tax revenue, increased road maintenance costs, and other downstream economic harms, were dismissed. The City's argument that it held a “proprietary interest” in the Key Bridge itself, because the bridge was a “functional component” of its municipal transportation network, was rejected by the Court. Likewise, damages to the City's streets and other bridges, caused by diverted heavy traffic, were also deemed too remote and attenuated. The Claims from Baltimore County The County's claim likewise survived only in part. It may proceed only on damages to those waterways and shorelines in which it can establish ownership. The collapse sent tons of debris into surrounding waters, and the County plausibly alleged physical damage to its shorelines, surface waters, and sediments. But the County's response costs, search-and-rescue expenses, lost tax revenue, and other economic damages were dismissed. The Claims from the Private Economic Loss Claimants The PEL Claimants, which were businesses ranging from shipping companies and longshoremen to sugar refiners and construction firms, saw their claims dismissed almost entirely as they could not show physical injury to their property. The sole exception: four “Container Claimant” parties who alleged they had cargo aboard the DALI that was physically damaged in the allision were permitted to proceed, because physical damage to one's own property is precisely the kind of injury that Robins Dry Dock rule does not bar. Key Takeaways  1. The Robins Dry Dock rule remains a big hurdle. Nearly a century after the Supreme Court issued the decision, the rule continues to operate as a near-absolute bar to recovery of economic damages for claimants who lack a proprietary interest in the damaged property. The Baltimore Bridge decision confirms and highlights that even catastrophic, highly publicized incidents with clearly devastating economic consequences do not affect the rule's application and implications. 2. The exceptions are narrowly applied. Although certain exceptions have been recognized by courts in the U.S., these exceptions are narrow and are only applied in very specific circumstances. As exemplified by the Court, none of the exceptions raised by the remaining Claimants prevented the harsh consequences of the Robins Dry Dock rule.  3. Proprietary interest in the physically injured property is key. The dividing line between claims that survived and claims that were dismissed is whether the claimant could establish a proprietary interest in property that was directly and physically damaged by the tortfeasor’s conduct. Thus, it is important to properly investigate a claim and develop the record following an incident to properly plead and show physical injury. _______________________________________________________________________________________ 1 In re Petition of Grace Ocean Private Ltd., Civ. No. 24-0941-JKB, Memorandum (D. Md. Aug. 25, 2026) (R. Doc. 906 at 4). 2 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501–30. This special maritime procedure is known as a limitation proceeding, which is a legal proceeding that consolidates all related claims into a single court. 3 On April 8, 2026, a grand jury returned an 18-count indictment charging the Owner and Captain with various crimes. See R. Doc. 906 at 5.  4 Petitioners sought to dismiss the remaining claims based on the standard of Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (motion to dismiss) or, in the alternative, to covert the motion and apply the standard of Rule 56 (summary judgment). See R. Doc. 906 at 7-8. 5 R. Doc. 906 at 11 (citing Robins Dry Dock, 275 U.S. at 307-10; State of La. ex rel. Guste v. M/V TESTBANK, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985)). 6 Robins Dry Dock, 275 U.S. at 303; TESTBANK, 752 F.2d at 1022.  7 Plains Pipeline, L.P. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 620 F. App’x 281, 286 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing TESTBANK, 752 F.2d at 1022, 1028-30)). 8 R. Doc. 906 at 12 (citing General Foods Corp. v. United States, 448 F. Supp. 111, 112-13 (D. Md. 1978)). 9 TESTBANK, 752 F.2d at 1028–29. 10 See Plains Pipeline, 620 F. App’x at 285 (citing In re Deepwater Horizon, 784 F.3d 1019, 1026 (5th Cir. 2015)). 11 See Tex. E. Transmission Corp. v. McMoran Offshore Expl. Co., 877 F.2d 1214, 1226 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Louisville & N. R. Co. v. M/V BAYOU LACOMBE, 597 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1979)); Mardi Gras World, LLC v. Marquette Transp. Co., 416 F. Supp. 3d 596, 602 (E.D. La. 2019). 12 Yarmouth Sea Prods. Ltd. v. Scully, 131 F.3d 389, 398 (4th Cir. 1997); see also Adams v. Star Enter., 51 F.3d 417, 424–25 (4th Cir. 1995). 13 Venore Transp. Co. v. M/V STRUMA, 583 F.2d 708, 711 (4th Cir. 1978); see Amoco Transp. Co. v. S/S MASON LYKES, 768 F.2d 659, 668 (5th Cir. 1985). 14 R. Doc. 906 at 13 (citing Venore, 583 F.2d at 711). 15 R. Doc. 906 at 36. 16 See, e.g., Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Marshland Dredging Co., 455 F.2d 957, 958 (5th Cir. 1972); Dick Meyers Towing Serv., Inc. v. United States, 577 F.2d 1023, 1025 (5th Cir. 1978). 17 R. Doc. 906 at 3 (citing Nautilus Marine, Inc. v. Niemela, 170 F.3d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1999)). 18 See Domar Ocean Transp., Ltd., Div. of Lee-Vac, Ltd. v. M/V ANDREW MARTIN, 754 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1985).

Sunny Rehsi (Of Counsel-Detroit, MI) coauthored “Ontario’s 15-Year Ultimate Limitation Period Bars Old Product Liability Lawsuits,” appearing in the September 2026 edition of DRI’s publication For the Defense. The article examines how Ontario’s 15-year ultimate limitation period can bar product liability claims involving older products, even where an injury occurs recently and the plaintiff sues within the ordinary two-year discoverability period. The authors explain that recent Ontario decisions, including Huether v. Sharpe and Hennebury v. Makita Canada Inc., clarify that a plaintiff cannot avoid the limitation period simply by characterizing an alleged failure to warn or other duty as “continuing”; there must be “successive or repeated actionable conduct” by the defendant. Referring to Hennebury, Sunny highlights the ruling’s significance for U.S. manufacturers, distributors, and insurers, noting that “the key limitation question is not simply when the plaintiff was injured or when the claim was discovered,” but when the underlying act or omission occurred. For product defendants, the practical lesson is to investigate the chronology of design, manufacture, distribution, warnings, recalls, and post-sale conduct at the outset of an Ontario claim and assess whether the 15-year ultimate limitation period provides a basis for an early dispositive motion.

Pernell Choren (Of Counsel-Washington, DC) and Catherine Hanrahan (Partner-Washington, DC) obtained summary judgment on behalf of a global logistics and courier company client in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, after more than two years of extensive litigation. The case arose from the alleged loss of a personal package that was shipped internationally from Iran to the District. The plaintiff claimed that the firm’s client failed to properly deliver the package and sued for negligence. After the trial was continued in February 2026, the court expressed willingness to entertain additional motion practice. Perry and Catherine filed a motion for summary judgment, supported by detailed shipping documentation demonstrating the client owed no duty of care to the plaintiff. They further established that the plaintiff failed to identify any expert witnesses or produce evidence of a standard of care the client allegedly violated, a necessary element of the negligence claim. In a thorough eight-page Order, the court agreed with the defense on all points, finding that the undisputed material facts were insufficient to demonstrate that the client owed any duty to the plaintiff and that the elements of his negligence claim could not be met. The court granted the motion, entered judgment in favor of the client, and closed the case.