The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) withdrew its 2013 and 2020 guidance on assistance animals in fair housing on September 17, 2025, sowing confusion among housing providers over the provisions of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) concerning reasonable accommodations in its absence. The wait for new direction under HUD on this pressing issue is over, as HUD issued its new enforcement guidance on assessing the use of animals as reasonable accommodations on May 22, 2026. The new guidance is that disability-related assistance animals exempt from housing providers’ pet policies, including pet fees, are now confined to trained service animals. The guidance also removes the presumption that untrained Emotional Support Animals (ESAs) must be accommodated by housing providers. Administratively, it puts all open HUD cases concerning ESAs on hold for individual review under the new standard by the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Enforcement. As such, HUD has taken another significant step in its view of the FHA. While the new guidance resolves certain threshold questions—most notably by confining disability-related animal accommodations to trained service animals and eliminating the longstanding presumption in favor of untrained ESAs—it leaves several critical issues open for housing providers, including the interplay with existing state and local ESA protections, the continued viability of breed and weight restriction challenges, and the status of pending and future private court actions involving ESAs. Understanding these open questions is essential for housing providers navigating this significant policy shift. HUD’s New Guidance on Assistance Animals Under the FHA HUD’s May 22, 2026 guidance begins by explaining why the 2020 guidance was rescinded, stating that it failed to provide housing providers with greater clarity on the distinction between pets and Emotional Support Animals and, instead, led to the emergence of an entire industry to convert pets into ESAs.1 The May 22, 2026 guidance provides that, effective immediately, HUD will only find “reasonable cause” and recommended charges with respect to complaints on animal-related reasonable accommodations in cases involving animals trained to provide disability-related assistance (i.e., service animals as opposed to ESAs). The new guidance further states that HUD will only find violations of the FHA for failure to provide a reasonable accommodation involving the waiver of a pet policy when the animal has been individually trained to perform work or tasks directly related to the individual’s disability. It further states that requests to waive pet policies for untrained ESAs are no longer presumptively reasonable, as opposed to requests to waive such policies for animals trained to perform specific disability-related services.  Open Issues for Housing Providers 1. Breed and Weight Restrictions The new HUD guidance raises the question of potential challenges to breed and weight restrictions for ESAs. Although it does not directly address these ancillary issues, the rescinded HUD guidance made it clear that landlords could not apply breed and weight restrictions to disability-related assistance animals, including ESAs. Whether the new guidance effectively permits the reimposition of such restrictions on ESAs remains an open question that housing providers will need to monitor closely. 2. Private Rights of Action It is important to note that, as explicitly stated in the new HUD guidance, individuals still have the right to seek redress for perceived violations of the FHA involving ESAs through private actions in court. Individuals may file complaints directly in court—bypassing HUD—within two years after the occurrence or termination of the alleged discriminatory housing practice. This means that even though HUD itself will no longer pursue ESA-related complaints, housing providers may still face litigation from individuals asserting ESA-based accommodation claims in federal and state courts. A. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act Housing providers should also note that HUD’s new guidance is not applicable to cases falling under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Section 504), which applies to properties participating in programs or activities receiving federal funding. Providers of federally-funded housing, therefore, remain subject to the prior, broader accommodation framework with respect to ESAs. B. State and Local Law Conflicts The new HUD guidance does not alter local and state laws and regulations where, in many jurisdictions, failing to waive a pet fee for an ESA could be considered a failure to accommodate. Given that many charges of discrimination are jointly filed with HUD and a local agency, the new HUD guidance can create a duality with respect to the treatment of ESAs. Housing providers operating in jurisdictions with independent ESA protections must continue to comply with those requirements regardless of HUD’s new position. Practical Implications The practical implications for housing providers of this reversal of decades of HUD policy concerning assistance animals as reasonable accommodations for individuals with disabilities cannot be overstated. Prior to the rescinding of the 2020 guidance, housing providers were generally understood to be required to allow ESAs without any pet fees or other penalties. This is no longer the case.  The new HUD guidance builds on the momentum in the direction away from the ESA-friendly interpretation of the prior HUD guidance reflected in a 2025 case from the Eastern District of Louisiana, Henderson v. Five Properties, LLC.2 In fact, HUD attached the Henderson decision to the memo issuing new guidance. In Henderson, the judge rejected the proposition that HUD guidance always required housing providers to waive pet fees for people with ESAs. Instead, the court in Henderson held that a tenant with an ESA seeking waiver of generally applicable animal fees was required to prove that waiver of the fee was both necessary for her to use and enjoy her home reasonably, and that whether such an accommodation is required is a fact-specific determination to be made on a case-by-case basis.  It is worth noting that this new HUD guidance was created in the wake of the Loper Bright decision from the U.S. Supreme Court in 2024, which noted the Court’s power to reject interpretations of statutes adopted by federal administrative agencies.3 In recent cases, such as Watts v. Joggers Run Prop. Owners Ass’n, courts are still deferring to HUD’s interpretation and regulations related to the FHA.4 The changes unfolding as a result of this new guidance will have far-reaching implications for housing providers’ operations. However, it does not change the current case law interpreting the FHA with respect to housing providers’ accommodations for ESAs. We will continue to watch closely as these issues inevitably unfold. ________________________________________________________________________________________ 1 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2026, May 22, Assessing Requests for the Use of Animal as a Reasonable Accommodation Under the Fair Housing Act [press release]. 2 Henderson v. Five Properties, LLC, 2025 WL 1951763 (E.D. LA July 16, 2025). 3 Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (U.S. June 28, 2024). 4 Watts v. Joggers Run Prop. Owners Ass'n, 133 F.4th 1032, 1042 (11th Cir. April 7, 2025).

Kimberly Blair (Partner-Chicago, IL), Peter Catalanotti (Partner-San Francisco), Joseph Francoeur (Partner-New York, NY), and Alexandra Skarka (Associate-Philadelphia, PA) will present the Wilson Elser Forum webinar “Scope of Services: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives for Claims Professionals” on June 8, 2026. The session provides a cross-disciplinary overview of how scope of services issues arise across design and construction, legal, brokerage, and real estate professions. Presenters will address how engagement agreements define and limit the scope of professional services, the risks of scope creep and undocumented service expansion, defenses available based on scope limitations, and evidentiary sources and trial strategies for scope disputes. Also covered are deposition tactics specific to scope of services claims, underwriting red flags and claims investigation best practices, third-party liability exposure when non-clients rely on an insured’s work product, and potential subrogation opportunities.

On May 29, 2026, Maria Papasakelariou (Of Counsel-Miami, FL) was sworn in as President of the Young Lawyer Section (YLS) of the Miami-Dade Bar at the Association’s 110th Annual Installation Gala, held at the Biltmore Hotel in Coral Gables, Florida. The YLS comprises more than 1300 members, including all regular, associate, and government service members of the Miami-Dade Bar who are age 36 and under. It’s focus is on professional development, networking, community service, and philanthropy through a variety of targeted programs, events, and legal advocacy. Governed by its own Executive Board and budget, the YLS hosts signature initiatives such as its annual “40 under 40” awards, which recognizes emerging legal talent across South Florida. Maria was honored as a YLS “40 Under 40” recipient in 2024 and also received the Miami-Dade Bar Circle of Excellence Award that same year. Most recently, she was selected as a recipient of the 2026 Florida Bar Young Lawyers Division’s 36 Under Thirty-Six Professionalism Award, recognizing young attorneys who exemplify the highest standards of professionalism in the practice of law.

Maxwell Billek (Partner-Madison, NJ), Rebecca Gelozin (Partner-White Plains, NY), and Daniel Tranen (Partner-St. Louis, MO) will present the Wilson Elser Forum webinar “Hit Send; Hit Panic! Protecting Your Protocol in the Digital Age” on June 9, 2026. This presentation provides recommendations for professionals on risk management related to document retention, email, metadata, and accidental exposure of information, and how those risks can create and exacerbate liability in claims. It also encourages claims handlers to examine their own habits in these areas and look for opportunities to improve.

Beata Shapiro (Partner-Boston, MA) authored “The Impact of the U.S. Supreme Court Decision in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, No. 24-1238: Supreme Court Allows State Negligent Hiring Claims Against Brokers,” appearing in the June 1, 2026, posting of Westlaw Today. The article examines the May 2026 Supreme Court decision in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, holding that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA) does not preempt state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers when those claims fall within the statute’s safety exception.   The case arose from a catastrophic Illinois truck accident that left the plaintiff with severe, life-altering injuries. The central question before the Court was whether the FAAAA shields brokers from liability for negligent selection of motor carriers, an issue that has divided federal appellate courts for years. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Barrett, the Court concluded that negligent hiring claims implicate a state’s traditional safety regulatory authority and therefore fall within the FAAAA’s safety exception. While the decision confirms that brokers may face certain state law negligence claims, the Court emphasized that the FAAAA retains meaningful preemptive force and continues to provide important protections. Justice Kavanaugh, concurring, cautioned that the ruling should not be read as imposing automatic liability on brokers, noting that traditional negligence principles and proximate cause requirements remain important safeguards. Beata observes, “The Court confirmed that broker selection practices are not insulated from state tort law where safety is at issue ‒ this decision will reshape how the industry evaluates risk and compliance going forward.” She also notes that significant questions remain regarding intrastate transportation and potential claims involving shippers, making Montgomery an important development in transportation law that narrows, but does not eliminate, the reach of FAAAA preemption.

White Plains, New York, partners Michael Grady and Siobhainin Funchion obtained a defense verdict following a four-week jury trial in the New York Supreme Court, Westchester County, on behalf of their obstetrician client. The plaintiff alleged that the client improperly managed her pregnancy by failing to timely deliver an infant with intrauterine growth restriction (IUGR). In her malpractice claim, the plaintiff maintained that the delay in delivery resulted in placental insufficiency and fetal hypoxia, causing hypotonia, failure to thrive, and permanent physical, cognitive, and developmental impairments. Mike and Siobhan successfully argued that the obstetrician's management of the pregnancy complied with the applicable standard of care. Relying on the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) guidelines, they demonstrated that, in cases of isolated IUGR with normal fetal testing, delivery between 38 and 39 weeks is appropriate. The evidence established that the infant was delivered within that recommended timeframe.   Working alongside counsel for the co-defendant maternal-fetal medicine physician, Mike and Siobhan further argued that the infant’s condition was attributable to a rare genetic microdeletion that was diagnosed the year following delivery, rather than any alleged delay in delivery. The trial featured testimony from 14 witnesses, including 10 expert witnesses in the fields of obstetrics, maternal-fetal medicine, neonatology, pediatric neurology, genetics, physical medicine/rehabilitation, and economics. During closing arguments, plaintiff’s counsel sought damages ranging from $26 million to $36 million. The jury returned a defense verdict in just 23 minutes.

Denise Motta (Of Counsel-Louisville, KY) has been appointed Vice Chair of the American Bar Association Tort & Insurance Practice Section’s Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Committee. The appointment further reflects Denise’s leadership in the field of alternative dispute resolution, where she also serves as Chair of DRI's ADR Committee and Vice Chair of the Kentucky Bar Association’s ADR Section. An experienced arbitrator and mediator, Denise is a panel member with the American Arbitration Association. In addition to her ADR leadership roles, Denise is a strategic advocate for clients in construction matters and complex business and injury disputes.

Nevada’s Supreme Court decided in Powers v. Dist. Ct. that NRS 629.620 violated Nevada’s separation of powers and is unconstitutional. This has immediate implications for clients defending traumatic brain injury cases in Nevada. The Decision The statute was sponsored by the local plaintiffs' bar and purported to regulate physical and mental examinations, replacing Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 35(NRCP). This was a second attempt, as the Supreme Court also deemed an earlier statute, NRS 52.380, unconstitutional for the same reasons. Both statutes upset the balance in tort litigation, violated separation of powers, and negatively affected defendants' ability to defend themselves. Powers also addressed recurring questions concerning neuropsychological examinations. These examinations generate raw data. In practice, courts had ruled this raw data could be exchanged only between the parties’ neuropsychologists. Here, the plaintiff wanted his counsel to have access to the raw data generated from the examination but without the expense of hiring his own neuropsychologist. The Supreme Court concluded “the district court did not abuse its discretion by permitting disclosure of the raw data to Bueno’s counsel, subject to a protective order.” The Court concluded “the generalized fears of some neuropsychologists that nonpsychologists, if they are provided raw data, will violate protective orders, misuse the tests and irreparably compromise the validity of future testing, is not sufficient” to support further, narrower restrictions. Finally, Powers addressed the plaintiff’s request to audio record the examination. Applying NRCP 35, “generally, recording is only proper when the court finds special circumstances amounting to good cause for the requests.” These special circumstances “are rare and typically include extreme situations….” The plaintiff’s “generalized fear that the neuropsychologist might distort the test results in front of the jury” was not sufficient. Michael Lowry (Partner-Las Vegas) submitted an amicus brief for Las Vegas Defense Lawyers asserting that NRS 629.620 was unconstitutional. The brief also addressed problems with the district court’s order implementing neuropsychological testing requirements. Implications for Pending Cases First, NRS 629.620 is inapplicable to litigated cases. This restores balance and discretion to the district courts. Removing NRS 629.620 also helps defendants in brain injury cases because the statute made it nearly impossible to obtain a neuropsychological examination. These requests are instead governed by NRCP 35. The Court, however, ruled narrowly and did not address whether NRS 629.620 may be applicable in other scenarios, such as pre-litigation examinations, UM/UIM claims, worker’s compensation claims, and other settings. This may not be the end of this years-long dispute, though. Like after the Supreme Court’s Lyft v. Dist. Ct. decision, NRS 629.620’s supporters might return to the legislature in the coming session and attempt to modify the statute in some way to achieve their goals but not violate separation of powers. Secondarily, though, defendants may still have a difficult time finding neuropsychologists willing to perform examinations. As a result of years of research, the neuropsychological community restricts the raw data generated from testing. It can be provided only to other neuropsychologists for their review. Powers, however, ruled that a party cannot be forced to hire an expert, and the district court adequately addressed the community’s confidentiality concerns by entering a protective order. Powers did not discuss NAC 641.234(3) and (4), which have the effect of expressly prohibiting such disclosure. The result is conflict between the neuropsychologist’s regulatory obligations and the terms of a court’s order. It seems likely this conflict will generate more motion work and writ petitions in future cases.

Jonathan Meer (Partner-New York, NY) and Angela Sekerka (Of Counsel-Chicago, IL) secured dismissal of two housing discrimination charges before the Texas Workforce Commission. On May 4, 2026, the Commission issued a letter of determination dismissing claims of housing discrimination based on race and retaliation.  The Commission found that the Respondent did not act to terminate the Complainant’s tenancy, nor did they take an action against this tenant that was different from someone in a different protected class.  The Commission found that the Respondents presented direct evidence suggesting that many of the actions were standard and universally applied in their policy enforcement.  It noted that the Complainant provided no evidence that a tenant of a different racial group or disability status committed a similar lease violation and was not issued an infraction or faced more lenient treatment.  After conducting an on-site inspection, the Commission also noted that interviews with other residents generally supported the absence of observed racial or disability discrimination.  As to the claim of retaliation, the Commission found that the Complainant did not even engage in an activity protected by the Texas Act, let alone be subjected to an adverse action. In a separate matter on May 8, 2026, the Commission dismissed claims of housing discrimination based on national origin and retaliation.  The Commission found that while the Respondent did restrict the Complainant’s use of the community workshop until she signed a waiver and issued formal violations, it was not due to her national origin.  The Complainant and all residents, including those who identify with a different national origin, were required to sign a waiver, and the Commission found that the Complainant was denied access solely because she explicitly refused to sign the mandatory safety form.  The Commission noted that she received a notice to vacate, not because of her national origin but because her rent was unpaid.  With respect to the claims that she was unfairly targeted by the annual audit process, the auditor who worked remotely had never met the Complainant, was unaware of the Complainant’s national origin, and used the income calculation using a locked-cell spreadsheet based on standardized state formulas used for all tenants, including those for non-Russian residents.  Further, the Commission found that there was no retaliation as the Respondents had documented issues with lease violations and failure to complete the income audit before she engaged in any potentially protected activity.

Denise Motta (Of Counsel-Louisville) will be a panelist at the 2026 AAA-ICDR Construction Conference in Marina Del Rey on June 4, 2026. She will join an expert panel of arbitrators/mediators and in-house counsel to discuss the implications of labor and supply chain issues increasingly impacting the construction industry. Denise and her fellow panelists will offer insights into navigating these claims and examine how early mediation, arbitration, and dispute review boards may help parties reach resolutions before disputes escalate.

On May 29, 2026, Maria Papasakelariou (Of Counsel-Miami, FL) was sworn in as President of the Young Lawyer Section (YLS) of the Miami-Dade Bar at the Association’s 110th Annual Installation Gala, held at the Biltmore Hotel in Coral Gables, Florida. The YLS comprises more than 1300 members, including all regular, associate, and government service members of the Miami-Dade Bar who are age 36 and under. It’s focus is on professional development, networking, community service, and philanthropy through a variety of targeted programs, events, and legal advocacy. Governed by its own Executive Board and budget, the YLS hosts signature initiatives such as its annual “40 under 40” awards, which recognizes emerging legal talent across South Florida. Maria was honored as a YLS “40 Under 40” recipient in 2024 and also received the Miami-Dade Bar Circle of Excellence Award that same year. Most recently, she was selected as a recipient of the 2026 Florida Bar Young Lawyers Division’s 36 Under Thirty-Six Professionalism Award, recognizing young attorneys who exemplify the highest standards of professionalism in the practice of law.

Kimberly Blair (Partner-Chicago, IL), Peter Catalanotti (Partner-San Francisco), Joseph Francoeur (Partner-New York, NY), and Alexandra Skarka (Associate-Philadelphia, PA) will present the Wilson Elser Forum webinar “Scope of Services: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives for Claims Professionals” on June 8, 2026. The session provides a cross-disciplinary overview of how scope of services issues arise across design and construction, legal, brokerage, and real estate professions. Presenters will address how engagement agreements define and limit the scope of professional services, the risks of scope creep and undocumented service expansion, defenses available based on scope limitations, and evidentiary sources and trial strategies for scope disputes. Also covered are deposition tactics specific to scope of services claims, underwriting red flags and claims investigation best practices, third-party liability exposure when non-clients rely on an insured’s work product, and potential subrogation opportunities.

The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) withdrew its 2013 and 2020 guidance on assistance animals in fair housing on September 17, 2025, sowing confusion among housing providers over the provisions of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) concerning reasonable accommodations in its absence. The wait for new direction under HUD on this pressing issue is over, as HUD issued its new enforcement guidance on assessing the use of animals as reasonable accommodations on May 22, 2026. The new guidance is that disability-related assistance animals exempt from housing providers’ pet policies, including pet fees, are now confined to trained service animals. The guidance also removes the presumption that untrained Emotional Support Animals (ESAs) must be accommodated by housing providers. Administratively, it puts all open HUD cases concerning ESAs on hold for individual review under the new standard by the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Enforcement. As such, HUD has taken another significant step in its view of the FHA. While the new guidance resolves certain threshold questions—most notably by confining disability-related animal accommodations to trained service animals and eliminating the longstanding presumption in favor of untrained ESAs—it leaves several critical issues open for housing providers, including the interplay with existing state and local ESA protections, the continued viability of breed and weight restriction challenges, and the status of pending and future private court actions involving ESAs. Understanding these open questions is essential for housing providers navigating this significant policy shift. HUD’s New Guidance on Assistance Animals Under the FHA HUD’s May 22, 2026 guidance begins by explaining why the 2020 guidance was rescinded, stating that it failed to provide housing providers with greater clarity on the distinction between pets and Emotional Support Animals and, instead, led to the emergence of an entire industry to convert pets into ESAs.1 The May 22, 2026 guidance provides that, effective immediately, HUD will only find “reasonable cause” and recommended charges with respect to complaints on animal-related reasonable accommodations in cases involving animals trained to provide disability-related assistance (i.e., service animals as opposed to ESAs). The new guidance further states that HUD will only find violations of the FHA for failure to provide a reasonable accommodation involving the waiver of a pet policy when the animal has been individually trained to perform work or tasks directly related to the individual’s disability. It further states that requests to waive pet policies for untrained ESAs are no longer presumptively reasonable, as opposed to requests to waive such policies for animals trained to perform specific disability-related services.  Open Issues for Housing Providers 1. Breed and Weight Restrictions The new HUD guidance raises the question of potential challenges to breed and weight restrictions for ESAs. Although it does not directly address these ancillary issues, the rescinded HUD guidance made it clear that landlords could not apply breed and weight restrictions to disability-related assistance animals, including ESAs. Whether the new guidance effectively permits the reimposition of such restrictions on ESAs remains an open question that housing providers will need to monitor closely. 2. Private Rights of Action It is important to note that, as explicitly stated in the new HUD guidance, individuals still have the right to seek redress for perceived violations of the FHA involving ESAs through private actions in court. Individuals may file complaints directly in court—bypassing HUD—within two years after the occurrence or termination of the alleged discriminatory housing practice. This means that even though HUD itself will no longer pursue ESA-related complaints, housing providers may still face litigation from individuals asserting ESA-based accommodation claims in federal and state courts. A. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act Housing providers should also note that HUD’s new guidance is not applicable to cases falling under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Section 504), which applies to properties participating in programs or activities receiving federal funding. Providers of federally-funded housing, therefore, remain subject to the prior, broader accommodation framework with respect to ESAs. B. State and Local Law Conflicts The new HUD guidance does not alter local and state laws and regulations where, in many jurisdictions, failing to waive a pet fee for an ESA could be considered a failure to accommodate. Given that many charges of discrimination are jointly filed with HUD and a local agency, the new HUD guidance can create a duality with respect to the treatment of ESAs. Housing providers operating in jurisdictions with independent ESA protections must continue to comply with those requirements regardless of HUD’s new position. Practical Implications The practical implications for housing providers of this reversal of decades of HUD policy concerning assistance animals as reasonable accommodations for individuals with disabilities cannot be overstated. Prior to the rescinding of the 2020 guidance, housing providers were generally understood to be required to allow ESAs without any pet fees or other penalties. This is no longer the case.  The new HUD guidance builds on the momentum in the direction away from the ESA-friendly interpretation of the prior HUD guidance reflected in a 2025 case from the Eastern District of Louisiana, Henderson v. Five Properties, LLC.2 In fact, HUD attached the Henderson decision to the memo issuing new guidance. In Henderson, the judge rejected the proposition that HUD guidance always required housing providers to waive pet fees for people with ESAs. Instead, the court in Henderson held that a tenant with an ESA seeking waiver of generally applicable animal fees was required to prove that waiver of the fee was both necessary for her to use and enjoy her home reasonably, and that whether such an accommodation is required is a fact-specific determination to be made on a case-by-case basis.  It is worth noting that this new HUD guidance was created in the wake of the Loper Bright decision from the U.S. Supreme Court in 2024, which noted the Court’s power to reject interpretations of statutes adopted by federal administrative agencies.3 In recent cases, such as Watts v. Joggers Run Prop. Owners Ass’n, courts are still deferring to HUD’s interpretation and regulations related to the FHA.4 The changes unfolding as a result of this new guidance will have far-reaching implications for housing providers’ operations. However, it does not change the current case law interpreting the FHA with respect to housing providers’ accommodations for ESAs. We will continue to watch closely as these issues inevitably unfold. ________________________________________________________________________________________ 1 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2026, May 22, Assessing Requests for the Use of Animal as a Reasonable Accommodation Under the Fair Housing Act [press release]. 2 Henderson v. Five Properties, LLC, 2025 WL 1951763 (E.D. LA July 16, 2025). 3 Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (U.S. June 28, 2024). 4 Watts v. Joggers Run Prop. Owners Ass'n, 133 F.4th 1032, 1042 (11th Cir. April 7, 2025).

Maxwell Billek (Partner-Madison, NJ), Rebecca Gelozin (Partner-White Plains, NY), and Daniel Tranen (Partner-St. Louis, MO) will present the Wilson Elser Forum webinar “Hit Send; Hit Panic! Protecting Your Protocol in the Digital Age” on June 9, 2026. This presentation provides recommendations for professionals on risk management related to document retention, email, metadata, and accidental exposure of information, and how those risks can create and exacerbate liability in claims. It also encourages claims handlers to examine their own habits in these areas and look for opportunities to improve.

Beata Shapiro (Partner-Boston, MA) authored “The Impact of the U.S. Supreme Court Decision in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, No. 24-1238: Supreme Court Allows State Negligent Hiring Claims Against Brokers,” appearing in the June 1, 2026, posting of Westlaw Today. The article examines the May 2026 Supreme Court decision in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, holding that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA) does not preempt state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers when those claims fall within the statute’s safety exception.   The case arose from a catastrophic Illinois truck accident that left the plaintiff with severe, life-altering injuries. The central question before the Court was whether the FAAAA shields brokers from liability for negligent selection of motor carriers, an issue that has divided federal appellate courts for years. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Barrett, the Court concluded that negligent hiring claims implicate a state’s traditional safety regulatory authority and therefore fall within the FAAAA’s safety exception. While the decision confirms that brokers may face certain state law negligence claims, the Court emphasized that the FAAAA retains meaningful preemptive force and continues to provide important protections. Justice Kavanaugh, concurring, cautioned that the ruling should not be read as imposing automatic liability on brokers, noting that traditional negligence principles and proximate cause requirements remain important safeguards. Beata observes, “The Court confirmed that broker selection practices are not insulated from state tort law where safety is at issue ‒ this decision will reshape how the industry evaluates risk and compliance going forward.” She also notes that significant questions remain regarding intrastate transportation and potential claims involving shippers, making Montgomery an important development in transportation law that narrows, but does not eliminate, the reach of FAAAA preemption.

White Plains, New York, partners Michael Grady and Siobhainin Funchion obtained a defense verdict following a four-week jury trial in the New York Supreme Court, Westchester County, on behalf of their obstetrician client. The plaintiff alleged that the client improperly managed her pregnancy by failing to timely deliver an infant with intrauterine growth restriction (IUGR). In her malpractice claim, the plaintiff maintained that the delay in delivery resulted in placental insufficiency and fetal hypoxia, causing hypotonia, failure to thrive, and permanent physical, cognitive, and developmental impairments. Mike and Siobhan successfully argued that the obstetrician's management of the pregnancy complied with the applicable standard of care. Relying on the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) guidelines, they demonstrated that, in cases of isolated IUGR with normal fetal testing, delivery between 38 and 39 weeks is appropriate. The evidence established that the infant was delivered within that recommended timeframe.   Working alongside counsel for the co-defendant maternal-fetal medicine physician, Mike and Siobhan further argued that the infant’s condition was attributable to a rare genetic microdeletion that was diagnosed the year following delivery, rather than any alleged delay in delivery. The trial featured testimony from 14 witnesses, including 10 expert witnesses in the fields of obstetrics, maternal-fetal medicine, neonatology, pediatric neurology, genetics, physical medicine/rehabilitation, and economics. During closing arguments, plaintiff’s counsel sought damages ranging from $26 million to $36 million. The jury returned a defense verdict in just 23 minutes.

Denise Motta (Of Counsel-Louisville, KY) has been appointed Vice Chair of the American Bar Association Tort & Insurance Practice Section’s Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Committee. The appointment further reflects Denise’s leadership in the field of alternative dispute resolution, where she also serves as Chair of DRI's ADR Committee and Vice Chair of the Kentucky Bar Association’s ADR Section. An experienced arbitrator and mediator, Denise is a panel member with the American Arbitration Association. In addition to her ADR leadership roles, Denise is a strategic advocate for clients in construction matters and complex business and injury disputes.

Nevada’s Supreme Court decided in Powers v. Dist. Ct. that NRS 629.620 violated Nevada’s separation of powers and is unconstitutional. This has immediate implications for clients defending traumatic brain injury cases in Nevada. The Decision The statute was sponsored by the local plaintiffs' bar and purported to regulate physical and mental examinations, replacing Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 35(NRCP). This was a second attempt, as the Supreme Court also deemed an earlier statute, NRS 52.380, unconstitutional for the same reasons. Both statutes upset the balance in tort litigation, violated separation of powers, and negatively affected defendants' ability to defend themselves. Powers also addressed recurring questions concerning neuropsychological examinations. These examinations generate raw data. In practice, courts had ruled this raw data could be exchanged only between the parties’ neuropsychologists. Here, the plaintiff wanted his counsel to have access to the raw data generated from the examination but without the expense of hiring his own neuropsychologist. The Supreme Court concluded “the district court did not abuse its discretion by permitting disclosure of the raw data to Bueno’s counsel, subject to a protective order.” The Court concluded “the generalized fears of some neuropsychologists that nonpsychologists, if they are provided raw data, will violate protective orders, misuse the tests and irreparably compromise the validity of future testing, is not sufficient” to support further, narrower restrictions. Finally, Powers addressed the plaintiff’s request to audio record the examination. Applying NRCP 35, “generally, recording is only proper when the court finds special circumstances amounting to good cause for the requests.” These special circumstances “are rare and typically include extreme situations….” The plaintiff’s “generalized fear that the neuropsychologist might distort the test results in front of the jury” was not sufficient. Michael Lowry (Partner-Las Vegas) submitted an amicus brief for Las Vegas Defense Lawyers asserting that NRS 629.620 was unconstitutional. The brief also addressed problems with the district court’s order implementing neuropsychological testing requirements. Implications for Pending Cases First, NRS 629.620 is inapplicable to litigated cases. This restores balance and discretion to the district courts. Removing NRS 629.620 also helps defendants in brain injury cases because the statute made it nearly impossible to obtain a neuropsychological examination. These requests are instead governed by NRCP 35. The Court, however, ruled narrowly and did not address whether NRS 629.620 may be applicable in other scenarios, such as pre-litigation examinations, UM/UIM claims, worker’s compensation claims, and other settings. This may not be the end of this years-long dispute, though. Like after the Supreme Court’s Lyft v. Dist. Ct. decision, NRS 629.620’s supporters might return to the legislature in the coming session and attempt to modify the statute in some way to achieve their goals but not violate separation of powers. Secondarily, though, defendants may still have a difficult time finding neuropsychologists willing to perform examinations. As a result of years of research, the neuropsychological community restricts the raw data generated from testing. It can be provided only to other neuropsychologists for their review. Powers, however, ruled that a party cannot be forced to hire an expert, and the district court adequately addressed the community’s confidentiality concerns by entering a protective order. Powers did not discuss NAC 641.234(3) and (4), which have the effect of expressly prohibiting such disclosure. The result is conflict between the neuropsychologist’s regulatory obligations and the terms of a court’s order. It seems likely this conflict will generate more motion work and writ petitions in future cases.

Jonathan Meer (Partner-New York, NY) and Angela Sekerka (Of Counsel-Chicago, IL) secured dismissal of two housing discrimination charges before the Texas Workforce Commission. On May 4, 2026, the Commission issued a letter of determination dismissing claims of housing discrimination based on race and retaliation.  The Commission found that the Respondent did not act to terminate the Complainant’s tenancy, nor did they take an action against this tenant that was different from someone in a different protected class.  The Commission found that the Respondents presented direct evidence suggesting that many of the actions were standard and universally applied in their policy enforcement.  It noted that the Complainant provided no evidence that a tenant of a different racial group or disability status committed a similar lease violation and was not issued an infraction or faced more lenient treatment.  After conducting an on-site inspection, the Commission also noted that interviews with other residents generally supported the absence of observed racial or disability discrimination.  As to the claim of retaliation, the Commission found that the Complainant did not even engage in an activity protected by the Texas Act, let alone be subjected to an adverse action. In a separate matter on May 8, 2026, the Commission dismissed claims of housing discrimination based on national origin and retaliation.  The Commission found that while the Respondent did restrict the Complainant’s use of the community workshop until she signed a waiver and issued formal violations, it was not due to her national origin.  The Complainant and all residents, including those who identify with a different national origin, were required to sign a waiver, and the Commission found that the Complainant was denied access solely because she explicitly refused to sign the mandatory safety form.  The Commission noted that she received a notice to vacate, not because of her national origin but because her rent was unpaid.  With respect to the claims that she was unfairly targeted by the annual audit process, the auditor who worked remotely had never met the Complainant, was unaware of the Complainant’s national origin, and used the income calculation using a locked-cell spreadsheet based on standardized state formulas used for all tenants, including those for non-Russian residents.  Further, the Commission found that there was no retaliation as the Respondents had documented issues with lease violations and failure to complete the income audit before she engaged in any potentially protected activity.

Denise Motta (Of Counsel-Louisville) will be a panelist at the 2026 AAA-ICDR Construction Conference in Marina Del Rey on June 4, 2026. She will join an expert panel of arbitrators/mediators and in-house counsel to discuss the implications of labor and supply chain issues increasingly impacting the construction industry. Denise and her fellow panelists will offer insights into navigating these claims and examine how early mediation, arbitration, and dispute review boards may help parties reach resolutions before disputes escalate.

On May 29, 2026, Maria Papasakelariou (Of Counsel-Miami, FL) was sworn in as President of the Young Lawyer Section (YLS) of the Miami-Dade Bar at the Association’s 110th Annual Installation Gala, held at the Biltmore Hotel in Coral Gables, Florida. The YLS comprises more than 1300 members, including all regular, associate, and government service members of the Miami-Dade Bar who are age 36 and under. It’s focus is on professional development, networking, community service, and philanthropy through a variety of targeted programs, events, and legal advocacy. Governed by its own Executive Board and budget, the YLS hosts signature initiatives such as its annual “40 under 40” awards, which recognizes emerging legal talent across South Florida. Maria was honored as a YLS “40 Under 40” recipient in 2024 and also received the Miami-Dade Bar Circle of Excellence Award that same year. Most recently, she was selected as a recipient of the 2026 Florida Bar Young Lawyers Division’s 36 Under Thirty-Six Professionalism Award, recognizing young attorneys who exemplify the highest standards of professionalism in the practice of law.

Kimberly Blair (Partner-Chicago, IL), Peter Catalanotti (Partner-San Francisco), Joseph Francoeur (Partner-New York, NY), and Alexandra Skarka (Associate-Philadelphia, PA) will present the Wilson Elser Forum webinar “Scope of Services: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives for Claims Professionals” on June 8, 2026. The session provides a cross-disciplinary overview of how scope of services issues arise across design and construction, legal, brokerage, and real estate professions. Presenters will address how engagement agreements define and limit the scope of professional services, the risks of scope creep and undocumented service expansion, defenses available based on scope limitations, and evidentiary sources and trial strategies for scope disputes. Also covered are deposition tactics specific to scope of services claims, underwriting red flags and claims investigation best practices, third-party liability exposure when non-clients rely on an insured’s work product, and potential subrogation opportunities.

The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) withdrew its 2013 and 2020 guidance on assistance animals in fair housing on September 17, 2025, sowing confusion among housing providers over the provisions of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) concerning reasonable accommodations in its absence. The wait for new direction under HUD on this pressing issue is over, as HUD issued its new enforcement guidance on assessing the use of animals as reasonable accommodations on May 22, 2026. The new guidance is that disability-related assistance animals exempt from housing providers’ pet policies, including pet fees, are now confined to trained service animals. The guidance also removes the presumption that untrained Emotional Support Animals (ESAs) must be accommodated by housing providers. Administratively, it puts all open HUD cases concerning ESAs on hold for individual review under the new standard by the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Enforcement. As such, HUD has taken another significant step in its view of the FHA. While the new guidance resolves certain threshold questions—most notably by confining disability-related animal accommodations to trained service animals and eliminating the longstanding presumption in favor of untrained ESAs—it leaves several critical issues open for housing providers, including the interplay with existing state and local ESA protections, the continued viability of breed and weight restriction challenges, and the status of pending and future private court actions involving ESAs. Understanding these open questions is essential for housing providers navigating this significant policy shift. HUD’s New Guidance on Assistance Animals Under the FHA HUD’s May 22, 2026 guidance begins by explaining why the 2020 guidance was rescinded, stating that it failed to provide housing providers with greater clarity on the distinction between pets and Emotional Support Animals and, instead, led to the emergence of an entire industry to convert pets into ESAs.1 The May 22, 2026 guidance provides that, effective immediately, HUD will only find “reasonable cause” and recommended charges with respect to complaints on animal-related reasonable accommodations in cases involving animals trained to provide disability-related assistance (i.e., service animals as opposed to ESAs). The new guidance further states that HUD will only find violations of the FHA for failure to provide a reasonable accommodation involving the waiver of a pet policy when the animal has been individually trained to perform work or tasks directly related to the individual’s disability. It further states that requests to waive pet policies for untrained ESAs are no longer presumptively reasonable, as opposed to requests to waive such policies for animals trained to perform specific disability-related services.  Open Issues for Housing Providers 1. Breed and Weight Restrictions The new HUD guidance raises the question of potential challenges to breed and weight restrictions for ESAs. Although it does not directly address these ancillary issues, the rescinded HUD guidance made it clear that landlords could not apply breed and weight restrictions to disability-related assistance animals, including ESAs. Whether the new guidance effectively permits the reimposition of such restrictions on ESAs remains an open question that housing providers will need to monitor closely. 2. Private Rights of Action It is important to note that, as explicitly stated in the new HUD guidance, individuals still have the right to seek redress for perceived violations of the FHA involving ESAs through private actions in court. Individuals may file complaints directly in court—bypassing HUD—within two years after the occurrence or termination of the alleged discriminatory housing practice. This means that even though HUD itself will no longer pursue ESA-related complaints, housing providers may still face litigation from individuals asserting ESA-based accommodation claims in federal and state courts. A. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act Housing providers should also note that HUD’s new guidance is not applicable to cases falling under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Section 504), which applies to properties participating in programs or activities receiving federal funding. Providers of federally-funded housing, therefore, remain subject to the prior, broader accommodation framework with respect to ESAs. B. State and Local Law Conflicts The new HUD guidance does not alter local and state laws and regulations where, in many jurisdictions, failing to waive a pet fee for an ESA could be considered a failure to accommodate. Given that many charges of discrimination are jointly filed with HUD and a local agency, the new HUD guidance can create a duality with respect to the treatment of ESAs. Housing providers operating in jurisdictions with independent ESA protections must continue to comply with those requirements regardless of HUD’s new position. Practical Implications The practical implications for housing providers of this reversal of decades of HUD policy concerning assistance animals as reasonable accommodations for individuals with disabilities cannot be overstated. Prior to the rescinding of the 2020 guidance, housing providers were generally understood to be required to allow ESAs without any pet fees or other penalties. This is no longer the case.  The new HUD guidance builds on the momentum in the direction away from the ESA-friendly interpretation of the prior HUD guidance reflected in a 2025 case from the Eastern District of Louisiana, Henderson v. Five Properties, LLC.2 In fact, HUD attached the Henderson decision to the memo issuing new guidance. In Henderson, the judge rejected the proposition that HUD guidance always required housing providers to waive pet fees for people with ESAs. Instead, the court in Henderson held that a tenant with an ESA seeking waiver of generally applicable animal fees was required to prove that waiver of the fee was both necessary for her to use and enjoy her home reasonably, and that whether such an accommodation is required is a fact-specific determination to be made on a case-by-case basis.  It is worth noting that this new HUD guidance was created in the wake of the Loper Bright decision from the U.S. Supreme Court in 2024, which noted the Court’s power to reject interpretations of statutes adopted by federal administrative agencies.3 In recent cases, such as Watts v. Joggers Run Prop. Owners Ass’n, courts are still deferring to HUD’s interpretation and regulations related to the FHA.4 The changes unfolding as a result of this new guidance will have far-reaching implications for housing providers’ operations. However, it does not change the current case law interpreting the FHA with respect to housing providers’ accommodations for ESAs. We will continue to watch closely as these issues inevitably unfold. ________________________________________________________________________________________ 1 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2026, May 22, Assessing Requests for the Use of Animal as a Reasonable Accommodation Under the Fair Housing Act [press release]. 2 Henderson v. Five Properties, LLC, 2025 WL 1951763 (E.D. LA July 16, 2025). 3 Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (U.S. June 28, 2024). 4 Watts v. Joggers Run Prop. Owners Ass'n, 133 F.4th 1032, 1042 (11th Cir. April 7, 2025).

Maxwell Billek (Partner-Madison, NJ), Rebecca Gelozin (Partner-White Plains, NY), and Daniel Tranen (Partner-St. Louis, MO) will present the Wilson Elser Forum webinar “Hit Send; Hit Panic! Protecting Your Protocol in the Digital Age” on June 9, 2026. This presentation provides recommendations for professionals on risk management related to document retention, email, metadata, and accidental exposure of information, and how those risks can create and exacerbate liability in claims. It also encourages claims handlers to examine their own habits in these areas and look for opportunities to improve.

Beata Shapiro (Partner-Boston, MA) authored “The Impact of the U.S. Supreme Court Decision in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, No. 24-1238: Supreme Court Allows State Negligent Hiring Claims Against Brokers,” appearing in the June 1, 2026, posting of Westlaw Today. The article examines the May 2026 Supreme Court decision in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, holding that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA) does not preempt state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers when those claims fall within the statute’s safety exception.   The case arose from a catastrophic Illinois truck accident that left the plaintiff with severe, life-altering injuries. The central question before the Court was whether the FAAAA shields brokers from liability for negligent selection of motor carriers, an issue that has divided federal appellate courts for years. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Barrett, the Court concluded that negligent hiring claims implicate a state’s traditional safety regulatory authority and therefore fall within the FAAAA’s safety exception. While the decision confirms that brokers may face certain state law negligence claims, the Court emphasized that the FAAAA retains meaningful preemptive force and continues to provide important protections. Justice Kavanaugh, concurring, cautioned that the ruling should not be read as imposing automatic liability on brokers, noting that traditional negligence principles and proximate cause requirements remain important safeguards. Beata observes, “The Court confirmed that broker selection practices are not insulated from state tort law where safety is at issue ‒ this decision will reshape how the industry evaluates risk and compliance going forward.” She also notes that significant questions remain regarding intrastate transportation and potential claims involving shippers, making Montgomery an important development in transportation law that narrows, but does not eliminate, the reach of FAAAA preemption.

White Plains, New York, partners Michael Grady and Siobhainin Funchion obtained a defense verdict following a four-week jury trial in the New York Supreme Court, Westchester County, on behalf of their obstetrician client. The plaintiff alleged that the client improperly managed her pregnancy by failing to timely deliver an infant with intrauterine growth restriction (IUGR). In her malpractice claim, the plaintiff maintained that the delay in delivery resulted in placental insufficiency and fetal hypoxia, causing hypotonia, failure to thrive, and permanent physical, cognitive, and developmental impairments. Mike and Siobhan successfully argued that the obstetrician's management of the pregnancy complied with the applicable standard of care. Relying on the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) guidelines, they demonstrated that, in cases of isolated IUGR with normal fetal testing, delivery between 38 and 39 weeks is appropriate. The evidence established that the infant was delivered within that recommended timeframe.   Working alongside counsel for the co-defendant maternal-fetal medicine physician, Mike and Siobhan further argued that the infant’s condition was attributable to a rare genetic microdeletion that was diagnosed the year following delivery, rather than any alleged delay in delivery. The trial featured testimony from 14 witnesses, including 10 expert witnesses in the fields of obstetrics, maternal-fetal medicine, neonatology, pediatric neurology, genetics, physical medicine/rehabilitation, and economics. During closing arguments, plaintiff’s counsel sought damages ranging from $26 million to $36 million. The jury returned a defense verdict in just 23 minutes.